

THE USE OF THE IMPERFECT IN HERODOTUS

1. IN the *C.Q.* xxxiv (1940), pp. 118 ff., I wrote on 'Some Uses of the Imperfect in Greek' (hereafter quoted as 'Uses'). It occurred to me to check the suggestions there made by examining *all* the instances in one author. I had no hesitation in choosing Herodotus, who of all authors, except perhaps Homer, presents the most baffling diversity of types (I quote by chapter and the lines of Stein's annotated edition). For purposes of comparison I also read Thucydides and Xenophon's *Anabasis* 1-4. It would appear that Thucydides retains something of Herodotus' freedom, Xenophon comparatively little. That these uses are inherent in Greek and not confined to the classical period is well illustrated by the scholia to *Iliad*, 1. 52: οἱ ἐν ταύταις πίπτοντες ἐλώρια κυνῶν ἐγίνοντο, οἱ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ λοιμοῦ φθειρόμενοι ἐκαίοντο: *ibid.*: τὰ σώματα τῶν θνησκόντων πρότερον ἐκαίετο.

2. I seemed to recognize an Imperfect of 'the *Abiding Result* of a past action' ('Uses', § 2), but it was not till I had examined some hundreds of passages that I realized that this use would explain the vast majority of cases that have puzzled editors, as will be seen from the cases collected below. For instance *λείπω* is a verb which from its meaning is particularly liable to variations of tense: we may think of 'left' either as a single act or as implying an 'abiding result': compare French '(he went out, and) laissait une lettre sur la table'. To what incision and makeshifts improvised explanations can lead is illustrated by Jebb's appendix on the subject (on *Tr.* 77 *ἔλειπε* . . . *μαντεύει*). Referring to *Il.* 2. 106 f., *Od.* 11. 174, he rejects the explanation that Deianira still had the tablet, and quoting *Od.* 11. 86, *Il.* 22. 226 (in which I find no difficulty), concludes the choice was largely a matter of metre—but 'metrical convenience' cannot change *ἔλειπε* from bad to good Greek. 'The Attic poets modelled their usage on epic, profiting by the metrical convenience, and feeling that they had good warrant'—whether it was good Greek or not? Jebb omits prose writers (for 'editorial convenience'?), and makes the unlikely suggestion that 'the impf. pictured the *process* of leaving' (whatever that may be). He then quotes other puzzling cases from Homer, and now suggests the meaning 'proceeded to', a usage I cannot accept. In the note *ad loc.* we have still another explanation—the imperfect suggests the moment he *was doing* the act. We have thus three mutually contradictory explanations, all, I think, wrong: see § 8.

3. To return to Herodotus. In reporting a speech the usage is on the whole *ἔλεγε τάδε* . . . *ταῦτα ἔλεξε*, but there is no uniformity: e.g. 8. 140 ff. *ἔλεγε τάδε* . . . *ταῦτα ἔλεξε* : *ἔλεγον* . . . *ταῦτα ἔλεξαν*, but then *ὑπεκρίναντο τάδε*. So *after* a speech we have aorist in 3. 73. 11, 135. 2, 146. 1, but imperfect 3. 81. 1, 82. 1, 134. 15, 142. 22. In 1. 87-90 we have *εἶπε* seven times, interspersed with imperfects. Cf. 5. 92, οἱ μὲν ταῦτα ἔλεγον, Κ. δὲ ἔλεξε τάδε: then (93. 1) Σ. μὲν ἔλεγε τάδε (= ταῦτα), 'Ι. δὲ ἀμείβετο (imperfect as in Hom.) . . . 'Ι. μὲν τοῦτοι ἀμείψατο: (5. 93) ἔλεξε τάδε (= ταῦτα) . . . ἀμείβετο . . . ἀμείψατο: εἶπαντος . . . αἰρέετο . . . ἐπεμαρτυρέοντο. For τάδε = ταῦτα (cf. ὥδε for οὕτως, 7. 62. 8) v. Stein on 1. 137. 2. 1. 155. 2 *εἶπε* τάδε . . . ἀμείβετο τοῖσιδε: 9. 27 ταῦτα ἔλεγον: ὑπεκρίναντο τάδε . . . ταῦτα ἀμείβοντο. In 9. 46. 14 *εἶπαν* τάδε = 'spoke as follows': 9. 79. 2, *ἔλεγε* τάδε 'so he spoke': 9. 87. 2 *ἔλεξε* τάδε 'spoke as follows'. In 1. 141. 5, 13

we have ἔλεξε before and after a speech, but in l. 17 ἔλεγε . . . In the *Story*, 4. 113-15 we have ἔλεξε throughout. That τάδε εἶπε was felt to be normal in Attic is perhaps indicated by its use in psephisms (cf. Philip's tetrameter Δημοσθένης Δημοσθένους Παιανιεύς τὰδ' εἶπε). ἀμείβετο seems usual, as in Hom.; e.g. 1. 88. 12, 1. 115. 7, 1. 155. 11: εἶπε . . . ἀμείβετο, 1. 88. 10, 12; but ἀμείψαντο, 5. 110. 1 (and see above). So ὑπεκρίναντο τάδε, 9. 27. 2. An explanation is suggested by X. An. 2. 3. 21, οἱ Ἕλλ. ἀπεκρίναντο ('gave their answer') καὶ Κ. ἔλεγε . . . ('C. was their spokesman, saying'). On H.'s variations of usage in general v. Stein on 5. 12. 11, 7. 50. 3, 8. 88. 9. For ἔλεγον 'I told you so' v. 'Uses', § 14. Cf. *dicebam*, Plaut. *As.* 738, *Men.* 729, *Truc.* 332, Prop. 1. 9. 1, Ov. *Am.* 1. 14. 1, Cic. *Phil.* 2. 89, *De Or.* 1. 230, Kroll on *Brut.* 293, Sen. *Aproc.* 12: *promittebas*, Plant. *Merc.* 631.

4. 'I learnt (inquired)' is ἐπυνθανόμην as a rule (partic. πυνθανόμενος), e.g. 1. 152. 5, 1. 153. 4, 2. 8. 8, 2. 24 f. (followed by εὑρίσκε) 5. 57. 4, 5. 63. 12, 5. 92ζ. 8, 8. 36. 2, 8. 40. 13, 8. 42. 2, 8. 74. 4; the inquiry (information) belongs to the past, the result remains. No one is surprised to read ἀκούω, πυνθάνομαι, 'I hear, learn' (ὡς πυνθάνομαι, 8. 35. 10), an idiom common to most, if not all, languages (ἀκούω is found as late as Nonnus, e.g. *Dion.* 13. 124, 405), but Greek carries it to great lengths: so ἤκουον, 1. 22. 10, 1. 152. 5, 1. 153. 4, 2. 2. 29, 2. 13. 6: ἐσήκουον 1. 152. 7. In 2. 2. 30 ff. we get ἤκουον followed by ἤκουσα and again ἤκουον. In 1. 90. 1 we have ἀκούων instead of the aorist. For 'took no heed' we have οὐκ ἐσήκουον, 1. 152. 7, but οὐκ ἐσήκουσε, 1. 214. 2.

But there is no uniformity: e.g. ἐπυνθάνετο . . . πυνθόμενος δέ, 4. 167. 9, 10; ὡς ἐπύθοντο, 5. 92γ. 5, 6. 17. 2: πυνθόμενος, 3. 154. 4, 6. 108. 21, 7. 3. 5, 9. 31. 2.

5. This use of the imperfect is normal with oracles: ἐχρησθηιάζετο (εἰρώτεον, 1. 158. 2: ἐπειρώτεον, 8. 122. 2), 1. 159. 1 followed by ὁ μὲν τοῦτο ἐπειρώτα, ὁ δὲ χρῆσμον ἔφανε, 1. 53. 6, 1. 55. 2, 4, 2. 52. 9, 13 ff., but followed by ἀνείλε: so ἐχρήσε thrice 6. 19.

The use is extended to παρεγύμνον ('told'), 1. 126. 18: ἀπηγγέετο, 1. 118. 5: ἐστήμαινε, 8. 21. 9 (cf. σημαίνων τοῦτο τῷ λόγῳ, διέβαινε, 8. 62. 1): γνώμην ἐσέφερε, 3. 81. 1, 3. 82. 1: (ἐπ-)ειρώτα, e.g. 1. 88. 9, 5. 128. 1: ἐπαγγέλλετο, e.g. 3. 142. 22: and naturally συνωμολόγειν, e.g. 2. 55. 13 ('Uses', § 11): cf. ἐξονόμαζεν ('announced'), Eur. *I.A.* 1066.

6. Very remarkable is the imperfect in συνεξέπιπτον: 1. 206. 17, προσετίθειε τὸ πρῆγμα . . . καὶ κατὰ τὸντὸ συνεξέπιπτον αἱ γνώμαι, (but) Κ. ἀπεδείκνυντο (the opposite view); and so 8. 49. 7, 8. 123. 9. συνεξέπιπτε τῷ πρώτῳ ('tied with') 5. 22. 13. συνέπιπτε, 'chanced by a coincidence', 5. 35. 7, 5. 36. 2. ἐπεχείρησέ τε καὶ πάλιν ἐξέπιπτε, 5. 72. 22. (In voting) οἱ πολλοὶ συνεξέπιπτον Θ. κρίνοντας, 8. 123. 9. (These then) τοιαύτῃσι περιέπιπτον τύχησι, 6. 17. 1. συνέπιπτε, 'it so fell out', 8. 15. 5, 8. 132. 17, but συνέπεσε 9. 101. 1—yet συνέβαινε ll. 7, 9. The imperfects again seem to be of 'abiding result'.

7. The imperfect is used where we say 'had been doing' ('Uses', § 16, Kühner-G. 2. 1, p. 145). An interesting case is 9. 38. 10 ff. συνεβούλευσε φυλάξαι . . . ἡμέραι δὲ ἤδη ἐγεγόνεσαν ὁκτὼ ὅτε ταῦτα συνεβούλευε. The use is extended to the participle, e.g. 9. 110. 2 μαθοῦσα τὸ ποιούμενον, 'what had been going on'; 8. 16. 13 οὕτω ἀγωνιζόμενοι διέστησαν. Cf. Th. 4. 129 ὥσπερ παρεσκευάζοντο 'had been preparing' (= 8. 26); ibid. τραυματιζόμενος 'suffering from a wound'; X. An. 1. 4. 2, αἱς ἐπολιόρκει Μίλητον.

8. In 1. 186. 11 we get a description of the works of Nitocris: ὠρυσσε, ἐτάμετο, ὠρυσσε ('had been digging'), ἐπίμπατο, ἀνοικοδόμησε (aor.), οἰκοδόμει:

but the series is broken by *μνημόσυνον τόδε ἔλιπετο*. With all H.'s fondness for the imperfect it is a little strange to find the aorist is preferred in this phrase, e.g. 2. 134. 1, 12: cf. *στρατὸν τὸν ἔλιπομεν*, 9. 16. 19. (7. 220. 9 is different: *μένοντι κλέος ἐλείπετο*, (and Sparta's glory) *οὐκ ἐξηλείφετο*, 'by this decision glory was being left', etc.). Homer in his fondness for *κάλυψε* seems to be on the side of H. Thuc. goes to the other extreme, e.g. 2. 12, *οἱ λειπόμενοι* 'those who had been left', and so 7. 2 ult. *τὰ δὲ καὶ κατεργασμένα κατελείπετο*: he even uses the pluperfect, *εἴ τις ὑπελέλειπτο ἐξετάσαι*, 7. 33 (a common use in Hom.). The imperfect seems normal in Tragedy: Elmsley on *Held*. 710 quotes many examples. The extreme freedom of H. is well shown by 4. 135, *ἔλιπε . . . ἐλείποντο . . . λελεμμένοι . . . λειψθέντες*. In 9. 45. 17 he has *λείπεται σιτία*. (See above, § 2 and 'Uses', § 4.) Somewhat similar is the use of *ἀπηλλάσσοντο*, e.g. 1. 152. 8, 6. 87. 2, 6. 108. 27, 8. 144. 32, 9. 89. 1.

9. In telling a story H. affects the 'panoramic' imperfect, e.g. 1. 208 *προηγόρευε . . . ἐξανχώρεε . . . ἐδίδου . . . διέβανε*: 1. 116 *ἦγον . . . ἐσήμανε . . . ἔφαινε*: 1. 191 *ἐποίεε τοιόνδε . . . ἀπῆλανε . . . ἐποίεε . . . ἐποίησε*: 3. 156 *ἦε . . . κατέτρεχον . . . εἰρώτεον . . . ἠγόρευε . . . ἦγον* (for 1. 186 see § 8). 8. 113 *ἐξελέγετο . . . εἴλετο . . . ἐξελέγετο . . . αἶρέετο*. In summing up a story, 6. 19. 12 ff., *ταῦτα τοὺς Μ. κατελάμβανε . . . ἐκτείνοντο . . . ἐν ἀνδραπόδων λόγῳ ἐγίνοντο . . . ὁ νηὸς ἐνεπίμπρατο* (but *ἐνέπρησε*, 6. 75 ult.). On the interchange of imperfect and aorist generally v. Stein on 7. 123. 4, *παρελάμβανε*. Homeric examples are common, e.g. *Od.* 11. 1-4, 25 ff., 14. 418-38.

10. The imperfect is preferred with verbs of ending ('Uses', § 9): *ταῦτα εἶπας ἐπαύετο* 6. 8 ult.: *ὡς ἡ ἡμέρα ἔληγε καὶ οἱ ἵππεῖς ἐπέπαντο*, 9. 52. 3: *ἐπετελέετο 'the oracle was fulfilled'* 9. 64. 2: *τούτων δὲ τελοσμένων*, 9. 93. 27: *Δ. δὲ ὑποδεξιόμενος ἐπετέλεε*, 3. 138. 13: *ἐς ἣν ἐτελεύτῃ καταλέγων τὰς πόλεις* 7. 123. 14 (cf. *Od.* 14. 293). Thuc. 3. 104 *ἐτελεύτα τοῦ ἐπανοῦ*: 7. 6 'where the walls of the works ended', *ἔληγον*. His *τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα* may be different, 'drew to an end', normally followed by the imperfect *ἐπιγιγνομένοι δὲ τοῦ χειμῶνος*: cf. 5. 56 *τελευτῶντος τοῦ χειμῶνος πρὸς ἕαρ ἤδη*: 5. 81 ult. *πρὸς ἕαρ ἤδη ταῦτα ἦν τοῦ χειμῶνος λήγοντος, καὶ* (the 12th year of the war) *ἐτελεύτα*. Cf. 3. 79 *ἡ ναυμαχία τοιαύτη γενομένη ἐτελεύτα ἐς ἡλίου δύσιν*: 3. 108 *ἡ μάχη ἐτελεύτα ἕως ὀψέ*: 7. 34 ult. *ἡ ναυμαχία οὕτως ἐτελεύτα*.

11. *ἐκέλευε* (*ἐνετέλλετο*): 'Uses', § 8. The imperfect is described by Neil on *Eq.* 514 as normal (but nothing is implied as to whether the order is obeyed or not): cases are 1. 53. 2, 1. 90. 10, 1. 114. 13, 1. 117. 4, 15, 1. 119. 22, 1. 127. 4, 1. 189. 18, 1. 211. 4, 2. 2. 14, 2. 30. 26: but *ἐκέλευσε* 3. 129. 15, 3. 130. 5. So *ὑπετίθετο* 1. 156. 2, *παρήγγελλον* 8. 70. 1, *προηγόρευε* 1. 208. 2.

12. *ἐπεμπε* ('Uses', § 7) is a precisely similar case. It comes four times in 1. 81. Note 6. 4. 2, *ἐπεμπε βυβλία . . . ἐκέλευε τὰ ἀντιπεμπόμενα δοῦναι* (of a single occasion). In 8. 136 we have *ἐπεμψε . . . ἐπεμπε . . . ἐπεμπε*. So *ἀπέστελλε* 1. 123. 20 (Thuc. 2. 85): *ἐκάλεε ἐπὶ ξείνῃ* 9. 6. 3 (so 1. 120. 2, 1. 127. 4): *ἐξεκάλεε* 8. 79. 6.

13. It is well known that verbs of birth take a present tense: *τίκτει*, 'was mother of'. So in H. with verbs of marriage and death (v. Stein on 3. 160. 12, 5. 92β. 6). An extreme case is Eur. *I.A.* 703: *Ζεὺς ἠγγύησε καὶ δίδωσι. θνήσκω* presents special difficulties, best illustrated from Thuc. In 2. 51-53 (the Plague) we have *τὸν τε θνήσκοντα καὶ τὸν πονούμενον: νεκροὶ ἐπ' ἀλλήλους ἀποθνήσκοντες ἔκειντο: νεκρῶν πλεῖα ἦν, αὐτῶν ἐναποθνησκόντων . . . τῶν αἰφνιδίως θνησκόντων*. These may be explained as imperfect participles, *οἱ (αἱ) θνήσκοντες*. Cf. H.

4. 94. 3 νομίζουσι ἵνα τὸν ἀπολλύμενον παρὰ Σάλμοξιν: 4. 190. 1 θάπτονται τοὺς ἀποθνήσκοντας (compare the passage quoted in § 1). But what are we to say of the (plu-)perfect in Th. 8. 66 εἰ δέ τις καὶ ἀντίποι, εὐθὺς τεθνήκει? We might translate 'used to be found dead'; but what then of 8. 74 ult. (they plan to seize hostages) ἵνα, ἣν μὴ ὑπακούωσι, τεθνήκωσι, and H. 2. 65. 25 δὲ δὲ . . . ἀποκτείνει τεθνάναι ἀνάγκη? I can think of no convincing answer.

Equally difficult is Lys. *Theomn.* 1. 2 φαίνομαι τρισκαίδεκάετης ὦν ὅτε ὁ πατήρ ἀπέθνησκε. We must not try to explain too much, or we may find ourselves implying that ἀπέθανε is less idiomatic. But on the analogy of Ar. *Nub.* 49 ταύτην ὅτ' ἐγάμουν 'when I was married to her', we may suppose that what was in the speaker's mind was that he was then an orphan.

Not less strange is X. *An.* 2. 6. 15 ὅτε ἐτελεύτα (he was about 50), and 2. 6. 20 ὅτε ἀπέθνησκε (he was about 30). If on the analogy of § 10 we translate ἐτελεύτα 'came to an end', we shall have for ἀπέθνησκε the unconvincing equivalent 'became dead'!

14. Of the use of εἰσιών (*Ran.* 981) quoted in 'Uses', § 19 (= εἰσελθών), I only find one case in H., ἀπὼν ἀναπαύο, 5. 19. 6, but in Ar. *Pax* alone it occurs in ll. 49, 427, 972, 1020, 1219, 1253, 1294 (cf. *Ecc.* 130). As it is always, except *Ran.* 981, followed by a future or imperative, it seems to be a sort of attraction of tenses, i.e. *future* participle, and that passage must be translated 'as he enters'. (I have not been able to see Van Leeuwen on *Nub.* 1213.)

15. I conclude by listing some unclassified instances. It will be seen that nearly all can be readily explained on the principles expounded above. Other passages I had originally listed I omit altogether as no longer requiring explanation.

4. 28. 3 ὕδωρ ἐγγέας πηλὸν οὐ ποιήσεις, πῦρ δ' ἀνακαίων ποιήσεις πηλόν, i.e. the water disappears without result, but the fire as it burns makes mud ('abiding result').

4. 61. 7 ἐμβάλλοντες ἔψουσι ὑποκαίοντες, τὰ ὁστέα . . . ἐμβάλλοντες καὶ παραμίξαντες ὕδωρ ὑποκαίουσιν, a Scythian custom: they throw in and burn, παραμίξαντες, having first added water.

7. 95 ff. (many cases) παρείχοντο (ναῦς): where Diodorus in the corresponding passage uses an aorist (11. 3, quoted by Stein, ad loc.): and so ἐπλήρουν 8. 1. 3, 5, but ἐπλήρωσαν 3. 136. 3.

A surprising case is 1. 4. 8 εἰ μὴ ἐβούλοντο, οὐκ ἂν ἡρπάζοντο (presumably 'would not have been victims of rape').

9. 85 ἔθαψαν . . . οὗτοι μὲν οὕτω ἔθαπτον 'such was the mode of their burying'.

1. 125. 4 ἐποίηε 'did as suggested': cf. 1. 211. 4: and so 1. 114. 9 ἐδίδου (preceded by διέταξε).

8. 22. 16, 23. 1 ταῦτα ἔγραφε 'wrote the above letter' . . . Θ. μὲν ταῦτα ἐνέγραψε.

1. 178. 2 ἐπετίθετο 'attacked': 1. 127. 10 συνέμωγον 'joined battle': 1. 127. 2 ἐλευθεροῦντο: 1. 119. 20 παρέφερον 'they served up': 8. 14. 1, 8. 16. 2 διεφθείροντο: 8. 34. 6, 7 ἔσωζον 'they saved the cities in this way': 1. 211. 10 ἐδαίνυντο. I add πεπονέσται 'they busy themselves' (which I cannot explain) 2. 63. 5, and ἐνδύμενος 'clothed' Thuc. 1. 130.

16. It is noteworthy that far the greatest number of striking examples of the imperfect (including alternation with aorist), occur in Homer and Herodotus, two of the most vivid story-tellers of all time—and this, I think, suggests the clue. In their highly imaginative, picturesque style, they constantly look on an

act not as a bald historic event, but as part of a tableau or drama: they see the thing happening, or think of the continuing effects (a similar 'panoramic' effect is obtained by the Historic Infinitive in Latin—and by the Historic Present). A somewhat similar use is in the titles of plays, *Προμήθευς λυόμενος*, *Περικειρομένη* 'seen on the stage being released, shorn'. (Can we thus explain Sophron *ap. Demetrium De El.* 156, *Ἡπόλησ δὲ τὸν πατέρα πνίγων* 'whom we all know of as throttling . . .?')¹

PS. Since writing the above I have read Blass's article in *Rheinisches Museum* (1889), pp. 406–30, where, starting from Demosth. 47. 5 f., and 29. 11 f., he deduces the following rules:

- (a) The Imperfect refers to the 'quality and nature' of an action, the Aorist to its completion and result. Hence the Imperfect is normal with verbs denoting an act whose completion depends on another, e.g. *προκαλοῦμαι*, *ἀξιῶ*, *κελεύω*, *πέμπω*, followed by a *present* infinitive.
- (b) The Imperfect is used with verbs of *complete* sense, when the action is only a beginning,
- (c) also with verbs denoting the *modality* of an act, i.e. the circumstances of its performance.

These rules supplement, but do not, I think, invalidate the conclusions indicated above.

He also deals with the interesting cases (e.g. Isaeus 7. 21, Dinarch. 1. 27, Dem. *Aphob.* II. 10–13), where we have *ἀνάγνωθι* used for the first law (or evidence) to be read, *ἀναγίνωσκε* (λέγε) to those following.

Finally he deals with Plato, *Gorg.* 447 b: *αἴτιος* X. ὅδε, ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἀναγκάσας ἡμᾶς διατρίψαι, and 449 b: *ἄρ' οὖν ἐβελήσαις ἂν . . . διατελέσαι*; where he explains *διατρίψαι* as 'delay'—till now, and *διατελέσαι* as 'continue'—till the end of our talks.

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¹ In the passages quoted in 'Uses', § 23 (*Nub.* 556, *Ran.* 560), where we should translate ἦσθι simply 'ate', *Od.* 20. 19 ὅτε . . .

ἦσθι Κύκλωφ . . . ἐτάρους seems to suggest that the impf. is durative.

SOME USES OF *PRIMUS* IN NAVAL CONTEXTS¹

ALL Roman historical writers use a naval terminology based on military parlance. Ships on the move in line ahead (or astern) are an *agmen navium*,² positions in the line are *ordines*³ (like ranks in a marching column), ships in a single file are said to move *tenui agmine*⁴—in two columns are said to be *binis in ordine navibus*.⁵ In one passage the three posts in the column are described as *prima navis, media classis, extremum agmen*.⁶ To bring up the rear is *agmen cogere*.⁷

Ships drawn up in line abreast for battle are said to be in an *acies*,⁸ *frons*, as in military language, for the front facing the enemy,⁹ *ordines* for the ranks, which normally (and in the three battles described by Livy in Books 36 and 37) in battles in the open sea form a single line.¹⁰ *Dextrum cornu* and *laevum cornu* are the right and left wings,¹¹ to draw up the line is *aciem instruere*,¹² or *naves instruere*,¹³ to deploy for battle (i.e. to change formation from line astern to line abreast, from *agmen* into *acies*) is *ordinem explicare*,¹⁴ or *cornu explicare*.¹⁵ More surprising perhaps is the use of *concurrere* for to come to grips.¹⁶

Other phrases modelled on military parlance are *expeditae naves* for ships ready for action,¹⁷ the use of *copiae* for the force,¹⁸ *praetoria navis* for the flagship,¹⁹ and *castra* for the station on land, sometimes *navalia castra* to distinguish a naval from a military base.²⁰

In military parlance *primus* is frequently used by itself and with a great variety of nouns in a primarily locative as opposed to temporal sense to mean 'foremost' or 'leading' (that foremost troops also meet the enemy first in time is a secondary consideration)—*primi, prima signa, prima acies, prima frons, primi ordines, primum agmen* are expressions common to all writers; Livy writes also *primos elephantos*,²¹ and Caesar (in this sense) *prima legio*.²²

¹ This is the substance of a paper read in 1954 to the Cambridge Philological Society, many of whose members have helped me with suggestions.

² The references quoted in this note and the following ones are not meant to be exhaustive; they are merely *exempli gratia* and taken solely from historians—with three exceptions from Caesar and Livy. Livy 21. 27. 8, 22. 19. 12, 22. 22. 2, 36. 20. 8, 37. 13. 1, and *passim*.

³ e.g. Livy 36. 43. 13, 37. 23. 8, 37. 29. 8.

⁴ Livy 36. 43. 13, defined (*ibid.*) as in *ordinem singulas naves ire*.

⁵ Livy 37. 29. 8.

⁶ Livy 37. 23. 8, and for *extremum agmen* also 36. 45. 2, 37. 23. 11. Contrast Caesar, *B.C.* 3. 73. 3 *medias classes* in a different sense.

⁷ Livy 36. 44. 3, 37. 29. 7.

⁸ Livy 30. 10. 4, 37. 30. 6, etc. Caesar, *B.C.* 1. 57, 58.

⁹ Livy 36. 44. 1, *ibid.* 3, 37. 29. 5, etc. Cf. in *frontem derigere* 37. 23. 7 and 9.

¹⁰ Livy 30. 10. 19 (virtually a land battle),

37. 29. 5. Cf. Auct. *Bell. Alex.* 14. 3 for in *secundo ordine*.

¹¹ Livy 29. 25. 10, 37. 30. 6 (*laevum*), 37. 23. 11 (*dextrum*), 36. 44. 1 (*sinistrum*), etc. Cf. *ex utroque cornu* Livy 37. 28. 8 and Caesar, *B.C.* 3. 101.

¹² Livy 36. 45. 6, 37. 23. 9, 37. 29. 7.

¹³ Caesar, *B.C.* 1. 57, 58.

¹⁴ Livy 37. 23. 10, 37. 29. 7, Auct. *Bell. Alex.* 14. 1.

¹⁵ Livy 36. 44. 1.

¹⁶ Livy 26. 39. 12, 36. 44. 10, 37. 23. 9, etc. Cf. *concurso* *ibid.* 24. 9 and *impetus classis* Caesar, *B.C.* 3. 26. 4.

¹⁷ Livy 32. 16. 5; cf. *classis expedita* *ibid.* 26. 24. 1.

¹⁸ Livy 32. 17. 3.

¹⁹ Livy 26. 39. 18, 29. 27. 1, 37. 23. 8, *ibid.* 24. 4 and 6, etc. Tac. *Hist.* 5. 22 and cf. *ibid.* *praetoriam triremem*.

²⁰ Livy 30. 9. 6 *et saep.* Caesar, *B.G.* 5. 11. 7, Tac. *Agr.* 25. 1 for a joint camp.

²¹ 30. 33. 4.

²² *B.G.* 2. 17. 2.

It would therefore seem natural to expect this usage of *primus* to occur also in naval contexts in descriptions of naval operations.¹ It does in fact occur four times in Livy,² twice in Caesar³ and once in Tacitus,⁴ but of these seven instances four have been the victims of editorial conjecture and emendation,⁵ though in one case only is the manuscript tradition dubious or obscure.

(a) Livy 37. 23. 8:

Rhodii longo agmine veniebant: prima praetoria navis Eudami erat; co-gebat agmen Chariclitus, Pamphilidas mediae classi praeerat.

Here the sense is unmistakable, and the manuscript tradition has not been challenged. The locative sense of *prima* is also clear.

(b) Ibid. 29. 5:

... ni Aemilius cum praetoria nave primus in altum evectus suo quamque in ordine in frontem instruxisset.

In this instance the *primus* has been transferred to the commander, but the usage is very similar. Cf. Auct. *Bell. Alex.* 25. 4: 'cum ... Euphranor primus proelium commisisset'.

(c) Ibid. 25. 27. 11. The manuscripts read:

itaque cadente iam Euro ... prior Bomilcar movit; cuius prima classis petere altum visa est quo facilius superaret promunturium, ceterum postquam tendere ad se Romanas naves vidit ... Bomilcar vela in altum dedit.

The tactical situation is quite clear; the Roman and Carthaginian fleets were both riding out a storm, one on either side of Cape Pachynus, intending to join battle as soon as it was calm enough.

Here *prima classis*, 'the van of the fleet', is logically and tactically the necessary meaning. The phrase cannot be paralleled exactly, but *media classis* in (a) above is very close, and the military equivalent *primum agmen*, 'the van of the column', is extremely common.

The alteration of *prima* to *primo* made by Duker and accepted both by Conway in the O.C.T. and in the Teubner Text is unnecessary and makes an awkward and very ugly piece of Latin. Had Livy intended to write the adverbial *primo* here he would surely have written it after *classis* and not between *cuius* and *classis*.

(d) Ibid. 26. 39. 14. Codex Puteanus reads:

insignis tamen inter ceteras pugna fuit duarum quae primae agminis concurrerant inter se.

P1 or P2 corrected *agminis* to *agminis*, which is the reading of the later manuscripts in this tradition: *agmini* K; *agminum* Koch, accepted by Johnson in the O.C.T.

This last is surely right; not only does Johnson cite other examples of confusion in P between -s and -m, but the sense 'which were at the head of the

¹ Non-technical instances come to mind in the funeral games in Virgil, *Aen.* 5—e.g. *primus* at 194 and 318 and *prior* *ibid.* 170, 186, 326, etc., for the leader of two.

² 37. 23. 8, 37. 29. 5, 25. 27. 11, 26. 39. 14.

³ *B.G.* 4. 23. 2 and *ibid.* 25. 6. Also in

Bell. Alex. 15. 3.

⁴ *Agr.* 24. 1. The passages will be discussed in this order.

⁵ Livy 25. 27. 11, 26. 39. 14 (where the text is faulty), Caesar, *B.G.* 4. 25. 6, Tac. *Agr.* 24. 1.

columns' is much superior to the sense gained by reading *primi agminis*, especially when we discover that the ship in question on the Roman side is the *praetoria navis* of Decimus Quinctius which would naturally be in the van.¹

(e) Caesar, *B.G.* 4. 23. 2:

ipse cum primis navibus Britanniam attigit . . . dum reliquae naves eo convenient ad horam nonam in ancoris exspectavit.

As in (b) above a temporal sense is not entirely absent from *primis*, but a locative sense gives a very much more clear and forceful meaning, and can be well paralleled by *Bell. Alex.* 45. 3: 'quae primae naves subsequebantur', *Bell. Alex.* 15. 3: 'primis navibus . . . reliquam classem', and by the military passage (*B.G.* 2. 17. 2) quoted above (p. 118, n. 22).

(f) *Ibid.* *B.G.* 4. 25. 6. The manuscripts read:

hos item ex proximis primis navibus cum conspexissent subsecuti hostibus adpropinquaverunt.

Editors either bracket *primis* as Hotomann, followed by Klotz ('Teubner) and the O.C.T., write *primi* with Madvig and Rice Holmes, write *primi* and delete *navibus* as Meusel in his second edition, or suggest *proris* for *primis navibus* as Wagner.²

Certainly if *primis* does not mean 'leading' some emendation is necessary, but if it can mean 'leading' the sense is excellent as the manuscripts stand. The tactical situation is that Caesar's fleet was drawn up³ opposite the Kentish coast in readiness to land; the *aquilifer* of the tenth legion had just set his famous example and leapt into the water, followed by the entire complement of his own ship.

Caesar's fleet must have been drawn up in a number of columns, each several ships deep;⁴ the ships at the head of each column were the *primae naves*—and these were of course nearest the shore. Inevitably it was from these, and from the ones nearest to the ship of the *aquilifer* of the tenth legion that the troops hastened to follow his example—as Long pointed out in his edition of 1860, and Schneider also maintained.

Rice Holmes's objections to Schneider's account are absurd.⁵ Caesar states clearly that some of the troops were disembarked into *scaphae* and *speculatoria navigia* to help those already in the water and struggling;⁶ if all the ships were equally near the shore (being in a single line as he supposes), what was the point of this manoeuvre? Indeed, Rice Holmes's own theory of Caesar's eighty transports being in a single line cannot be accepted at all, in the light of both modern experience and what Caesar himself tells us. Apart from the point mentioned above, which certainly suggests more than one line of ships, Caesar tells us that he moved the warships away from the transports to attack the Britons on their unprotected flank with missiles.⁷ This he could hardly have done had there been a line of transports—on Rice Holmes's own admission—fully a mile long.⁸

We conclude therefore that *ex proximis primis navibus* is correct, and means

¹ Cf. (a) and (b) above and Livy 36. 44. 8.

² *Phil. Woch.* (1924), pp. 1085 ff.

³ *naves constituit* c. 23. 6.

⁴ Cf. pictures of modern landings on enemy beaches.

⁵ Caesar, *de Bello Gallico*, p. 160, note on the passage.

⁶ *B.G.* 4. 26. 4.

⁷ *Ibid.* 25. 1.

⁸ *Op. cit.* note on *ibid.* 26. 3.

'the nearest leading ships'; both *proximis* and *primis* are necessary to the sense.

(g) Tacitus, *Agricola* 24. 1. The manuscripts read:

quinto expeditionum anno nave prima transgressus ignotas ad id tempus gentis . . . domuit.

In this passage *nave prima* has been the subject of a great deal of controversy; commentators have grouped themselves in three schools; those who read *nave primā* and complain that the sense is weak or obscure, those who emend the text, and those who read *nave primā*.

To turn to the last first. The divorce of *nave* from *prima* was first propounded by Walch, quoted by Gudeman¹ who argued that the neuter plural stood for the neuter singular and meant 'for the first time'. Haverfield² had argued that it is an accusative of respect and rendered the phrase 'as regards the first part of the expedition', an idea that Mattingly³ has more recently taken up and expressed more elegantly 'he began with a sea passage'.

But had Tacitus wanted to say this, surely he could have found something better than *nave prima transgressus*? To say the least the latinity is odd, no parallels are adduced, and in any case the divorce of *nave* from *prima* must be regarded as a last resort and a work of desperation.

For it is possible for *prima* to be taken with *nave*; it is true that in all the other examples of *primus* in this sense it precedes the noun, yet examples of *primus* following its noun can be found in all the historians. Tacitus himself writes *luce prima*⁴ and *legio prima*⁵ (naming the legion), Caesar writes *luce prima* at least twice,⁶ Livy besides *luce prima*⁷ writes *de ala prima*,⁸ *ad conspectum primum agminis*,⁹ *impetum primum*,¹⁰ and in the two last examples at least *primus* is emphatic.¹¹

Many commentators who emend the text admit this too; emendations are too numerous to discuss in detail, but those who emend *nave* alone (Becker and Peter *vere primo*, Peerlkamp *aestate prima*, Semple *navigazione prima*) all agree on this position for *prima*. Other attempts consist of emending *prima*, as Wex and Rigler read *nave in proxima*, Boot *nave primum*, J. B. Bury *nave una*, or believe that *nave prima* conceals a place-name, as Peerlkamp (at another attempt) wrote *Britanniam*, Madvig *Sabrinam*, Ulrichs *maritima*, Nipperdey in *Clotae proxima*, and the writer has heard of other, hitherto unpublished, attempts also.¹²

Of the attempts to interpret we may quote Church and Brodribb,¹³ who offer four interpretations:

1. The first Roman vessel that had visited these parts.
2. The first vessel that ventured to sea in the spring.
3. The foremost vessel of the fleet.
4. The first vessel that Agricola employed.

¹ C.R. xi (1898), 328.

² C.R. ix (1896), 310.

³ Tacitus on Britain and Germany (Pelican Series), p. 74.

⁴ Hist. 2. 49, and 3. 6 and 70. Cf. the very emphatic *optimus est . . . dies primus*. Hist. 4. 42.

⁵ Hist. 2. 43, etc.

⁶ B.G. 5. 49. 5 and B.C. 3. 28. 6, also *oppidum primum Thessaliae* B.C. 3. 80. 1.

⁷ e.g. 37. 23. 6.

⁸ 27. 12. 17.

⁹ 24. 20. 11.

¹⁰ 25. 21. 8.

¹¹ Lewis and Short quote also Petronius 116, *urbem . . . Italiae primam*, where *primam* is emphatic meaning 'leading, foremost'.

¹² Apart from Bury, J.R.S. xii (1922), 57, and Semple, C.R. xliii. 214, these are discussed by J. G. C. Anderson in his edition (Furneaux and Anderson, Oxford, 1922), who expresses the view that 'no plausible emendation has been proposed' (ibid., p. 109). We may echo his view.

¹³ Macmillan, ed. 1869, note ad loc., p. 66.

Of these they reject 2 and 4 outright and of the others prefer 1 as 'grammatically simplest and best suited to the context'; no explanation of why this is so is put forward. Gerber and Greef (*Lexicon Taciteum*) prefer 2 *protinus cum nave transgredi posset*, Anderson¹ offers only 1 and 2 as possible alternatives, and expresses a distaste for both. Other minor editions have tended to follow his lead. No editor since Ritter in 1848 has favoured 3—*hoc est in navium agmine primus ipse legatus fuit*—until A. R. Burn,² who translates the passage 'crossing in the first ship'.

If we take the parallel passages from Livy and Caesar quoted above this must be seen to be the right interpretation, and there is no reason to complain of a lack of either sense or force. It is surely by now accepted by all critics that the tone of the *Agricola* is laudatory.³ Tacitus seeks to show that Agricola's achievement in Britain depended on personal leadership on campaign and judgement as a commander⁴ (emphasized at times in contrast to that of his staff).⁵ Every campaign but the fourth, which was merely one of occupation and not of advance,⁶ has specific mention of Agricola's personal leadership. In the fifth campaign the claim is made in the phrase *nave prima*; this is surely sufficient justification for rejecting the view of those who claim the phrase has no point. The truth indeed is just the opposite; the phrase makes exactly the point required by the context; its purpose is to show Agricola leading in the only way a naval commander can, by putting his own ship at the head of the line and leading the assault on the beaches. This sense *nave prima* can give—is there any other natural phrase in Latin which says as much and in so brief a compass? The writer does not think so.

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¹ Op. cit., note ad loc.

² *Agricola and Roman Britain*, 1954, p. 125. More recently also Dr. M. Duggan, *Proc. Class. Assoc.* 1955, p. 20.

³ Anderson, op. cit., *Introd.*, pp. 21 ff., and most recently Nesselhauf in *Hermes*,

lxxx (1952), pp. 226 ff.

⁴ *Passim*, especially 18. 3, 20. 2, 35. 4.

⁵ 18. 3, 25. 3 with 27. 2, 35. 4.

⁶ The view of I. A. Richmond in *J.R.S.* xxxiv (1944), 39 is surely correct.

THE ORIGIN OF THE VERANII

'VERANIUS' is an uncommon *gentilicium*, with brief and transient notice in Roman annals.¹ The earliest Veranius on record is the friend of Catullus. According to Catullus (28; 47), he was abroad on the staff of a governor while, or just after, the poet was with Memmius (*pr.* 58) in Bithynia. The governor was a Piso, clearly L. Piso (*cos.* 58), proconsul of Macedonia till the summer of 55.² Veranius, it emerges elsewhere (9. 5 ff.; 12. 14 ff.), had also been in Hispania Citerior, accompanied here too by his inseparable Fabullus. Veranius may, or may not, have been an author, identical with the Veranius who wrote on religious antiquities—who again might be the Veranius Flaccus whom Caesar Augustus derided for his affected and archaic style.³

Two senators of the name are discovered under the rule of Iulii and Claudii. Q. Veranius, *comes* of Germanicus Caesar in the eastern lands, was among those who insisted that the prince be avenged, took a share in the prosecution of Cn. Piso, and got a priesthood for his reward. Tacitus gives him prominence by naming him no fewer than five times in the company and context of P. Vitellius.⁴ As for his son, likewise Q. Veranius, 'pietas' towards the dynasty, a signal service rendered to Claudius Caesar, and (it is a fair conjecture) some help from the great master of patronage L. Vitellius, carried him much further—the first governor of the new province of Lycia-Pamphylia, *consul ordinarius* in 49, legate of Britain in 57 or 58 (succeeding old Didius Gallus), where he died before a year had elapsed, ambitious and still in the prime of life.⁵

It would be useful to have the provenance of the Veranii. Catullus knew his friend's family, at least he refers to 'fratresque unanimos anumque matrem' (9. 4). It has been supposed that Verona was their home.⁶ If that were so, they cannot be the ancestors of the senatorial Veranii, whose tribe is the 'Clustumina'—as is proved by the fact that the 'Clustumina', attached to their *nomen*, is found in families of Lycian notables which patently derive name and citizenship from grants made by Q. Veranius when Lycia was annexed.⁷

¹ All the Veranii (save, by some mishap, the friend of Catullus) are registered by A. E. Gordon in P.-W. viii A, and all instances of the *nomen* (967 f.). A suspicious feature should be noted—'Veranius' no fewer than eleven times in C.I.L. xiii. Many of these will be native in origin, and 'pseudo-Latin', cf. 'Veracius', and (sometimes) 'Veratius'. For such fabricated *nomina* see W. Schulze, *L.E.* 48 ff.; E. Birley, *Roman Britain and the Roman Army* (1953), 165 ff.

² As has generally been assumed, although some vaguely invoke M. Pupius Piso (*cos.* 61), who may not have been extant in 57/6. See now *Class. et Med.* xvii (1956), 129 ff.

³ Veranius the antiquarian, *P.I.R.*¹, V 264; P.-W. viii A, 937; Veranius Flaccus, Suetonius, *Divus Aug.* 86. 3. It is a clue to the date of the former that he was cited by Verrius Flaccus. A trace of his operations

might be surmised in the notice of the first pair of Vestal Virgins, Verenia and Gegania (Plutarch, *Numa* 10). The *nomen* 'Verenius' does not appear to exist. Münzer was puzzled and hesitated to assume that a Verania must be meant (*Philologus*, xcii (1937), 53).

⁴ Tacitus, *Ann.* 2. 74. 2; 3. 10. 1; 13. 2; 17. 2; 19. 1. Cf. further *J.R.S.* xlvii (1956), 20.

⁵ *Ann.* 14. 29. 1 (not omitting his last will and testament). For his career see now *A.E.* 1953, 251, with the exhaustive commentary of A. E. Gordon, *Univ. of Cal. Pub. in Class. Arch.* ii. 5 (1952), 231 ff.

⁶ B. Schmidt in his *Prolegomena* (1887), xlix; R. J. M. Lindsay, *Class. Phil.* xliii (1948), 44. Only one, a lady of no class, Verania Vera (C.I.L. v. 3787). Observe, for that style of 'native' nomenclature, C.I.L. xiii, 652; 12027.

⁷ Cf. A. E. Gordon, P.-W. viii A, 940. The

At first sight, the 'Clustumina' points powerfully to Umbria. A large number of communities have it, enrolled at the time of the *Bellum Italicum*. Elsewhere, two towns only, Larinum in Samnium—and Forum Novum in the Sabine country.¹

Now all Umbria can produce nothing closer to a specimen of the name 'Veranius' than a woman called Messia Veranilla.² That being so, it is legitimate to cast a glance at the Sabine country, or rather that part of it which had been in close relations with Rome and Latium from early times. Whereas the tribe 'Quirina' covers the rest of Sabinum, this tract, the south-west, is eccentric: the 'Sergia' at ancient Cures and at Trebula Mutuesca, the 'Clustumina' at Forum Novum. Moreover, a Roman historian, producing a Sabine centurion to harangue the citizen body, makes him state his tribe—'Sp. Ligustinus tribu Crustumina ex Sabinis sum oriundus, Quirites.'³ The family of Q. Veranius had property in the old Sabinum. There is no evidence for Forum Novum, it is true; but there is a tile with 'Q. Verani' at Trebula Mutuesca, and at Cures two *seviri*, descendants of freedmen of a Q. Veranius, namely Q. Veranius Sabinus and Q. Veranius Asclepiades, offered the town a public banquet in A.D. 147.⁴

For rarity, and for other reasons, the name 'Servaeus' suggests a parallel. Like 'Veranius', it is attested for the first time in the last age of the Republic—a *publicanus* in Gaul c. 74, and a man elected tribune of the plebs in 51, but condemned for bribery.⁵ Then Q. Servaeus, one of the *comites* of Germanicus, and one of the prosecutors of Cn. Piso.⁶ Finally, and the last of this family, '[Servaeus In]noc(ens)' whom the *Fasti Ostienses* disclose as consul suffect in 82, and Q. Servaeus Innocens (*suff.* 101). The *gentilicium* cannot be attached to any town or region of Italy as *origo* of these Servaei.⁷ The next senatorial Servaei belong to a later age, coming from Africa (from Sufetula and from Gighi): hence the surmise that a Servaeus had once been proconsul of that province.⁸ But they should rather belong to old immigrant stock. Africa furnishes notable instances of rare Italian *gentilia*.⁹

'Veranius' is a *nomen* so uncommon that it encourages one to link the first

best and earliest instance is *I.G.R.* iv. 914 f.—from Cibra, perhaps temporarily in his *provincia*. A close parallel are Ummidii in Cyprus (e.g. *I.G.R.* iii. 950), showing the 'Teretina', which is the *tribus* of the proconsul C. Ummidius Quadratus, of Casinum (*P.I.R.*¹, V 600).

¹ W. Kubitschek, *Imp. Rom. Trib. Discr.* (1889), 41, 55. He prints 'Clustumina' with a query. *C.I.L.* ix, citing two inscriptions (4789, 4808), omits the query. The 'Claudia' is also found there (4790). A new inscription brings no certainty—'L. Carus L. f. C[...]. M. Atius M. f. Cla[...].p.p.' (published by C. Pietrangeli, *Epigr.* ii (1940), 287, n. 5). But observe the fragment 'I Clu. VI' (*ibid.* 289, n. 12).

² *C.I.L.* xi. 4491 (Ameria).

³ Livy 42. 34. 2. For Crustumium and the tribe 'Clustumina' see W. Kubitschek, *De Romanorum Tribuum Origine ac Propagatione* (1882), 15; K. J. Beloch, *Röm. Gesch.*

(1926), 159, 174 ff., 270, etc.

⁴ *C.I.L.* ix. 6078¹ (Trebula); 4957 (Cures): the solitary instances in the volume. Note that Trebula can show a Verana P. f. Polla (4938). The *nomen* 'Veranus' is exceedingly rare. Schulze cites one other instance (*L.E.* 379, *add.*), viz. vi. 31723.

⁵ *Pro Fonteio* 19; *Ad fam.* 8. 4. 2.

⁶ *P.I.R.*¹, S 398.

⁷ Very rare. Not in *C.I.L.* i², v, ix, x, xi, xiv, and only eight instances at Rome (vi). A notable instance abroad is the *primipilaris* T. Servaeus Sabinus and his centurion son (*C.I.L.* iii. 14398; *J.R.S.* xviii. 189 = *A.E.* 1930, 109: near Iconium).

⁸ E. Groag, *P.-W.* ii A, 1755 (on the *suffectus* of 101). The African senatorial Servaei, unfortunately omitted from *P.-W.*, are *P.I.R.*¹, S 399, 400 (cf. *I.L.S.* 8978), 402, 403.

⁹ Cf. *Historia*, iv (1955), 56, discussing 'Aufustus', with a reference to 'Farsuleius', 'Fidiculanus', 'Furfanius'.

Veranius and the last, illustrating the vicissitudes of men and families, of society and government. The first Veranius emerges as client of a Piso, of that active and excellent proconsul of Macedonia whom Cicero traduced. The last, the successful *novus homo*, rose high as a client of the Caesars and gave his daughter in marriage to one of the Pisones, Piso Licinianus, who derived his lineage from the dynasts Pompeius and Crassus—and who was selected by Galba to be his son and partner in the power. Thereafter the name lingers sporadically among persons of low degree, save in Lycia, where it is perpetuated in families of the local aristocracy.

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THE AUTHENTICITY OF LUCAN, FR. 12 (MOREL)¹

IN H. R. Luard's edition of the *Chronica Maiora* of Matthew Paris the following passage occurs: 'De quo (sc. Brennio) etiam Lucanus poeta eximius sic dixit:

"Tarpeiam cum frerit arcem
Brennius",

hoc est, Capitolium'.² This sentence comes in a passage based on a portion of the *Historia Regum Britanniae* of Geoffrey of Monmouth (3. 10 ad init.), but is not itself to be found in Geoffrey. Since Luard was unable to find the words attributed to him 'in Lucan', he concluded that the chronicler who was responsible for their inclusion (he calls him the 'compiler') had made a mistake.³ He offers no suggestions about the origins of the quotation. In a posthumous work of G. Gundermann's edited by G. Goetz, *Trogus und Gellius bei Radulfus de Diceto*, we find the quotation described as 'einen angeblichen Lucanvers'.⁴ W. Morel learned of its existence from this reference and printed it as fr. 12 of Lucan:

Tarpeiam <saeuus> cum frerit arcem
Brenn[i]us.

saeuus was inserted 'ne uersus caesura careret',⁵ and the 'i' of *Brennius* bracketed since this form is 'inaudita'.⁶ Although Morel's printing of the quotation as one of the fragments of Lucan does not appear to have been challenged, a statement of several considerations which seem to support him in doing so is perhaps worth making.

(1) *The Circumstances of the Preservation of the Fragment.* That a fragment of Lucan should have come down to us as a kind of interpolation in a passage based on Geoffrey of Monmouth is surprising, but is not to be rejected as impossible. The 'compiler' was a monk of St. Albans⁷ and so had at his disposal one of the best libraries in medieval England.⁸ His knowledge of the fragment may have been derived, directly or indirectly, from a florilegium.

¹ *Fragmenta Poetarum Latinorum* (Leipzig, 1927), 130.

² *Matthaei Parisiensis Monachi Sancti Albani Chronica Maiora*, ed. H. R. Luard (Rolls Series), i (London, 1872), 59.

³ *Op. cit.* i, pp. xli, lvi.

⁴ *Ber. Sächs. Ges. Wiss., Philol.-histor. Klasse*, lxxviii (Heft 2) (1926), 5.

⁵ This is unnecessary, for the quotation, as far as it has been preserved, is in accordance with Lucan's metrical practice. There are 35 lines in the *Bell. Ciu.* which lack a caesura in the third foot. In all of these there is a word-ending after the second arsis and before the third (A. Fortmann, *Quaestiones in Lucanum Metricae*, Diss. Greifswald [Gryphae, 1909], 49). Of these lines 14 have a spondaic third foot, and with one exception

(8. 747) the word containing this foot is an adjective or participle of three syllables.

⁶ It is presumably a medieval corruption: 'Brennius' appears to be the only form used by the 'compiler' in his narrative and occurs in Geoffrey of Monmouth also; there is no mention of the form in Niese's article *Brennos* (*R.E.* iii. 829 f.). For the names 'Brenia' and 'Brinnius' see W. Schulze, *Zur Gesch. lateinischer Eigennamen* (= *Abh. königl. Ges. zu Göttingen, Philol.-histor. Klasse*, n.f. v. 5 [Berlin, 1933]), 367.

⁷ Luard, *op. cit.* i, p. xxxii.

⁸ Cf. N. R. Ker, *Medieval Libraries of Great Britain: a list of surviving books* (Royal Historical Society Guides and Handbooks, no. 3 [London, 1941]), pp. xi, 93 ff.

Another possibility is that the quotation occurred in a grammatical work where it might have been cited to illustrate the use of *frangere* in the sense of *expugnare*.¹

(2) *A Parallel in the Bellum Civile*. In support of the attribution of the fragment to Lucan we may compare *Bell. Civ.* 7. 758:

cum sibi Tarpeias uictor desponderit arces.²

It seems reasonable to suppose that the author of this line, which occurs in a passage describing the hopes of Caesar's soldiers that they will pillage Rome, was the author of our fragment which is concerned with the attack made on the city by the plundering Gauls.

(3) *The Reference to the Gallic Attack*. If the sentence in which the fragment occurred ran in this fashion: 'when Brennus has stormed the Tarpeian citadel, Rome will be humbled', there would be no need for a discussion of this topic. But if *cum* is to be rendered by 'since' or 'although', we are faced with the implication that the Capitol as well as the rest of Rome fell to the Gauls. The possibility that this is implied cannot be rejected, for O. Skutsch has demonstrated the existence of a variant tradition according to which the Capitol was captured by the Gauls.³ Now Lucan is one of the few authors who refer to this tradition:

Tarpeia sede perusta
Gallorum facibus Veiosque habitante Camillo
illic Roma fuit (5. 27 ff.),⁴

and it is tempting to regard the fragment as implying the variant tradition and to see in this confirmation of Lucan's authorship.

¹ For a close parallel to the use of *frangere* in the quotation we must turn to one of the *additamenta* to the *Chronica* of Prosper Aquitanus which are to be found in a manuscript of the late sixth or the seventh century (Vaticanus Reginae n. 2077): 'Aquileia fracta est' (*Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Auctorum Antiquissimorum Tomus IX [Chronicon Minorum Saec. IV. V. VI. VII., Vol. I],* ed. Th. Mommsen [Berlin, 1892], pp. 482, 492). Cf. Ampelius 18. 11: 'Scipio Hispaniam fregit'. The absence of parallels close to Lucan's own time may not be used as an argument against his authorship, for the usage is perfectly natural. In general see *Thes. Ling. Lat.*, vi. 1, col. 1247. 81-1248. 3 and cf. *Stat. Theb.* 9. 556: 'effractamque aperit uictoribus urbem'.

² If some such word as Morel's *saeuus* is inserted in fr. 12, the position of *Tarpeiam* corresponds exactly to that of *Tarpeias*.

³ *J.R.S.* xliii (1953), 77 f.

⁴ 'Tarpeia sede perusta | Gallorum facibus' was misunderstood by such early commentators as Omnibonus, Sulpitius, Badius, Beroaldus and Farnabius. The problem posed by the expression was in general ignored by subsequent commentators; Bourguery, the Budé editor, was apparently the first to point out (ad loc.) that the passage

implies the fall of the Capitol. I take this opportunity of discussing Varro on the subject of the Gallic attack. A quotation from the *de uita populi Romani* occurs in Nonius p. 498. 23 M. (800 L.): 'ut noster exercitus ita sit fugatus, ut Galli Romae Capitolii sint potiti neque inde ante sex menses cesserint'. All the manuscripts read 'Romae Capitolii', but with the exception of Lindsay all editors of Nonius or of the fragments of the *de uita* alter this to bring it into harmony with the traditional account of the Gallic attack (e.g. 'Romae nisi Capitolii', Popma). In view of Skutsch's article it is tempting to follow Lindsay in accepting the reading of the manuscripts, but this is inadvisable. In another fragment of the same work Varro speaks of the ransom received by the Gauls. If the Gauls were in control of every part of the city, who paid them the ransom? If any Romans continued to live in the occupied city, they would have been in no position to offer gold in return for evacuation since all their wealth would already have been taken from them. The Romans at Veii might have paid the ransom, but this seems an unlikely explanation. The fragment of Varro which refers to the ransom occurs in Nonius p. 228. 13 M. (338 L.).

(4) *The Original Context of the Fragment.* Although Morel described it as 'incertae sedis', it is possible to suggest a context in which it is not unlikely to have occurred. We learn from Tacitus that the great fire of 64 turned the thoughts of some to the Gallic attack on Rome: 'fuere qui adnotarent XIII Kal. Sextilis principium incendii huius ortum, et quo Senones captam urbem inflammauerint, alii eo usque cura progressi sunt ut totidem annos mensisque et dies inter utraque incendia numerent' (*Ann.* 15. 41).¹ I would suggest that our fragment may have come from a poem where in the course of dealing with the fire of 64 Lucan turned back to the Gallic attack. We know that the subject of the fire interested him, for we find a prose work *de incendio urbis* listed as one of his writings by Vacca. In *Silu.* 2. 7. 60 f. Statius refers to a work by Lucan about the fire which is usually, and, I think, rightly,² assumed to be the prose *de incendio*:

dices culminibus Remi uagantis
infandos domini nocentis ignis.

The work must, whether openly or covertly, have been hostile to Nero;³ indeed it seems likely that we should take the words *domini nocentis* as indicating that in the *de incendio* Lucan held Nero responsible for the fire.⁴ The disaster had put an effective weapon into Lucan's hands; is it likely that he, who was above all a poet, would confine himself to prose in his use of that weapon? In the life of Lucan by Suetonius there is mention of a *carmen famosum* directed against Nero and his friends.⁵ Marx suggested that it is of the same date as the *de incendio urbis*. We might go further and say that the *carmen* had points of contact in its subject-matter with the prose work and that while dealing with the fire in a manner hostile to Nero, Lucan looked back to the Gallic attack, comparing the destruction wrought in his own day with that which Brennus had caused.

It would be rash to describe this suggestion as anything more than a reasonable possibility, but when the other points discussed above are taken in conjunction with the fact that the reference to the Gallic attack can without difficulty be brought into connexion with Lucan's times and what we know of his works, we are surely justified in accepting the attribution of the fragment to Lucan.

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¹ Livy tells us that after the departure of the Gauls there was a proposal that the people of Rome should abandon their ruined city and migrate to Veii (5. 49. 8, 50. 8). It is interesting that the author of a couplet quoted in the life of Nero by Suetonius (39) saw in the building by Nero of the *domus aurea* after the fire a disaster which like the burning of the city by the Gauls might appropriately call forth the advice that Romans should move to Veii: 'Roma domus fiet: Veios migrate, Quirites, | si non et

Veios occupat ista domus'.

² Since Statius refers to Lucan as a writer of prose as well as of verse (21 f.) and all the other writings mentioned in 52 ff. are poems, it seems reasonable to suppose that 60 f. represent him as a writer of prose.

³ Marx, *R.E.* i. 2229.

⁴ Vollmer, ad loc., takes the words as indicating only that Statius laid the blame on Nero.

⁵ See Hosius's third edition of the *Bell. Ciu.*, p. 333. 5 f.

MAGNUS IN AMMIANUS, EUNAPIUS, AND ZOSIMUS: NEW EVIDENCE

SUIDAS, s.v. ἀνασχοῦσα (Adler A 2094):

ὁ δὲ πρῶτος ἀνασχὼν ἐκ τοῦ ὀρύγματος ἦν Μάγνος, ἀνδρώδης τε καὶ διαφερόντως
τολμητής.

This passage seems to have escaped identification so far. This is somewhat surprising, since it clearly refers to an incident at the sack of Maiozamalcha during Julian's Persian campaign which has been much discussed by editors and critics of Ammianus and Zosimus. The reason may well be that in some older editions of Suidas (e.g. Küster) the name appears as *Μάγνης*.

Magnus is referred to by both Ammianus (24. 4. 23: 'evolat Exsuperius de Victorum numero miles, post quem Magnus tribunus et Iovianus notarius; quos audax multitudo secuta . . .') and Zosimus (3. 22. 4: ὁ πρῶτος ἀναδὺς . . . ἦν δὲ Σουπεράντιος, ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῶν βικτόρων οὐκ ἄσημος, ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὲ Μάγνος, καὶ τρίτος ὁ Ἰοβιανὸς τοῦ τάγματος τῶν ὑπογραφέων προτεταγμένος, ἔπειτα δὲ πλείους). In both he appears in the tunnelling party at Maiozamalcha, and both agree that he was the second man out. In other details they disagree, and even more clearly they disagree with the extract from Suidas above. Ammianus and Zosimus, while agreeing that the first man out was a soldier of the Victores, give different versions of his name; similarly they agree that the next man was Magnus, but while Ammianus describes him as tribune, Zosimus omits his rank and title; as for Iovianus, who, both agree, was third, Zosimus describes him as τοῦ τάγματος τῶν ὑπογραφέων προτεταγμένος, Ammianus as merely a *notarius*, although later he refers to him as *primus inter notarios omnes* (25. 8. 18; cf. 26. 6. 3). In the Suidas extract, however, Magnus is promoted to be first out of the mine, receives the commendation for courage which Zosimus reserved for Superantius, and loses, as far as can be seen, the rank by which Ammianus describes him.

E. A. Thompson (*The Historical Work of Ammianus Marcellinus*, pp. 28–33) has had the last word in the varied arguments which have centred round the identity of this Magnus. He has convincingly shown that it is impossible to accept the theory that Magnus is to be identified with the historian Magnus of Carthage, who has been regarded as the real source of the campaign narratives of both Ammianus and Zosimus. The Suidas passage should confirm Thompson's findings, unless indeed we are to assume that here we have a fragment from yet a third historian who is adapting the *ἐγώ* of the original, for it is clear that the author cannot be Magnus himself. Greek historians and sophists of the fourth century may have their conceits, but not one of them goes so far as to describe himself as ἀνδρώδης τε καὶ διαφερόντως τολμητής. On the other hand, Thompson is less kind in suggesting that the lack of information about Magnus in the account of Zosimus is due to innate perversity on Zosimus' part. Unless we are to believe that the author of the Suidas extract is later than Zosimus and borrows from him while adapting freely (unlikely assumptions at best), we find that Zosimus is not alone in omitting any description of Magnus' rank from his narrative, and that he has, reasonably enough, reserved his

commendations for the first man up, as this author does. He may differ from him with regard to the name, but the general pattern of the incident is the same—position in the party first, then the name, and finally the commendation which Zosimus has compressed. The likelihood is rather that Zosimus borrowed from this author than that he was a source of information for him.

The authorship of the fragment should, almost certainly, be attributed to Eunapius. To judge even from the few words which it contains, the passage has much of the high-flown quality of Eunapius' diction; the subject-matter is part of a well-known military operation in the career of Julian about which Eunapius must have heard, considering his great interest in all that Julian did; also it is well known that Zosimus was most in debt to Eunapius (cf. Phot. *Bibl.*, cod. 98, p. 84; εἶποι δ' ἂν τις οὐ γράψαι αὐτὸν ἱστορίαν ἀλλὰ μεταγράψαι τὴν Εὐναπίου, τῷ συντόμῳ μόνον διαφέρουσαν), so that the fact that he mentions the incident allows the presumption that Eunapius did also; finally, while there may have been plenty of such information circulating in literary form in the fourth and fifth centuries, precious little of it survives in Suidas except in fragments from Eunapius.

If this attribution to Eunapius be accepted, the passage is important enough to require that both Mendelssohn's views upon the value of Eunapius as a source for Zosimus' narrative of the Persian campaign and Thompson's criticisms of them should be re-examined (cf. Zosimus, ed. Mendelssohn, pp. xxix ff., Thompson, op. cit., pp. 28–33, 134–7). Now, and for the first time, we have a reference to one and the same incident of this campaign from the narratives of Ammianus, Eunapius, and Zosimus. Mendelssohn, in default of such information, had had recourse to Magnus as the alleged source of Zosimus, and his views had provided the basis for the numerous variations of the critics with whom Thompson engages in his second chapter. Now if we examine the question in the light of the information provided by the one factual reference common to all three authors, the following results emerge. In the first place, even though Mendelssohn was constrained to apply the *argumentum ex silentio* (cf. Thompson, p. 136), this passage seems to support him to some extent when he asks how it is that the fragments of Eunapius do not correspond with the information in Ammianus. One may agree with Thompson in rejecting Mendelssohn's consequent attempt to find in Magnus the original for Ammianus and Zosimus, for Mendelssohn had in fact overstated his case in dubbing Magnus the sole original source for the various accounts of the Persian campaign. This is most clearly seen in his suggestion (cf. p. xlv, note 3; p. 128 n.) that Libanius also is in his debt for the account in *Or.* 18. In Libanius' case the suggestion is almost absurd, for Libanius can be found questioning returned survivors (*Ep.* 1220. 8), asking for access to the campaign diary of Philagrius (*Ep.* 1434), and encouraging another eyewitness, Seleucus,¹ to edit his story of the expedition (*Ep.* 1508. 6). Moreover, the time factor makes the view even less plausible, since the Epitaphius was written as early as 365 (cf. Liban., ed. Foerster, ii. 204). The utter improbability of Libanius' use of Magnus, coupled with Ammianus' remarks upon his own practice, puts Mendelssohn's thesis and its subsidiaries out of court. However, the divergences

¹ If Seleucus (cf. Seec, *Briefe des Libanios*, p. 272) is to be identified with Seleucus of Emesa (cf. Suidas, s.v.) author of a work entitled 'Perthica', then Eunapius (*fr.* 21) is not

the only one of his time to misuse the term Parthian for Persian. The parallel of *fr.* 21 with *Amm.* 24. 2. 10 would then be above suspicion.

of detail, noted above in the comparison of the present passage and those of Ammianus and Zosimus, seem to weaken Thompson's own conclusion that there is nothing to prove that Eunapius is not following Ammianus directly or indirectly in this campaign narrative and supplementing him with anecdotes from the *ὑπόμνημα* of Oribasius. Adding this passage to the four extracts of Eunapius fr. 22, which alone are used by Thompson as referring to the campaign with full certainty, we find that the discrepancy of the proper name which he had already noted in the comparison of Amm. 24. 3. 14 and Eunap. fr. 22. 3 is here reinforced by another. This cannot be merely another slip, and two such mistakes in five extracts are more than accidental. In any case, Maiozamalcha and the tunnelling operations there were famous (cf. Liban., *Or.* 18. 234-42). It would appear therefore that Eunapius also dealt with them in some detail, but that his information represents a different tradition.

It seems idle to look for other literary sources in the accounts of Julian's expedition as given by Ammianus and Zosimus. The common-sense solution is surely that both independently composed their narratives from the observation of eyewitnesses, just as Libanius did also. In the case of Ammianus the observation was mostly his own, supplemented by the information provided, as the result of his inquiries, by other survivors. This was in keeping with his usual practice (cf. Thompson, pp. 20 ff.). Zosimus adapted the narrative of Eunapius; and in the case of Eunapius, the information came, as he himself indicates, at second-hand, its inspiration being the memoir of Oribasius (fr. 8). This memoir, moreover, was not compiled immediately after the events (cf. Seck, cited by Thompson, p. 135). There would, therefore, be a broad measure of agreement, since each account was ultimately based on the main sequence of events: the lack of correspondence would arise from the fact that there were two different assessments of the events. One account is that of the soldier and expert, who may conceivably have made some mistakes in his composition thirty years after but who was capable of checking his general information and producing a coherent narrative in the light of his personal experience; the other is that of a civilian and amateur of an even later day, related at second-hand from the narrative of another civilian and amateur whose own information comes from an original composed at least a generation after the event by an eyewitness without any military qualifications. Naturally there would be, on balance, more inaccuracies and misplacement of emphasis in the second type of story than in the first, but in its general character it would not be entirely a travesty of the facts. While subscribing to Thompson's protests against the dangerous use of the *argumentum ex silentio* by Mendelssohn in criticizing the quality of Eunapius' history, one may wonder whether the same considerations should not apply to his own remarks about the lack of value to be attached to the information Eunapius gained from Oribasius. That information, good, bad, or indifferent, may well have formed the most vital part of this narrative, and there is in fact no firm evidence for any other source.

In the present instance, indeed, by comparing the passage with Zosimus' account, one may, without too much strain on the imagination, reconstruct the information received and transmitted by Eunapius. This detail, that the first man out of the mine was Magnus, would come from Oribasius' original notes. There next appeared, most likely, some mention of the rank of tribune, followed immediately by reference to the *notarius* Iovianus, with Superantius of the Victores coming third. Hence, besides the mistakes of the changed name

and the reversed order, there was yet a third error of detail possible: either Oribasius' memory let him down once again, or Eunapius, not unaware of Iovianus' high position among the notaries—he was in fact *primicerius*—erred in his transcription and read, for 'Magnus the tribune and the notary Iovianus', 'Magnus and the tribune and notary Iovianus', a title inferior only to the *primicerius* which Zosimus duly renders by the ambiguous description τοῦ τάγματος τῶν ὑπογραφέων προτεταγμένος. The lack of a definite article in the description has already been noted in Mendelssohn's critical note on the passage.

Here, then, it may be seen that Zosimus, while following the general narrative of Eunapius, is found correcting it in details which to some extent agree with Ammianus. The commendation which in Ammianus is reserved for the whole party, the *audax multitudo*, is condensed but still applied to the leader, as had been done in his main authority. However, by applying it to Superantius, Zosimus corrects the order of persons but presumably retains the same form of name. With Magnus' rank merged in that of Iovianus in the account of his main authority, it is not surprising that Zosimus can find no epithet for him. There was nothing he could say.

If this was the technique of Zosimus in this passage, some solution may again be attempted of the vexed problem of his exact relationship with Eunapius. It is inescapable that Zosimus tended to reproduce in abbreviated form the general narrative of his predecessor. That is fixed by the evidence of Photius. Up to now it has not been possible to point to any definite instance in this campaign narrative where both deal with the same event. This passage helps to fill that deficiency. Zosimus (3. 2. 4) had outlined his practice as follows: εἰρήσεται καὶ ἡμῖν συντόμως ἕκαστα κατὰ τοὺς οἰκείους καιροὺς, καὶ μάλιστα ὅσα τοῖς ἄλλοις παραλείψθαι δοκεῖ. He should, *prima facie*, be including Eunapius among τοῖς ἄλλοις, as Mendelssohn had believed and as Thompson denies. Here Zosimus is found administering a correction to a deficiency in the account of Eunapius, which is in keeping with his stated programme. Why he did not make a better job of his correction is uncertain. Possibly Superantius or Exsuperius was of such little note that his name did not occur in Zosimus' alternative sources, although the order of persons was correctly given, with an anonymous soldier of the Victores in the lead. However, the arrangement of details in this incident would indicate that it is wrong to go with Mendelssohn and to believe that Zosimus switched from Eunapius to some entirely different source for the history of this campaign, and that it is unlikely that he merely selected from Eunapius those incidents which had tended to be ignored by other writers, as Thompson suggests. If Zosimus used Eunapius and corrected him as here, the idea of Eunapius' direct or indirect dependence upon Ammianus may also be discarded, and we are a fair way towards explaining the numerous discrepancies of proper names and military movements which exist in the narratives of Ammianus and Zosimus. Most of Zosimus' mistakes are due to the errors of Eunapius or Oribasius, for which no alternative details were available to him.

In that case from where did the information come for these corrections? It seems impossible to pin him down. He refers to the large number of historians and poets—a significant combination. Perhaps a fair sample of this kind of thing would be Liban. *Or.* 18, in which the sophistic garnishing serves to obscure the factual information. In such a case, he would derive little from this corpus.

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If he used official dispatches, it is odd that he did not correct the name or insert the rank. Either there were no official dispatches to use, as Mendelssohn believed (p. xl) and as possibly could be inferred from such passages as Liban. *Or.* 1. 133-4, or, as Seeck argued, information of this detailed kind was not included in them. Another alternative, but more unlikely since Ammianus was nearer to the event in every way, is to assume that Ammianus is in error. If, on the other hand, Ammianus is to be relied upon and Zosimus had access to the information to be found in him, Zosimus' conduct here is almost inexplicable, since he but half corrects a point of detail and leaves so much undone.¹

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¹ Maenchen-Helfen ('The Date of Ammianus Marcellinus' Last Books', *A.J.P.* lxxvi. 392, n. 45) follows Thompson's suggestion of access by Eunapius to information from Ammianus, and develops it to explain the parallelism in the description of the Huns in *Amm.* 31. 2. 6-7 ff. and *Zosimus* 4. 2. 4. The view is naturally weakened by the removal of the arguments for it based on the

Magnus episode; and the use of some common source by both authors seems a more likely explanation. Neither Ammianus nor Eunapius had any personal acquaintance with the Huns apparently, and, in any case, there is little evidence for a knowledge of Latin on Eunapius' part adequate for him to be able to copy Ammianus so faithfully.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE 'CORNELIA' ELEGY¹

(Propertius 4. 11)

testor maiorum cineres tibi, Roma, colendos,
sub quorum titulis, Africa, tunsa iaces,
et Persen proavi stimulantem pectus Achilli
quique tuas proavo fregit Achille domos,
me neque censurae legem moluisse nec ulla
labe mea vestros erubuisse focos.

40

39 *simulantem* s 40 *proavus* V₂ v; *proavos* μ

The text of lines 39-40 is open to three main objections: *stimulantem pectus Achilli* cannot be construed in its context;² to refer *tuas* to *Persen* would involve a difficult, though not unexampled, change of person; and thirdly, and most serious, it is scarcely possible to believe that Cornelia could appeal to a king of Macedon to testify to the soundness of her morals.

The first difficulty is easily met in one of two ways. We may either emend *proavi . . . Achilli* to *proavo . . . Achille* (Lipsius) and translate 'Perseus urging on his courage with the thought of his ancestor Achilles', or for *stimulantem* we may read *simulantem* (with some inferior manuscripts)—'Perseus pretending to the courage of his ancestor Achilles'. In favour of the second alternative it may be said that the change involved is slighter and the resulting construction easier. But *simulantem* must have a derogatory sense³ and Cornelia is thereby made to depreciate Perseus and to detract from the achievement of her ancestor, Aemilius Paullus, who defeated him. Moreover, the lines of Silius Italicus (xiv. 93 ff.):

tum praecipiti materna furori
Pyrrhus origo dabat stimulos proavique superbum
Aeacidae genus atque aeternus carmine Achilles

seem a clear imitation of the Propertian passage. If this is so, Silius read *stimulantem* in his text and the corruption, if corruption there is, must be very early. The evidence of Silius and the superior sense of *stimulantem* point to the correctness of Lipsius's emendation.

The text of the pentameter poses much more difficult problems. Adherence to the manuscript reading and conservative attempts to emend it are both exposed to damaging criticism. If the text is retained unaltered, we must accept the sudden change to the second person without an accompanying vocative and we must admit that Cornelia appeals to Perseus. Moreover, if we read *proavo . . . Achille* in v. 39 the occurrence of the same words in the following line is intolerable, and with *proavi . . . Achilli* only slightly less so. The mockery or irony which the repetition is said to secure seems quite out of place in this poem, while the depreciation of Perseus is also increased. Again, if two lines are allotted to

¹ I am deeply indebted to Professor G. P. Goold of the University of Cape Town for his searching criticism and for several valuable suggestions. He is not responsible for what remains.

² Unless we are to regard *Achilli*, as Post-

gate suggests (*Select Elegies*, p. 235), as an extreme instance of a 'Propertian' genitive—'goadng his breast to an Achilles' courage'.

³ *Simulare* appears always to mean 'pretend to something', or 'lay claim to something one does not possess'.

Perseus, the allusion is magnified out of proportion. The lack of a vocative with *tuas* is not without parallel in Propertius¹ but in conjunction with the other difficulties affords grounds for suspicion. To alter *tuas* to *suas* avoids one difficulty only to run into another, since Perseus is then said to destroy his own house—an unlikely expression, especially in the context.² But it is the appeal to Perseus which constitutes the greatest obstacle to acceptance of the received text. Cornelia could perhaps appeal to him to testify to the valour of her ancestors, but scarcely to testify to her conduct.³ Hertzberg's suggestion that *quique* is an instance of a postponed relative and that *Persen* is the object of *fregit* is an attempt to avoid the dependence of *Persen* on *testor*, but the postponement is so harsh as to be impossible. I think it is fair to say that no conservative solution of the difficulties of this couplet so far proposed is at all satisfactory.

Munro's suggestion⁴ is of a different order. He believes that a couplet (e.g. *et qui contuderunt animos pugnacis Hiberi | Hannibalemque armis Antiochumque suis*) has fallen out before v. 39, and reads at v. 40 *quique* (= *et eo qui*) *tuas proavus*⁵ *fregit, Averno, domos*. *Averno* will then refer to the last exploit of Hercules, the rescue of Theseus from Hades, and Perseus will think of two of his ancestors, Achilles and Hercules. Yet, despite the attractiveness of the suggestion, the allusion is rather obscure and the sense given to *quique* difficult. Richmond, accepting the loss of two verses before v. 39, proposes to read *Achive* instead of *Averno*. In this case *qui* will refer to Aemilius Paullus and *Achive* to his (supposed) conquest of Greece to which Virgil refers in *Aeneid* 6. 839. This is in some ways an improvement upon Munro's text but, since Paullus defeated Perseus, we should have to suppose that he is included in the subject of (e.g.) *contuderunt* and then mentioned separately in v. 40. This seems to me very harsh.

The great merit of Munro's proposal is that, apart from introducing a vocative, it provides a verb upon which *Persen* depends and thus avoids the necessity of supposing that Cornelia appeals to a king of Macedon. On the other hand it is clearly unnecessary that Cornelia should refer to the defeats of Hannibal and Antiochus in order to show that her conduct has been worthy of a censor's wife. We may, however, eliminate the appeal to Perseus by a different method.

I suggest that vv. 39–40 have been displaced from their original position following v. 30 and that *Persen* depends upon *loquuntur*. The manuscript reading of vv. 29–32 is as follows:

si cui fama fuit per avita tropaea decori
et Numantinos regna loquuntur avos:
altera maternos exaequat turba Libones,
et domus est titulis utraque fulta suis.

30

30 et LPDV₁Vo (a)era F₄V₁uv

¹ Five instances are collected by Butler and Barber on 2. 9. 15–16. It is true that in four of the cases the second person pronoun is used, not the adjective, a construction which seems to me somewhat easier. The remaining instance occurs in the notoriously difficult 'Pactus' poem (3. 7) and there *tua* . . . *assa* (v. 11) is followed in the next line by *tibi*.

² Santen's *te, Perseu*, in v. 39 provides a vocative, but the reference to Perseus is very abrupt, and Cornelia is still said to appeal to Perseus.

³ Schuster (*Philologus*, lxxxix [1926], 478) does not meet this objection. Postgate (*Select Elegies*, p. 236) writes: 'it is quite in keeping with Propertius' manner to appeal to the conquered as witnesses to the conqueror's glory'. This is true, but irrelevant here.

⁴ *Journal of Philology*, vi. 53 ff.

⁵ This is the reading of v and, if *proavos* is nominative, of μ also; in all probability, therefore, it stood in the text of N, which is lacking for vv. 17–76 of this elegy.

In this passage Cornelia is describing her ancestors' achievements and it is not unnatural for her to refer to Perseus as an instance of their success. Here the correct reading of v. 30 is vital. *et* is clearly corrupt and (*a*)*era* . . . *regna* cannot both stand. The simplest correction is that of Scaliger—*AFRA* for *AERA*—which is adopted by Butler and Barber, and by Barber in the recent Oxford text. If this is correct, my suggestion cannot stand since the kingdoms of Africa can hardly be said to tell of Perseus. But Baehrens objected that *Afra* and *Numantinos* do not go well together and that the reference to the destruction of Carthage is contained in v. 38. Although perhaps not conclusive these objections are weighty and the emendation must be considered doubtful.¹ It is permissible, then, to consider the other solutions proposed. Housman's analysis of the passage is worth quoting.² '*aera* again', he writes, 'is no interpolation, since it cannot be construed; and *era* will explain the corruption *et*. Now as to the original sense of the verse there can be no doubt; it was "*nobis fama per avita tropaea decori est*": the *si cui* of the hexameter, as Baehrens says, admits of no other sequel. We may write

aera Numantinos nostra locuntur avos

"the spoils of armour in our house tell of our ancestors who took Numantia." The first three letters of *nostra* might be absorbed in the last three of *Numantinos*, and the remaining *tra* corrected into the first word that came to hand.³ Richmond⁴ has suggested an additional reason for the corruption of *nostra* to *regna* and has found confirmation in the *era* of a manuscript of the *c* class. It is true that Housman preferred to read (with Baehrens) *nostra*. . . . *signa* on the grounds that *aera* could well be a relic of *nostra*, i.e. *nīra* and that *regna* and *signa* are sometimes confused in manuscripts, but *aera* in the sense of *tituli aeneis litteris* (Richmond) rather than 'spoils of armour' seems preferable to *signa*, 'statues'.⁵ In either case *tropaea* in v. 29 should be taken literally. Whichever of these two readings is adopted vv. 39–40 follow naturally upon v. 30,⁶ if we read Richmond's *Achive* in the pentameter. As an alternative to referring this to the conquest of Greece it is, I think, possible (though less likely) that it may allude to the actions of Aemilius Paullus in Epirus—certainly *tuas fregit domos* would be only too true.

I suggest, then, that vv. 29 ff. should read as follows:

<i>si cui fama fuit per avita tropaea decori</i>	29
<i>aera Numantinos nostra loquuntur avos,</i>	30
<i>et Persen proavo stimulantem pectus Achille</i>	39
<i>quique tuas proavus fregit, Achive, domos:</i>	40
<i>altera maternos exaequat turba Libones</i>	31
<i>et domus est titulis utraque fulta suis.</i>	32

¹ Housman characteristically called it 'incoherent'. I cannot see that Claudian, *Laus Serenae*, vv. 42–43, affords any support for the emendation *Afra: claram Scipiadum taceat Cornelia gentem | seque minus iacet Libycis dotata tropaeis* may refer equally well to vv. 38 and 43.

² *Journal of Philology*, xxii. 108.

³ *Sexti Properti quae supersunt omnia* (1928), Adn. 16, p. 394. 'pentameter praecedens ad caesuram habuit litteras—*ros urgea*—t; itaque post—*nos* facile potuit scribi *urgea*, illud postea

in *regna* mutari.'

⁴ This view is supported by the reference to *titulis* in vv. 32 and 38. I cannot accept Palmer's original view that *aera nostra* means 'family coins', although the surrender of Perseus to Aemilius Paullus is depicted on a *denarius* of Paullus Lepidus (Sydenham, *The Coinage of the Roman Republic*, No. 926).

⁵ This is true also if we accept Hoppe's conjecture *atra* which Schuster prints in the Teubner edition.

It would be rash to claim that in such a vexed passage I have restored exactly what Propertius wrote, and I would admit the possibility of further corruption in the pentameter (v. 40); but the removal of vv. 39-40 allows verses 37, 38, 41, 42 to run smoothly and the sense at vv. 29 ff. is unexceptionable, provided Scaliger's *Afra* is not accepted. One possible objection to the transposition would be that it allots three lines to Cornelia's paternal ancestors and only one to the Libones, thereby destroying the balance. But such a balance would be an hypothesis, and the truth of the matter is that the Libones had no comparable achievements to boast of.

ille sua nata dignam vixisse sororem	
inrepat, et lacrimas vidimus ire deo.	60
et tamen emerui generosos vestis honores	
nec mea de sterili facta rapina domo.	
tu, Lepide, et tu, Paulle, meum post fata levamen,	
condita sunt vestro lumina nostra sinu.	
vidimus et fratrem sellam geminasse curulem:	65
consule quo, festo tempore, rapta soror.	
filia, tu specimen censurae nata paternae,	
fac teneas unum nos imitata virum.	

65-66 post 60 Koppiers, post 46 Richmond, post 98 Housman, Postgate.

The dissatisfaction of scholars with the position of vv. 65-66 is well summed up in the words of Butler and Barber (ad loc.): 'this couplet forms such a glaring interruption to Cornelia's address to her children, that it is hard to believe that it is in its correct place.' The problem is where to put it. The solution has, I believe, already been found by Koppiers despite the general rejection of his proposal. Butler and Barber remark that 'Koppiers placed it [i.e. this couplet] after 60, led thereto by the repetition thus secured of *vidimus*. But it is wholly inappropriate after *lacrimas vidimus ire deo*'.¹ Personally I agree with Koppiers that the repetition of *vidimus* is a distinct gain, but a difference of opinion on this point is understandable. There are, however, strong grounds for making the transposition and positive gains secured by it to be set against any disadvantage in the repetition. In the first place it is hard to see what force *tamen* is to have if v. 61 follows directly after v. 60. Butler² in his note to v. 61 writes: 'Yet (sc. *young though I was*) well did I merit . . .'; but it is impossible to extract this sense from the preceding lines. Transfer vv. 65-66 to follow v. 60 and all is clear: *tamen* refers to *rapta soror*—'I was carried off before my time . . . and yet I had three children.' Moreover *rapina* is the first occurrence of the word in this unusual sense and it seems proper that *rapta soror* should precede and prepare the reader for *rapina*. Again, *et* in v. 65 is an example of the very common postponement of non-enclitic conjunctions and we should translate 'I also saw' and not (as Butler in the Loeb edition) 'My brother also I saw . . .'. This seems to indicate that the *vidimus et* of v. 65 followed the *vidimus* of v. 60. It should not be overlooked that Propertius is very fond of epanalepsis.³ This occurs naturally most frequently within the couplet, but there are several examples of a word in the pentameter being repeated at the beginning of the

¹ I know of Koppiers's arguments only from Butler and Barber (ad loc.).

² *Sexti Propertii Opera Omnia* (1905), p. 398.

³ See M. Platnauer, *Latin Elegiac Verse*, pp. 33 ff.

following hexameter.¹ Propertius has also an example, very similar to the present one, where the repeated word begins a new sentence, i.e. 4. 1. 56-57 . . . *moenia* lacte tuo! | *moenia* namque. . . . There is one further consideration which suggests that Koppiers is right. If we transpose the couplet, we secure a perfectly coherent train of thought. In v. 55 Cornelia addresses her mother, Scribonia, and then passes naturally to her mother's former husband, Augustus (v. 58). Next she turns to Augustus' daughter, Iulia, who is her half-sister. After this, if we adopt Koppiers's transposition, Cornelia mentions her own brother before addressing her sons, her daughter, and finally her husband. The remainder of the elegy is concerned with her husband and her children. The logical place, therefore, for Cornelia to mention her brother is after v. 60; and while we must, of course, beware of forcing logic upon Propertius, there seems nothing to be gained by the poet in forsaking the natural order. When all considerations are taken into account, the scale, I suggest, comes down in favour of the transposition.

Since writing this article I see that Enk (in a review of Barber—*J.R.S.* xlv (1955), 242) suggests that vv. 65-66 should follow v. 62. Although this is an improvement on the received text, it still leaves *tamen* (v. 61) unexplained and is definitely inferior to Koppiers's proposal.

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¹ e.g. 1. 11. 28-29 *litora* discidium |
litora . . . ; 1. 10. 16-17 *possum* aperire fores |
et possum . . .

*AN WITH THE FUTURE: A NOTE

THE use of *άν* with the future indicative (and the corresponding participle and infinitive) is admittedly rare in post-Homeric Greek. In the passages concerned many deny the usage completely and either omit the particle or resort to emendation (*δη, αἶ, ἄρα*, etc.), or dismiss the construction as a mere anacolouthon. In an instructive article in the *Classical Quarterly*, xl (1946), Moorhouse argues in favour of retaining many of the readings, and it is only his interpretation that is in question here.¹ His main thesis is that in Homeric Greek, where the usage is common enough, *κε* or *άν* with the future means either 'in that case' (where a condition is stated or implied) or 'probably' (where there is no such condition). The latter usage, however, he regards as sometimes assuming a tone of dogmatic certainty ('ironical meiosis'), and this 'emphatic future' came to be the regular and literal meaning of the later idiom, without any irony being involved.

But it may be remarked that:

(i) Even in the later instances a condition is often stated by means of a subordinate clause or participle, or implied by such adverbs as *οὕτως* (or simply by the context itself), and *άν* may then perhaps be understood in its purely conditional or 'anaphoric' sense ('in that case'). Among the examples cited by Moorhouse the following have a condition stated: Pind. *Ol.* 1. 108 (*ει*), *Nem.* 7. 68 (*μαθών*); Thuc. 1. 140 (*ἀπισχυρισάμενοι*), 2. 80. 1 (*ἤν*); Xen. *Cyr.* 7. 5. 21 (*ὅταν*); Plat. *Ap.* 29 c (*ει*); the following have a condition implied: Aeschin. 2. 6 (*ἐπ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ*), 2. 11 (*οὕτω*). Rather more vague, but not altogether absent, is the conditional implication in Eur. *Hel.* 448; Thuc. 6. 66; Plat. *Apol.* 30 b. In all these cases the function of *άν* is to point to and emphasize the conditionality, whether explicit or implicit.

(ii) It is from this anaphoric usage that Moorhouse's apparently modal meaning is derived; for where the condition referred to is neither clearly stated nor definitely implied, but is left only vaguely and generally understood, it is to be translated 'in some event', 'if/when the occasion arises'. But it is to be noted that the anaphoric feeling of *άν* still remains and that, though conditionality of some kind is indicated, the verb may, within its own sphere, be as strong as ever; for it is one thing to define or limit the application of a verb and another to weaken the force of the verb itself in the manner of the auxiliaries 'may', 'might'. However the particle is translated, whether narrowly ('in the relevant circumstances') or more extensively ('in general'), there is no real understatement here, and generally speaking, where meiosis and irony are detected, these lie, if anywhere, in the verb itself (as for example where the optative is used) and not in the addition of *άν*. Thus Moorhouse is wrong in rendering *μελήσει κε* in *Il.* 17. 515 as 'haply they will be the care of', and *καὶ κέ τις ὦδ' ἐπέει* in *Il.* 4. 176 as 'thus may one speak', if these phrases imply any lack of force in the Greek expressions; and he is particularly at

¹ A favourable view of the construction is also held by Raeder (*Ein Problem in griechischer Syntax—Die Verbindung der Partikel άν mit Futurum*, *Danske Hist.-filol. Medd.*, 33. 5,

Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1953), whose judgement is based mainly on an examination of the texts independent of a study of meaning.

fault in taking Nestor's forthright $\delta \delta \epsilon \kappa \epsilon \nu \kappa \epsilon \chi \omega \lambda \acute{\omega} \sigma \epsilon \tau \alpha \iota$ in *Il.* 1. 139 as understatement and therefore—as in the context he is compelled to do—as ironical, and similarly $\tau \acute{\alpha} \chi \alpha \kappa \epsilon \nu \epsilon \delta \omicron \nu \alpha \iota$ in *Il.* 22. 42. All these cases illustrate in fact the implicit conditional meaning already described and attributed by Moorhouse himself, quite correctly, to *Il.* 1. 523, 9. 167, and other passages, where he admits that 'there can be no question of watering down the future'.

(iii) This interpretation applies both to the Homeric and to the post-Homeric instances, and it is difficult to see any difference of meaning and emphasis between them. In the former it is a mistake to look for understatement, still more for irony, and Moorhouse himself in effect throws doubt on the interpretation of some of his potential and ironic examples, and greatly weakens his case, by placing them *also* in the vaguely anaphoric class: e.g. *Il.* 1. 139 (mentioned above), 4. 176. Equally mistaken is the search for 'emphasis' in the latter, except to the extent that such expressions as 'in any case' may be regarded as emphatic; and even so the route by which this meaning is arrived at is a very different one from that so circuitously traced by Moorhouse. Besides, in some passages this 'strong' interpretation is far from appropriate: Demosth. 19. 342 (450) $\tau \omicron \upsilon \varsigma \delta \tau \iota \omicron \upsilon \nu \acute{\alpha} \nu \epsilon \kappa \epsilon \acute{\iota} \nu \omega \pi \omicron \iota \eta \sigma \omicron \nu \tau \alpha \varsigma$ 'those who are likely to (rather than 'sure to') do anything to him'; Isocr. 8. 81 $\tau \acute{\alpha} \mu \epsilon \nu \pi \iota \kappa \rho \acute{\omicron} \tau \alpha \tau \alpha \kappa \alpha \iota \mu \acute{\alpha} \lambda \iota \sigma \tau' \acute{\alpha} \nu \upsilon \mu \acute{\alpha} \varsigma \lambda \upsilon \pi \eta \sigma \omicron \nu \tau \alpha \pi \alpha \rho \alpha \lambda \epsilon \acute{\iota} \psi \omega$ 'I shall pass over those things that are likely to, may well, are of a kind to, hurt you'.¹

¹ The view taken here is a traditional one, held in different forms by Kühner, Meillet, and Schwyzer, besides Goodwin, Monro, and Chantraine, quoted below. The clearest case of the anaphoric use is in conditional sentences, and this may be regarded as the logically basic application. It is common in Homer, where $\kappa \epsilon$ and $\acute{\alpha} \nu$ are found in protasis and in apodosis, with varying idiom, in many kinds of condition and also in the corresponding conditional relative sentences; here the particle belongs strictly to the main clause, and its use in the subordinate clause may well be due to transference of position, as has been recently suggested by Howorth (*C.Q.*, n.s. v (1955), 72–93), though he does not treat fully of the future indicative construction. Similar is the usage, also found in Homer, where there is a reference to some condition stated or implied in an accompanying parallel clause, whatever be its mood and whether the verb to which $\kappa \epsilon$ or $\acute{\alpha} \nu$ is itself attached be indicative, subjunctive, or optative. Chantraine (*Grammaire Homérique*, tome ii, § 332) maintains that the joining of $\kappa \epsilon$ and $\acute{\alpha} \nu$ to the subjunctive is 'ancien et naturel' and that the future indicative use is due to a natural tense-confusion, but without sufficient argument; at all events, the indicative type must be accepted. Goodwin (*Moods and Tenses*, § 401) speaks of $\kappa \epsilon$ 'giving to each [clause of a conditional sentence] more distinctly its force as protasis and apodosis', and Chantraine (op. cit., § 311) translates

the particles 'alors, dans ces conditions', remarking that 'elles soulignent un cas particulier' (see also §§ 322, 507–8). The reference to 'a particular case', also indicated by Monro (*Homeric Grammar*, 2nd ed., § 362, etc.), must be doubtful—at any rate if general or recurring conditions are thereby meant to be excluded. But the conditional meaning is clear, and still holds in Attic in all the constructions in which $\acute{\alpha} \nu$ is found—the future indicative with $\acute{\alpha} \nu$ in main clause (the usage we are chiefly concerned with here) being simply a vestige of a normal Homeric idiom. It is unfortunate that the term 'modal' is sometimes applied to these particles (e.g. Chantraine, op. cit., §§ 326, 453, etc., *L.S.J.*, s.v.), since it may too easily be taken to imply some weakening of the force of the verb, and even their description as 'potential' is apt to be likewise misleading. Neither in Homer nor later have they any modal force in this sense at all; and though the particles are often used together with the subjunctive and optative, and often must be, their use and meaning and that of these moods are strictly independent and are to be studied separately. Illustrative of the confusion is the article on $\acute{\alpha} \nu$ in *L.S.J.*, where the future indicative with $\kappa \epsilon$ is taken to mean 'will likely', and the subjunctive with $\kappa \epsilon$ 'will (emphatic), if . . .', though the meaning in the latter case is said to be 'the same as with the future indicative'.

(iv) In two special cases an effect of certainty may be achieved. If the positive $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ means 'in certain instances', the negative $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ means 'in no instances'. The well-known $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon}\delta' \tilde{\alpha}\nu \eta\tilde{\xi}\epsilon\iota$ of Plat. *Rep.* 615 D means not 'he possibly won't come', but 'there is no possibility that he will come', all conditions and possibilities whatever being excluded. Such a denial of possibility is not only stronger than the mild negative ('may not') but stronger even than the categorical negative ('will not'); emphasis is thus achieved, but as a matter of logic, not of concealed or lurking irony.¹ The point is of some importance, because, very noticeably, a fair number of Moorhouse's examples, both Homeric and post-Homeric, are in fact of the negative kind. There are also a number of interrogatives—a class to which the same principles apply. Of Moorhouse's Homeric instances, for example, *Od.* 17. 547 (in which $\kappa\epsilon \dots \alpha\lambda\upsilon\tilde{\xi}\epsilon\iota$ is translated 'like to escape') is negative, as are *Il.* 8. 404–5 and 9. 61–62, both of which are explained as ironical meiosis. Of the post-Homeric instances the following are negative: Plat. *Euthyd.* 287 c, *Rep.* 615 D; Lys. 1. 22; Philemon, *fragm.* 91 (Kock); Soph. *Ant.* 390 ($\sigma\chi\omicron\lambda\eta$); Aristoph. *Nub.* 1157; Thuc. 6. 66 ($\eta\kappa\iota\sigma\tau\alpha$); Plat. *Apol.* 30 B, *Phaed.* 61 c; Xen. *Cyr.* 2. 1. 3, *Comm.* 2. 2. 3; Isaeus 1. 23; Herodas 6. 35–36. The following are interrogative: Plat. *Euthyd.* 287 c (also negative); Aristoph. *Nub.* 465; Callimachus, *H. to Zeus* 93–94; Theocr. 27. 38. In some cases the negative itself is strengthened: Plat. *Euthyd.* 287 c ($\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon}\delta' \tilde{\alpha}\nu \acute{\omicron}\tau\iota\omicron\upsilon\nu$), *Phaed.* 61 c ($\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon}\delta' \acute{\omicron}\pi\omega\sigma\tau\iota\omicron\upsilon\nu \tilde{\alpha}\nu$); Lys. 1. 22 ($\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon}\delta\acute{\epsilon}\nu \tilde{\alpha}\nu \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\lambda\eta\phi\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$);² Aristoph. *Nub.* 465 ($\acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha \gamma\epsilon \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau' \tilde{\alpha}\nu \acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega \pi\omicron\tau'$) and others. Of Moorhouse's thirty passages eleven are anaphoric, thirteen negative, and four interrogative; the interpretation of some, such as Plat. *Euthyd.* 287 c (negative or interrogative) and Thuc. 6. 66 (negative or anaphoric), may be in doubt, but twenty-six of his thirty instances seem to fall somewhere or other within these three classes.

Apart from these special usages it must remain doubtful whether the future with $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ can in any way be regarded as emphatic. The safest conclusion would seem to be that (i) the general range of meaning belonging to the Homeric idiom belongs likewise to the Attic, which is not, therefore, possessed of quite such a 'peculiar sense' as Moorhouse maintains. In both there is not so much mere potentiality or understatement as an implication of conditions and determining circumstances—an implication which, when placed in a negative or interrogative context, gives rise, literally and logically, to an expression of certainty.³ (ii) The construction should be regarded as parallel to $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ with the

¹ Where $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ is taken in a weaker or narrower, rather than a stronger, sense, irony may conceivably be intended; but when it is, and if ever it is (M.'s Attic instances include no clear examples, as he himself admits), the meaning of the words themselves, as opposed to their rhetorical nuance, remains unaffected.

² The future optative with $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ is extremely rare. Here it is in Oratio Obliqua and corresponds to an original future indicative with $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$, but in other contexts it should probably be emended to an aorist indicative, optative or—it may be suggested—future indicative (e.g. Lyc. 15, Plat. *Legg.* 719 D). Keith in *C.Q.* vi (1912), 121–6, wishes to make it

expressive of intention or likelihood ($\delta\acute{\epsilon}\xi\omicron\iota\sigma\theta\epsilon \tilde{\alpha}\nu$ 'you would be prepared to, likely to, receive') and in fact regards it, and not the indicative, as the *fons et origo* of the participle and infinitive constructions (the indicative construction he rejects altogether). But (a) better attested cases of the optative with $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ are required to establish its validity (K. evidently accepts this usage even in Homer); (b) the meaning of intention, according to the view put forward, is equally possessed by the indicative construction, and the optative has thus not a 'peculiar sense'; (c) the indicative construction is not a 'mere anomaly'.

³ Cobet (*Variae Lectiones*, 2nd ed., pp. 92 ff.), who rejects the construction, thinks,

imperfect and aorist indicatives; here irony could hardly be employed at all, and the one use of *ἄν* may well help to elucidate the other. Moorhouse does not make use of or discuss the analogy.

Only Moorhouse's own citations have been mentioned; but other possible cases may be similarly interpreted: Thuc. 8. 25, anaphoric (*εἰ*) (cf. 2. 80-8, 3. 94); Xen. *An.* 2. 5. 13, anaphoric and also in negative context; Plat. *Phaedrus* 227 B, negative or interrogative, *Crito* 53 C, anaphoric or negative, *Rep.* 492 C, anaphoric. It is not denied that particular cases may require emendation, but the construction itself, as being both a neat and a natural one, well deserves recognition and reinstatement—though along rather different lines from those which Moorhouse suggests.

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like M., that *ἄν* with the future belonged to the *plebeius sermo*. But the evidence is not conclusive, and rather than being a colloquialism

it may well be taken as an archaism with a poetical or dignified nuance.

AESCHYLUS, *CHOEPHORI*, 61-65

ῥοπή δ' ἐπισκοπεῖ δίκας
 ταχεῖα τοὺς μὲν ἐν φάει,
 τὰ δ' ἐν μεταχμίῳ σκότου
 † μένει χρονίζοντ' ἄχῃ βρύει,†
 τοὺς δ' ἄκραντος ἔχει νύξ.

61 δίκας Turnebus, δίκαν M. ἐπισκοπεῖ O. Mueller. 62 τοὺς e scholio Turnebus:
 τοῖς M. 64 χρονίζοντ' ἄχῃ βρύει M.: χρονίζοντας ἄχῃ Dindorf: χρονίζοντα βρύει Ahrens:
 χρονίζοντ' ἀτυχή Hermann. ἄχῃ ex ἄχει corr. M.

All past interpretations of this passage involve an obscure train of thought. There appear to be two ideas running right through; light—twilight—night, and quick—slow—(never?). But how are we to combine these ideas so as to make sense of them?

Most, if not all, past commentators have agreed in taking ἐπισκοπεῖ to mean 'punishes';¹ and most interpretations conform to one or other of the following patterns:

- (i) The first two lines concern swift punishment here on earth; the third and fourth concern a second form of punishment that both takes longer and is in some way worse than the first; while ἄκραντος νύξ (or ἄκρατος νύξ) implies some kind of 'eternal night'—i.e. Hell, as opposed to Purgatory.²
- (ii) The second interpretation agrees with the first about the first four lines, but says that ἄκραντος νύξ implies that the sinner is punished after death. Wilamowitz and Groeneboom support this interpretation, and they compare Theognis 205 ff., Aesch. *Eumen.* 267, etc.³

The first of these explanations involves an impossibly obscure train of thought. Cryptic Aeschylus may be, but not as cryptic as this. If the first punishment is immediate, and the second delayed, one would expect the third to be punishment that is delayed even longer, i.e. never comes; and one's first idea seems to be borne out by the use of the word ἄκραντος. Wilamowitz and Groeneboom would perhaps agree to this, but they would say that in the third case the sinner dies before he can be punished; but all the same he is punished—after death. The objection to this is that ἄκραντος ἔχει νύξ implies not merely that the sinner is not punished before death; it implies he is not punished in death either. The plain implication of ἄκραντος is 'not punished at all', and if Aeschylus had meant to imply punishment after death, or punishment visited on the next generation, it would have been necessary for him to add a few words of boding import.⁴

Hermann stood out against the common opinions, and gave the following interpretation: 'Sed conversio iustitiae subito respicit hos in luce (i.e. sed iustitia subito se convertit in hos qui in luce versantur: Clytaemnestram et

¹ So does the scholiast.

² See Plutarch, *M.* 564 e (quoted in full by G. Thomson, ad loc.).

³ Cf. also Solon, fr. 13 (Bergk), 29-32.

⁴ It might be possible to take the passage to mean: 'Some sinners are punished at once:

others are lucky enough to remain unpunished for a good long time, or even to die unpunished.' In this case the passage would no longer concern the sureness of eventual punishment, but rather the power of τύχη.

Aegisthūm intelligit); alii inter lucem et tenebras infelices morantur (infelix exsilio Orestes); alios (Agamemnonem) cassa nox tenet.' The great merit of Hermann here is that he did at least try to fit this passage into its dramatic context; but his interpretation still involves a hopelessly obscure train of thought, as Paley (ad loc.) pointed out.

I think that the true explanation may be that ἐπισκοπεῖ here means 'watches over', in the sense of 'protects, assists'. This is just as likely a meaning for the word as the other suggested meaning (see L.S.J.).¹ We can now interpret on the basis of the preceding line and a half:

τὸ δ' εὐτυχεῖν,
τόδ' ἐν βροτοῖς θεὸς τε καὶ θεοῦ πλεόν.

'Good fortune is a god and more than a god among mortals.' Then: 'Only those fully in the light can get revenge at once; others, in the twilight, have to wait; others, held by the night of death, can do nothing at all.' A horribly pertinent comment.

This fits the context well. The general sense of the preceding ten lines (together with the passage itself) is as follows:

'Alas, the house is darkened by the murder of my master. My lord Agamemnon,² once all-powerful, is now removed. One is afraid. Good fortune is a god and more than a god among mortals. Only those in the light can obtain justice swiftly; those in the twilight have to wait, and those who are in utter darkness can do nothing.'

Then the continuation (66 ff.):

'I know the blood-guilt is firmly established, and that the libations I bring have no power to wash it away. But I am a slave and am compelled to perform this unjust task; though secretly I weep for my lord's *helpless plight* (ματαιοῖσι δεσποτῶν τύχαις).'

It remains to find a satisfactory emendation for line 64, which is unmetrical and nonsensical. This is a very uncertain matter, but I would suggest either (i) Hermann's emendation (possibly with ἀτυχεῖ dative instead of the neuter plural?): μένει χρονίζοντ' ἀτυχῇ (cf. *Agam.* 847 τὸ μὲν καλῶς ἔχον ὅπως χρονίζον εὖ μενεῖ), or else possibly (ii) μένει χρονίζοντας ἄκη (though I have some doubts as to the suitability of the word ἄκος). βρύει seems to be an interpolation from βρύειν in line 70. An overall reason for the corruption might be that some one wished to read the idea of the inevitability of punishment into the passage.

Possibly in line 62 we should read τοῖς μὲν (with M), and take ἐπισκοπεῖ as a general statement of the watch of justice, and τοῖς μὲν ἐν φάει as a single phrase³ depending closely on ταχεῖα. The neuter plural in line 63 is a metrical necessity, but it perhaps serves to bring out the vague futurity of the twilight avenger.

It may seem strange that the dead Agamemnon should in this ode be both powerful enough to send bad dreams, and yet at the same time felt to be

¹ Compare Aesch. *Suppl.* 402-6, noting also 381-6.

² I take σέβας as 'abstract for concrete' for Agamemnon; this is necessary in view of the phrase ἀμαχον . . . τὸ πρῶν which is

attached to σέβας.

³ If τοῖς μὲν is preferred, it is not necessary to take τοῖς μὲν ἐν φάει as a single phrase.

powerless.¹ But such juxtapositions of the superstitious and the rational are by no means uncommon in tragedy; they contribute to its peculiar power and depth. Reasoned despair may curb the omnipotence of fancy.

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¹ See Aesch. *Choeph.* 131 and 315-31; his own solution seems to be that, although the dead man has vengeful power, only a live man can put this power into effect.

THE AGENNENSIS (LIVY 21-25)¹

THE purpose of this article is to set down the results of a careful examination of certain readings contained in Books 21-25 of the Codex Agennensis of Livy (Mus. Brit. Harl. 2493), to consider the significance of these readings in the textual tradition of Livy 21-25, and to discuss briefly a point raised by Professor G. Billanovich in his recent article on the Agennensis.²

I

A full and detailed collation of the readings of this important manuscript was carried out by the late Professor Walters and Professor Conway for the Oxford Classical Text edition of Livy Books 21-25.³ There are, however, a few instances in which a close examination of the Codex throws some doubt on the readings cited by the O.C.T. In most of these cases the discrepancies are comparatively unimportant, but on one or two occasions, where the Editors have based the choice of a reading for their text on the authority of the Agennensis, that authority does, in fact, prove to be non-existent. For example:

21. 8. 6	<i>for</i> <i>muris</i> <i>A</i>	<i>read</i> <i>muros</i> <i>A?</i> , <i>muris</i> <i>A?</i> <i>in ras.</i>
22. 39. 18	<i>resistas</i> <i>A</i>	<i>resistat</i> <i>A</i>
60. 14	<i>faciet</i> <i>A</i>	<i>faciet. Et</i> <i>A</i>
23. 21. 1	<i>T. Otacili</i> <i>A</i>	<i>Otacili</i> <i>A</i>
24. 16. 13	<i>quis</i> <i>A</i>	<i>qui</i> <i>A?</i> <i>quis</i> <i>A?</i>
22. 2	<i>seruitu onus</i> <i>A</i>	<i>seruitudinis</i> <i>A</i>
29. 6	<i>auertere</i> <i>A</i>	<i>uertere</i> <i>A</i> , <i>auertere</i> <i>A?</i>
25. 41. 3	<i>quod</i> <i>A</i>	<i>quo</i> <i>A</i>
41. 13	<i>Sulpicio</i> <i>A</i>	<i>Sulpicio urbana</i> <i>A</i> , <i>Sulpicio</i> <i>A?</i>

Similar errors are also found in the O.C.T. citations from *N*. For example:

21. 5. 5	<i>for</i> <i>ciuium</i> <i>CMDN</i> , <i>ciuium</i>	<i>read</i> <i>ciuium</i> <i>CMD</i> , <i>ciuium</i> <i>suorum</i>
	<i>suorum</i> <i>A</i>	<i>AN</i>

In the collation of *D*, too, a number of errors have been overlooked. For example, in 22. 49. 4 *DAN* all read *equites tum* for *equitum*, while in 24. 45. 4 those three manuscripts read *agebat* for *aiebat*. A more comprehensive examination of these codices would, without doubt, reveal further discrepancies. In the case of *A* those set out above form only a small proportion of the errors in citation that have been observed.

II

The Codex Agennensis contains approximately 350 readings in Books 21-25 that do not occur in any of the earlier manuscripts. Many of these are merely examples of common manuscript errors, such as transposition in word order,

¹ For the facilities granted me for the study of this codex I must express my thanks to the Department of Manuscripts of the British Museum, and also to the Sheffield University Research Fund for their generous assistance.

² G. Billanovich, 'Petrarch and the Textual Tradition of Livy', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, vol. xiv (1951), 137-208.

³ The sigla adopted by the O.C.T. are used throughout this article.

misspelling of unfamiliar proper names, or general carelessness and inaccuracy. However, a large number of these readings are clearly deliberate attempts at emendation where the existing tradition seemed corrupt or unsatisfactory. Some of the conjectures attempted are highly ingenious but manifestly improbable; but many of them are sound and undoubtedly provide the true reading. These corrections reflect an excellent knowledge of Latin and a high degree of intelligence, work worthy to precede that of Petrarch, who, as Professor G. Billanovich has shown, was responsible for the corrections inserted in the Agennensis in the fourteenth century.

The most important of these readings are set out below:¹

22. 1. 18 conferre cuique *A*; conferrent quique *PCM*; conferrent quinque *C⁴D*
 7. 10 dispertiti *A*; dispraeti *PCRMD*
 10. 2 qui cis Alpes *A*; qui uicis Alpes *PCRMD*
 23. 6 plus *A*; prius *PCRMD*
 31. 11 diceretur *A*; caederetur *PCRMD*; crederetur *C²*
 38. 11 caute ac consulta *A*; cautaea consulta *P*; cauta ea consulta *ea*
C; cauta at consulta *ea R*; cautae ad consulta *M*; capte consulta *ea D*
 48. 2 praeter consueta *A*; praeterita *PCRMD*; praeter *C¹*
 49. 9 consul, Tu *A*; consulto *PCRMD*; consulta *R³M⁵*
 53. 3 admodum adolescentem *A*; admodum *PCRMD*
 23. 9. 7 tremunt *A*; sustineren *P*; sustinerem *R²M*; sustinere *M²*; sustinerent *CRD*
 24. 8. 10 curam *A*; suram *PCR²M*; uram *BD*
 36. 3 idem fere tempus *A*; item for tempus *P*; idem forte tempus *P²CRMB*; idem tps forte *D*
 25. 32. 5 uerus *A*; uetus *CM¹*; uenus *PRMBD*
 41. 13 Sulpicio *A*; pupio *PRMBD*; publico *C*

These corrections appear in two other manuscripts that are of approximately the same date as the Agennensis, namely, the Laurentianus Notatus (*N*) and the Alatri Fragment. Billanovich, in the article mentioned above, has shown that there was a very close connexion between these three Italian codices. In addition to the evidence set out by Billanovich, there are numerous examples of significant errors found for the first time in these three manuscripts. For example:

21. 13. 4 iam aut arma uos *AN*; uos iam aut arma *CM*
 22. 35. 7 quem iam antea mandatus honos non gessisset *AN*; mandatus honos quem iam non antea gessisset *PCRMD*
 59. 5 trucidatis nostra *AN, Alatr.*; nostra trucidatis *PCRMD*
 59. 12 armari seruorum audio *AN, Alatr.*; seruorum audio armari *PCRMD*
 60. 2 turbe ac in foro *AN*; turbe ac informe *Alatr.*; in foro ac turbae *PCRMD*
 23. 31. 9 accilius *AN*; otacilius *C*; topacilius *P*; tacilius *MD*

¹ Further examples can be found in the apparatus criticus of the O.C.T., vol. iii: 21. 3. 1, 24. 5, 58. 9; 22. 3. 4, 4. 1, 4. 2, 10. 2, 24. 1, 27. 4, 39. 18, 40. 8, 56. 2, 60. 9; 23. 5.

11. 34. 11; 24. 7. 8, 8. 4, 20. 4, 20. 10, 39. 6, 43. 9, 48. 8, 48. 13; 25. 12. 15, 15. 7, 16. 3, 18. 9, 29. 4, 30. 3, 41. 2.

25. 8. 13 segnis eius mora suspecta esse *AN*; suspecta esse iam segnis mora eius *PCRM²BD*

The exact relationship between these three manuscripts is uncertain, but the fact that *A* contains passages that are omitted in *N*, in circumstances where the omission could hardly have been made good by conjecture, while similarly *N* contains passages omitted in *A*, proves that neither of these two manuscripts could have been derived from the other. For example:

21. 22. 3 et parua Ilergetum manus ex Hispania, ducenti *A*, *om. N*
 22. 10. 3 tum donum duit populus Romanus *A*, *om. N*
 23. 7. 3 nec pacta: illa insuper quam quae pacta erant facinora Campani ediderunt *N*, *om. A*
 25. 15. 7 propter obsides nuper interfectos *A*, *om. N*

Similarly, omissions in the Alatrinus of words that occur in *A* and *N* prove by internal evidence that neither the Agennensis nor the Notatus can have been derived from it. For example:

22. 46. 5 Hispano . . . mucronibus *AN*, *om. Alatr.*
 49. 7 culpae (cladis) *AN*, *om. Alatr.*

On the other hand, the Alatrinus does not seem to have been derived from either the Agennensis or the Notatus. Both these manuscripts contain separate errors that are not found in the Alatrinus. For example:

22. 45. 6 copias suis *Alatr. A*; copiis suis *N*
 49. 1 funda grauiter *Alatr. A*; grauiter funda *N*
 59. 13 sitis *Alatr. A*; *om. N*

and,

22. 49. 8 aliquid *Alatr. N*; aliquot *A*
 49. 11 patere *Alatr. N*; patireque *A*
 60. 4 praediis *Alatr. N*; praesidiis *A*

From this it may be concluded that the Agennensis, the Notatus, and the Alatrinus were all independently derived from a common exemplar.

Almost all these emendative corrections appear in the Notatus, while the Alatrinus contains both the examples that occur in the chapters for which it is extant. This is clear proof that these corrections were the result of a revision of the common exemplar from which *A*, *N*, and the Alatrinus were derived. It is logical to connect this revision with the sudden and widespread growth of an Italian tradition for these books of Livy at the beginning of the thirteenth century, and to assume that the exemplar, which must have been of French origin, as descended from the Puteanus, was carefully and fully corrected, probably in Italy, in preparation for the transcription of the earliest Italian copies of this group.

There are some indications that the Notatus, at least, was directly copied from this revised exemplar. In 22. 1. 18 it reads *conferre cuique quique*, thus preserving part of the uncorrected reading as well as the correction. Similarly, in 22. 23. 3 *N* gives the uncorrected reading *prius*, with the letters *ri* deleted in *punctis* and the letter *l* written above them in the original hand. It contains further examples of conflation between the corrected and uncorrected reading. In 22. 59. 1, where the reading *principes* of *PCRM²D* has been corrected to

princeps, *N* reads *princepes*, while in 25. 32. 5, where the meaningless *uenus* of *PRMBD* has been corrected to *uerus*, *N* reads *uērus*, i.e. *uenrus*.¹

It seems *prima facie* improbable that the errors in word order, causing nonsense, that are a significant feature of this group of manuscripts appeared at the same time as the corrections. There is one passage that throws some light on this point. In 27. 35. 7 the misplacement of *mandatus honos* after *quem iam* renders the sentence unintelligible. Accordingly, the word *cuiquam* that precedes *eorum praeter Terentium consulem* has been emended to *quisquam* and *erat* inserted between *consules* and *quem*, in order to make some kind of sense out of the passage. This alteration, presumably carried out by the author of the other corrections, indicates that the transpositions occurred at some time before the corrections, and also that when the corrections were inserted in the exemplar of *A*, *N*, and the Alatrinus, the manuscript from which the exemplar, along with the Bambergensis and Cantabrigiensis, was copied was not available for reference. This would fit in with the theory that the exemplar was originally copied out in France,² during which process the errors of transposition occurred, and was then taken to Italy and corrected there.

Billanovich maintains that the emendations with which Petrarch corrected Books 21-25 of the Agennensis were purely conjectural.³ This is true in the great majority of cases, but there are three instances where it seems that Petrarch must have had recourse to some other, and older, manuscript. In 22. 27. 8 he restored the sentence *Q. Fabio . . . habuisset*, which had been omitted by *A*; in 23. 7. 3 he restored the sentence *nec pacta: illa . . . ediderunt*, which *A* had omitted, and at the same time corrected the initial word *nec* to *hec*; and in 35. 33. 5 he filled in the lacuna caused by the omission in *A* of the words *erat quippe . . . Romanis*, though in so doing he inserted a superfluous *ducibus*, so that the corrected text would read *ab Romanis ducibus erat, quippe tam paucis . . . semper Romanis ducibus erit*. Now Petrarch could not have obtained these readings from the other manuscript known to have been in his possession, the Parisinus Latinus 5690, because a careful comparison of this codex with the Agennensis indicates, as has already been implied by Billanovich,⁴ that Books 21-25 of the Parisinus were copied directly from the Agennensis after the latter had been partially corrected by Petrarch. In these five books the Parisinus follows the reading of *A* very closely and where it does deviate from it, it is nearly always to follow some correction of Petrarch. There are no cases of a true reading, such as could not have been arrived at by conjecture, being found in the Parisinus at a point where the Agennensis is in error. Moreover, in 21. 16. 5 the completely unnecessary conjecture of Petrarch *primum Hamilcare deinde Hasdrubale nunc Hannibale* has been incorporated into the text, but in the process the word *duce*, with which the original text of the Agennensis resumes, has been omitted by the scribe and subsequently written in the margin. Also, in 23. 7. 3, where *A* has a lacuna that was filled in by Petrarch, the Parisinus has a partial lacuna; the words *hec pacta: illa insuper quam quae* were originally omitted, and *alia insuper quam quae* subsequently written in.

Some information about the manuscript that Petrarch must have used can be gathered from a consideration of the three passages noted at the beginning

¹ Also, possibly, 21. 35. 11 publica CMDA; lubrica publica *N*.

² Evidence for the French origin of the Bambergensis and the Cantabrigiensis is


given in O.C.T. vol. iii, p. xix and C.Q. xi (1917), 73.

³ Loc. cit., pp. 146, n. 2, 175.

⁴ Ibid. p. 176, n. 1.

of the preceding paragraph. The lacuna in 23. 7. 3 occurs only in *A*, and not in *N*, while the lacunae in 22. 27. 8 and 25. 33. 5 occur in *A* and *N*, but not in *D*. On the other hand, the lacuna in 22. 33. 5 *exierat* . . . *obsides*, which occurs in *A*, *N*, and *D*, but not in *R*, is left untouched by Petrarch. It seems, therefore, that the manuscript in question must have belonged to the older French group of codices and its descent should be traced back to a point on the stemma between *R* and *D*. It can be concluded, then, that Petrarch had access to a third text of Books 21–25, in addition to the Parisinus and the Agennensis, though it may not have actually been in his possession and he does not seem to have studied it in great detail, as he leaves uncorrected a number of small omissions in *A* and *N* where the sense is not seriously affected.¹

In the light of the evidence set out above the following stemma can be drawn up for these manuscripts:



In this stemma, *y* will represent the corrected exemplar from which the thirteenth-century Italian manuscripts were copied, *z* will represent the manuscript which Petrarch used for filling in the three lacunae, while *A^p* will represent the Agennensis as corrected by Petrarch.

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¹ e.g. 22. 37. 8 *missili telo om. AN*; 23. 20. 6 *reliquum om. AN*.

NOTES ON CLAUDIAN

Fescen. de Nupt. Hon. i. 6-24:

Te Leda mallet quam dare Castorem;	
praefert Achilli te proprio Thetis;	
victum fatetur Delos Apollinem;	
credit minorem Lydia Liberum.	
tu cum per altis impiger ilices	10
praedo citatum cornipedem reges	
ludentque ventis instabiles comae,	
telis iacebunt sponte tuis ferae	
gaudensque sacris vulneribus leo	
admittet hastam morte superbior.	15
Venus reversum spernit Adonidem	
damnat reductum Cynthia Virbium.	
cum post labores sub platani voles	
virentis umbra vel gelido specu	
torrentiorem fallere Sirium	20
et membra somno fessa resolveris;	
o quantus uret tum Dryadas calor!	
quot aestuantes ancipiti gradu	
furtiva carpent oscula Naiades!	

'Prince, lovelier than the flashing star', says the Poet Laureate to his Emperor; 'Leda would rather have produced thee than Castor, Thetis than Achilles; Delos prefers thee to Apollo, Lydia to Bacchus.' Then follows a passage describing the effect on nature of the Emperor's going out to hunt: 'the beasts will gladly fall to your spear, the lion will be proud to die at your sacred hand. Venus scorns Adonis returned to life, Diana Hippolytus'. How are these two lines (16-17) to be connected in sense with the rest? Why these two statements in the present indicative when we have been in the future since line 10 and revert to the future again in l. 18, where we are told that after the hunting, when he seeks rest, 'the Dryads will burn for him, and the Naiads steal kisses'?

The sudden intrusion of the present tenses at ll. 16 and 17 has caused some solicitude in the past. The second hand in P alters them both to present subjunctives, and some of the later (14th and 15th cent.) manuscripts take their cue from this; Heinsius also.

But perhaps the right solution is to suppose that ll. 16-17 have fallen from their proper place in the list of divinities after l. 9: 'Delos prefers you to Apollo, Lydia to Bacchus; Venus scorns Adonis, Diana Hippolytus'. Then follows a passage in which all the verbs are future, divided into (1) 'what will happen when you hunt' (10-15), (2) 'what will happen when you rest from hunting' (18-24).

It seems possible that the loss might occur from the presence of two pairs of lines, the first of which ends with *em* and the second with *um*, together with a final word in each pair which is not unlike the corresponding word in the other (*Apollinem-Adonidem*: *Liberum-Virbium*).

Epithal. Hon. et Mar. 144-8:

prorupit gurgite torvus
semifer; undosi verrebant brachia crines;
hispida tendebant bifido vestigia cornu,
qua pistrix commissa viro. ter pectora movit;
iam quarto Paphias tractu sulcabat harenas.

Venus wishes to be carried across the sea to Neptune's palace. So one of the *Amores* goes in search of Triton. He finds him pursuing Cymothoe—in vain; but he shall have her as a reward, says the boy, if he will come to Cyprus to act as ferry for Venus. And so *prorupit gurgite*. This, I think, means 'he burst forward in the water', not 'he uprose from the abyss' (Loeb); for *ter . . . harenas*, 'he swam three strokes and landed with the fourth on Cyprus', would be abrupt without some indication that he entered the water again after coming out of it.

Next, what does *vestigia* mean? It ought to mean 'tracks', 'traces'; but how can tracks be shaggy? The Delphin and the Loeb take it to mean 'feet' or 'hooves' (*feribat pedes hirsutos cornu bisulco*, Delph.). But what right have we to take *vestigia* in this sense? Barthius saw a further difficulty: *quomodo*, he asks, *pedes bisulcos adscribit Tritoni, qui piscis est inferiore corporis parte*? May we not solve the problem by divorcing *hispida* from *vestigia* and attaching it to *brachia*: 'his wavy' (or 'watery'?) 'hair swept his shaggy arms'? For the pause after each of two consecutive first-foot dactyls, cf. *In Eutrop.* 481.

A fish-monster can, I suppose, make tracks in the sea, as the wind can (cf. *In Ruf.* 1. 73), or as a serpent can on land; cf. *Carm. min.* 52. 8 of the twiform giants, half man, half serpent, *stridula volventes gemino vestigia lapsu*. 'His tracks', 'his wake', then, 'was extending out with the aid of the fish's tail', lit. 'the horn divided at the point where the fish was joined to the man'.

Finally, having started him on his journey in these clauses, the poet can quite naturally add: 'three breast-strokes, and with the fourth he was there'.

De Cons. Man. 6-8:

ex alta mortalia despicit arce.
at tamen invitam blande vestigat et ultro
ambit honor.

Virtue mocks at Fortune and scorns mortal things from her high citadel. *at tamen*¹ carries the apparently invariable sense of 'but at any rate', 'but at least', the Greek δ' οὐν. This sense cannot stand here. We must take *tamen* with *invitam*: 'but, unwilling though she is, fame tracks her down'.

Stil. Cons. 1. 51-52:

vix primaevus eras pacis cum mitteris auctor
Assyriae.

Primaevus is here taken to mean 'a young man'; '*iuvenis ephebus*' (Delph.). But I do not think it can be used in this sense. Its proper sense is 'in one's first age', i.e. 'young', not 'in one's first age after childhood'; e.g. Ammianus uses it with *adulescens*, thus suggesting that the two words were not in Claudian's time

¹ The reading *hanc tamen* (pace Heinsius) in one 13th-century manuscript and one early edition.

synonyms. 'You were scarcely *young* when you were sent' is not sense; and I suggest that for *vix* we read *vir*.

Stil. Cons. 1. 172-6:

Illyricum peteres; campi montesque latebant.
vexillum navale dares; sub puppibus ibat
Ionium. nullis succincta Ceraunia nimbis
nec iuga Leucatae feriens spumantia fluctu
deterrebat hiems.

Wherever Stilicho went with his army he covered the whole earth or sea. He was not deterred by Ceraunia or storms. Every editor (except the Loeb editor) prints *nullis* in l. 174. Only Burman (and Birt after him) has compunctions; for, says he, *si nullis nimbis succincta essent Ceraunia, quae terroris causa?* And he inclines to accept a gloss in an Oxford manuscript that *nullum* is right, meaning *nullum sociorum tuorum*. *deterrebat* would certainly be happier with an object expressed, as the Loeb editor points out. He reads *nullas* (sc. *puppes*).¹ But *nullum*, I believe, is the object. We cannot make sense of it, however, until we have correctly translated *vexillum* in 173. Everyone has been misled by Barthius, who explained it by *vexilli propositio: indicium belli*: i.e. 'if you gave the signal to your fleet'. But *vexillum* here means 'a squadron', as it does at *In Eutrop. 1. 254*; and *dares* means *mitteres* (cf. *Bell. Gild. 246 non puppe data, non milite misso*): 'if you sent a naval squadron'. Then with *nullum* we understand *vexillum*. The gap since the last use of *vexillum* may seem long, but it is nothing to the gap at 280 between *bellum* and *civile* (sc. *bellum*) or at *IV Cons. Hon. 334* between *hostis* and *inclusum* (sc. *hostem*).

Stil. Cons. 2. 147-51:

a milite parcus
diligetis; neque enim neglectas pace cohortes
tunc ditas cum bella fremunt. scis nulla placere
munera quae metuens illis, quos spreverit, offert
serus et incassum servati prodigus auri.

Claudian is commending Stilicho's generosity to his soldiers in peace as well as war. The only subject for *offert* is the word *metuens* which has to mean 'a man in fear'. Claudian nowhere uses the present participle as a noun in the nominative, except, of course, for *amans*. Even in other authors in classical Latin this use is very rare. Apart from *amans* and some instances in lists, such as Cicero's *probus improbum, pudens impudentem*, where the addition of the adjectives as nouns, or other contrasted participles in oblique cases, obviously helps us out, I find no example in Kühner-Stegmann² except *rediens* once and *timens* once, both in ante-Augustan Latin.

I suggest that Claudian wrote *qui spreverit. quos* might well have arisen from the proximity of *illis*. I take *illis* as looking back to *cohortes* (148): 'you know that those gifts do not please which a man who has in the past despised the military offers to them through fear.'

¹ Barthius apparently takes *nullis* as obj. of *deterrebat*: '*nullis deterrebat*', he says, '*frustra*

hic haereas'. On the contrary, *eo magis haereo*.

² The other examples there are errors.

Pan. Prob. et Olybr. 81-84:

Hic ligat axe rotas; hic sub iuga ferrea nectit
cornipedes rigidisque docet servire lupatis.
ipsa, triumphatis qua possidet aethera regnis,
adsilit innuptae ritus imitata Minervae.

The goddess Roma is about to journey by air to the Alps to visit Theodosius. *Hic* and *hic* refer to her two slaves, *Impetus* and *Metus*, who are putting her chariot together and harnessing the horses to it. Then she herself *adsilit*. It seems unlikely that this means 'she soars aloft' (Loeb), still more that it means *exsultat* (Delph.). The former was no doubt dictated by the clause *qua . . . regnis* (a reading approved by Heinsius): 'she soars aloft on the road by which she takes possession of the sky' (Loeb). This is the best that can be done with *qua*.¹ But the main objection to it is that, from the context, Roma has clearly not yet left the earth. Ll. 85-99 describe her clothes, helmet, and shield. Then *iam simul emissis . . . fertur equis* (100). Whether *simul* means that she releases both her steeds together, or (more likely) 'and now at the same moment' (sc. 'as the horses are ready')—i.e. looking back to 82—in either case these words imply that she has not started on her journey till l. 100. Surely, then, *adsilit* must mean 'she leaps on to the car'.

What then of *qua*? There is no need to read it. We may accept the well-attested reading *quae*. The relative clause simply prepares us for an aerial journey: indeed the suddenness of the words *dividuis clarescunt nubila sulcis* (102) suggests that we already know by then that she is travelling by air.

But can *regnis* be right? The general sense must surely be that Roma takes possession of the *air* now that she has triumphed over the *earth*. But *regnis* cannot mean the realms of earth as opposed to the realms of air. I suggest that we should read *aethera terris*. This may have been written *aetheris* and so caused the alteration to *aethera regnis*.

De Bell. Gild. 162-3:

distantibus idem
inter se vitiis cinctus.

Could Claudian use *cinctus* of a man's relation to his vices? I think not. *cinctus*, when used metaphorically, seems always to mean either 'hemmed in by', or 'girt with' as in *balteo castitatis c.* It is natural to speak of one's *virtutes* as a protection, not of one's *vices*. Nor again can one imagine what could be meant by saying that Gildo was *hemmed in* by his vices. According to Claudian he suffered from no inhibitions at all. Did not Claudian write *tinctus*? He is a simple writer, with a small and unambitious vocabulary; and *this* metaphor, of the dye, is sufficiently trite to be his; cf. *In Ruf.* 2. 505 *vitiisque inolevit imago*.

In Eutrop. 1. 476-7

quanti foedabitur aevi
canities.

Barthius comments on *canities*: *veneranda antiquitas*. He ought to have said *antiqua venerabilitas*, as is clear from his citation, *IV Cons. Hon.* 505, which means: 'the laws resume their ancient *venerability* or *sanctity*'. The translators

¹ See Shackleton Bailey, *Propertiana*, p. 202.

have been misled by Barthius: the Delphin gives *quanti temporis antiquitas contaminabitur* and the Loeb editor, more ingeniously, but less probably, 'how the reverence due to all *past ages* will be impaired'. *quanti aevi canities* surely means 'the white hairs' (i.e. the revered persons) 'of how long an age'. For *canities* of persons cf. *Carm. min.* 17. 30, where the two filial brothers are praised for *tollere canitem*, 'rescuing their aged parents'.

In *Eutrop.* 2. 24-30:

induerat necdum trabeas; mugitus ab axe
redditus inferno, rabies arcana cavernas
vibrat et alterno configunt culmina lapsu.
bacchatus per operta tremor Calchedona movit
pronus et in geminas nutavit Bosphorus urbes.
concurrere freti fauces, radice revulsa
vitant instabilem rursum Symplegada nautae.

The shock of Eutropius' consulship was preceded by an earthquake. It is described in the verbs *vibrat*, *configunt* ('dash together'), and *movit*. Chalcedon was shaken, and the Bosphorus *nutavit*. What does this mean? 'Hung doubtful over the two cities'? But that sense is at variance with *configunt culmina*, and even more so with *concurrere freti fauces*. Finally how can *pronus*, which evidently means 'headlong', be reconciled with *nutavit*? I feel sure that if Claudian had intended a metaphor so frigid as this notion of the waters in suspense before they swept over the two cities, he would not have spoilt it by using so many other words in the vicinity which run counter to the metaphor.

Did he not write *undavit*, 'swelled in waves over' or 'inundated'? He is fond of the verb in this sense, and I suggest that it might at some time have been changed to *nudavit*, and so later 'emended' to *nutavit*.

De Bell. Get. 384-5:

ne vos longe sermone petito
demorer, exemplum veteris cognoscite facti.

Stilicho is trying to check the rebellion of Italians which has arisen from the victories of the Goths in Italy. He warns them that Rome can still punish revolts (382-3). He then cites from Italy the defeat of Hannibal, etc. But what of *longe*? This six-hundred-year-old *factum* is certainly *longe petitem* if *longe* means 'drawn from long ago'. Birt would accept the *longo* of the Brussels manuscript and alter *petito* to *peritos*; but *longe* was evidently corrupted in that manuscript by the proximity of *sermone*. *Longe* means (as the Loeb editor says) 'from far in distance'; 'not to delay you with a tale taken from distant peoples', but from your own past. This is sense; but since we want stress on 'your own', perhaps Claudian wrote not *veteris*, but *vestri*.

Carm. min. 8(69): *De Polycaste et Perdicca*:

Quid non saevus amor flammaram numine cogat?
sanguinis affectu mater amare timet.
pectore dum niveo miserum tenet anxia nutrix,
illicitos ignes iam fovet ipsa parens.
ultrices pharetras tandem depone, Cupido;
consule iam Venerem: forsan et ipsa dolet.

This epigram is presumably about a picture or statue representing Perdiccas and Polycaste. The story¹ was that he fell in love with his mother. He is sitting with his head in her lap. The commentators all seem to assume that the *mother* here finds herself falling in love with the *son*, presumably because they think that *fovet ignes* in line 4 means 'she conceives a passion'.

But there is no need to suppose that Claudian is altering the story: *fovet ignes* means that the mother, while holding him in her bosom 'fosters illicit passion in him'. I am assuming that the mother knows of the passion, as Hippolytus knows of Phaedra's; and what is meant is that the mother fears to love her son with the proper show of maternal love for fear of stimulating his sexual passion for her. This is expressed in line 2: 'the mother fears to love with the emotion' (I take Heinsius' *affectu* for the *affectum* of the manuscripts) 'appropriate to her relationship'. The last couplet of the poem would then be a piece of pure fancy: 'Stop shooting arrows at this unfortunate son. Consult your own mother (to see what all this love may lead to: for all you know,) she may be in the same awkward position as *this* mother (and for a similar reason).'

Carm. min. 17(50): *De piis fratribus* 11-14:

Erexit formido comam, perque omne metallum
fusus in attonito palluit aere tremor.
in iuvenum membris animosus cernitur horror
atque oneri metuens impavidusque sui.

Here we have a description of the statue put up at Catina to the two brothers who carried their parents away from the fire during an eruption of Etna. The first two lines (11-12) describe the parents' fear, which you can see vividly depicted, though in metal; in the limbs of the young men fear can also be seen, but it is an *animosus horror* (a typical oxymoron), a courageous fear, fear for their burden, not for themselves. (For the use of *horror* with an adj. which properly belongs to the person feeling it, cf. *De Bello Getico* 371 *horror perosus libertatem*.)

But the trio of epithets is most uneasy, for the second pair are really explanatory of the words *animosus horror*, and the conjunction of them with *animosus* by *atque* seems clumsy. Claudian perhaps wrote *aeque*, 'a courageous fear, as fearful for its burden, etc.' The use of *aeque* with *-que* following and the elision of the long syllable after the thesis can both be paralleled, the latter in Claudian himself.

Carm. min. 40(41): *Epist. ad Olybrium* 1-8:

Quid rear adfatus quod non mihi dirigis ullos
nec redivit alterno pollice ducta salus?
scribendine labor? sed quae tam prona facultas,
carmina seu fundis seu Cicerone tonas?

In this letter to his friend Olybrius Claudian complains that he has not had a reply to his last letter. 'It cannot be due', he says, 'to the toil of writing, for who has so ready a facility as you, whether you are pouring out poetry or thundering Cicero?' I suppose that the word *Cicero* might stand for 'Ciceronian prose'. But is the ablative the right case? *Tonare Cicerone quasi fulmine*, says Birt.

¹ See *Mythographi Latini*, i. 232; ii. 130.

He quotes, laconically enough, Sidonius. Presumably he means the passage at l. 175 of the *Panegyric of Avitus*: *surgentes animi Musis formantur et illo quo Cicerone tonas*; but the ablative there is simple enough: it stands for *illo Cicerone quem tonas*: 'his growing mind was formed by poetry and by that Cicero whom you thunderd at him'. The acc., not the abl., is what we want here.

Heinsius, evidently thinking this, emended to *Cicerona*, but it seems to me very unlikely that Claudian would use a Greek acc. of a familiar Latin name. Nowhere else does he use a Greek acc. for any Latin name, unless one counts *Aponon* and *Saxona*; and Birt may well be right in thinking (*Praef.* p. lx) that he regards both as Greek names. With a familiar Latin name like *Stilicho* what is his practice? Although he uses it over a hundred times, he never uses a Greek form in any of its cases.

I would suggest a different method of emending the passage: *ceu Cicerove tonas*. Claudian is fond of *ceu* as a variant for *sicut* or *quasi*; and the combination of *seu* and *-ve*, though apparently not so common as *seu* and *vel*, is found in Vergil, Ovid, and elsewhere. The change of *-ue* to *-ne* might easily occur, and if it did, *ceu* would be altered to *seu*, to supply the missing conjunction.

I will end these remarks by briefly drawing attention to some readings of the older editors which have not been noticed by their successors or have been wrongly, as I think, discarded by them.

Fescenn. 2(12), 36-38:

Oriensque regna fratrum
simul Occidensque plaudat;
placide iocentur urbes.

Surely we should follow Barthius, Heinsius, and others in reading *placidae*, 'cities at peace'; cf. *De Cons. Man.* 172 *et placidas inter discurremus urbes*.

In Ruf. 2. 276-7:

dabitur tibi debita pridem
victima: promissis longe placabere sacris.

The mourning army promises Stilicho a long-owed victim, Rufinus. The manuscripts read *longe* (277). Heinsius alters to *longum*, presumably in order to bring the sense into line with *pridem*. But *longe* is right: it repeats the idea in *absens* (275). Stilicho, though parted from the army, will experience their loyalty; so *longe placabere* means 'you will be placated at a distance'.

De Bell. Gild. 333-5:

Firmumne iacentem
obliti Libyam nostro sudore receptam
rursus habent?

Theodosius the elder is addressing his grandson Honorius in a dream. Why *habent*? Gildo's Moors have *not* got Libya, or so it appears. It might be argued that they have, if the language of ll. 113 and 158-61 is not intended to be merely rhetorical; but if so, why should Theodosius *ask* if they have? One might perhaps surmount this obstacle by putting emphasis on *obliti*: 'is it in forgetfulness of the death of Firmus that they again possess . . .?' But there still

remains a problem in *receptam*: this would have to mean, most elliptically: '... that they again possess Libya, which had *previously* been recovered (i.e. for Rome) by my labours'. This seems to me to be pressing *receptam* too far. Barthius solved the problem by suggesting *avent* for *habent*, but no editor receives it.

De Bell. Get. 138-44:

Primus fulmineum lento luctamine Poenum
compressit Fabius, campo post ausus aperto
Marcellus vinci docuit, sed tertia virtus
Scipiadae Latiis tandem deterruit oris.
unus in hoc Stilicho diversis artibus hoste
tris potuit complere duces fregitque furentem
cunctando vicitque manu victumque relegat.

Heinsius would read *cunctamine* for *luctamine* in l. 138. He points out that Fabius is usually called *Cunctator*. A still stronger argument is this: the activities of all three generals are later summed up in the single person of Stilicho, who *tris potuit complere duces* (143), where *vicit* looks back to Marcellus and *relegat* to Scipio. In l. 144 of Stilicho's third activity we find *cunctando* used. Is it not almost certain that this is a reference back to l. 138, and that Claudian there wrote *cunctamine*?

De Rapt. Pros. 3. 263-5:

arduus Hyrcana quatitur sic matre Niphates,
cuius Achaemenio regi ludibria natos
advexit tremebundus eques.

So the manuscripts, and so Birt and most of his successors. But how inappropriate *advexit* is! The horseman has clearly *not* brought the tiger-cubs to the king. Apart from the fact that the point of the simile is that he has only just taken away the cubs from their angry mother, he is actually described in the next lines (265-8) as still facing her in the hunt. We must therefore read *avexit* with Heinsius, and take the dative *regi* as a dative of advantage.

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THE DATE OF LIVIUS ANDRONICUS

THERE can be no doubt of the primacy of Andronicus in Roman literature, but there is an interesting and unorthodox ancient tradition concerning his date. Modern scholars incline to place Andronicus' birth about 285 B.C. and to postulate either that he came to Rome as a slave from Tarentum in 272 B.C., or that the story of his captivity is a fiction. His first play was produced in 240 B.C.¹ The tragic poet Accius, however, whom Cicero knew as an old man, believed that Andronicus came to Rome as a captive when Tarentum fell in 209 B.C.! One of his plays was produced at the Ludi Iuventatis of C. Livius Salinator in 197 B.C. Cicero is thoroughly sceptical about this (*Brutus* 18. 72-73) and ever since Accius' view has been condemned without a proper hearing.² Perhaps this is neither just nor historically sound. It may be worth attempting a reconstruction of Andronicus' life on the basis of what might well prove our earliest evidence. For it is most probable that Accius (born c. 170 B.C.) had access to oral tradition older than the *commentarii* on which Cicero relied to discredit him.

Andronicus will have been born a little after 245 B.C., for Cicero reckons that on Accius' view he would be a contemporary of Ennius.³ Though he may have taken little active part in the revolt of Tarentum, he was enslaved on its capture in 209 B.C. and taken to Rome. Yet significantly he came into the hands of M. Livius Salinator, himself (or a relative) the commandant of the garrison which held the Tarentine acropolis throughout the revolt. Possibly the two men had had communications earlier. Salinator employed Andronicus as tutor for his sons.⁴ Perhaps it was for them that he made his Latin version of the *Odyssey*. Their father had successfully commanded in the Second Illyrian War (219 B.C.) in the Adriatic near Odysseus' homeland,⁵ and this with later Roman operations in Sicily, Greece, and the Aegaeon would have made the poem wonderfully vivid and appealing for them. Soon freed by his master, Andronicus was commissioned in 207 B.C. (his patron's second consulate) to compose a hymn in honour of Iuno Regina. Her favour brought Rome such amazing success in the crisis that the poet was given exceptional rewards. In his honour the *collegium poetarum* was granted corporate recognition, with the right of meeting in the Aventine Temple of Minerva.⁶ Andronicus' hymn, according to Livy, was written in rough archaic Latin, and probably in the Saturnian metre like his *Odyssea*: but both works imply considerable mastery of a foreign language, and for that the time allowed in this scheme may seem too short. He may,

¹ E. H. Warmington, *Remains of Old Latin*, ii, pp. viii-xiv; W. Beare, *Roman Stage*, pp. 16-17; G. E. Duckworth, *The Nature of Roman Comedy*, p. 40.

² See works cited; also Beare in *C.Q.* xxxiv (1940), 12. In support of Accius Niese, 'Zur Geschichte des Pyrrischen Krieges', *Hermes* xxxi. 504.

³ Cicero, l.c. 73: 'In quo tantus error Accii fuit ut his consulibus (197 B.C.) xl annos natus Ennius fuerit; cui quum aequalis fuerit Livius . . .'

⁴ Cicero (*De Senectute* 4. 11) has Salinator at Tarentum: Polybius calls *praefectus* C. Livius (8. 27. 7 etc.); Livy M. Livius Macatus, *cognatus Salinatoris* (27. 34. 7). Tutor: Jerome (ad ann. 1830) says 'T. Livius . . . qui ob ingenii meritum a Livio Salinatore cuius liberos erudiebat libertate donatus est'.

⁵ Broughton, *Magistrates*, i. 236; P.-W. xviii, 'Livius', 892-3.

⁶ Hymn: Livy 27. 37. *Collegium*: Festus s.v. *scribae*, 492, 22.

however, have learnt much before he ever came to Rome, and this problem remains even with the orthodox dating.

Ten years after the victory of Metaurus, Salinator's temple of Iuventas was ready for dedication and his son gave the opening games. These included a theatrical performance, a play by Andronicus. Did Accius regard this as his first, and therefore as the first Roman drama? I think not, but on his view Andronicus could hardly have written for the Roman stage before 206/5 B.C.¹ Accius possibly imagined Andronicus living many years after the Ludi Iuven-tatis, for the tradition preserved in Jerome (ad ann. 1830; see p. 159, n. 4) of a *floruit* in 187 B.C. may well derive from him.

The reconstruction is reasonably consistent, but there are grave reasons for suspending belief! Yet we should first impartially weigh Accius' authority. He was apparently born within a generation of Metaurus; then he was a playwright himself and a man of the theatre from his earliest years. Surely in the *collegium poetarum* of which he was a prominent and respected member there were reliable traditions of stage history?² Furthermore he was a citizen of the colony of Pisaurum, his father having been sent thither in 184 B.C. in company with Ennius.³ Founded not far from the site of Salinator's great victory, this town had close links with the Livii, and also with the cult of Iuno Regina (as J. Gagé has recently emphasized).⁴ Here too, in his home town, Accius was in close touch with contemporary evidence for Livius Andronicus. How can he be dismissed lightly as an authority?

Let us now examine the orthodox dating. The pivotal point is the date of 240 B.C. for the first Roman play. Cicero (*Brutus* 18. 72) quotes as evidence for this the old *commentarii* which Atticus investigated. Were these official records drawn up by the aediles or some other magistrate? I think not, for otherwise Cicero could have refuted Accius by their authority alone.⁵ The *commentarii* were probably early grammarians' annotations on the plays such as Varro used, and which hardly go back beyond the Gracchan era.⁶ Cicero also quotes them as evidence for the year of Naevius' death (*Brutus* 15. 60). Incidentally Varro considered this notice erroneous, and this verdict of a great scholar is worth remembering. Cicero, for whom Varro is *diligentissimus investigator antiquitatis* (l.c.), is half inclined himself to follow Varro here. If the *commentarii* were un-

¹ The balance 'postquam eum *fabulam docuisse* (240 B.C.) et Atticus scribit' and '*docuisse autem fabulam*' (197 B.C.; Accius) suggests that Cicero (*Brutus*, l.c.) thought that Accius meant the first play. This strengthens his *argumentum ad absurdum*. Livy's variant date for Ludi Iuven-tatis (36. 36) makes things worse—191 B.C.! Perhaps it was meant to deal Accius the *coup de grâce*? Cicero refutes Accius by orthodox chronology (Plautus, Ennius, Naevius); Beare, *C.Q.* xxxiv. 11 sees the way out—did Accius accept (a) Livius' primacy or (b) orthodox dates for the other poets?

² For Accius see Warmington, op. cit. xix–xxi; P.-W. i. 142 f. (father was freedman of colonist, not colonist himself). Accius' status: Pliny, *N.H.* 39. 19 (proud bearing towards noble poet, Caesar Strabo).

³ Pisaurum: Livy 32. 44. *Fundus Accianus*

near Pisaurum: Jerome ad ann. 1878 (poet himself a colonist!). Ennius: given *civitas* by Q. Fulvius Nobilior as *iiivir col. ded.* (Cicero, *Brutus* xx. 79).

⁴ Livii: P.-W. xiii, 'Livius' 12–13, pp. 854–5; J. Gagé, 'La Balance de Kairos et l'épée de Brennos', *Rev. Arch.* 1954, pp. 163–4. Iuno Regina: *C.I.L.* i². 370(?), 371 (I. Lucina), 378, cf. 372 and 79 (Mater Matuta).

⁵ Yet Beare (*C.Q.* xxxiv. 11, 14; *Roman Stage*, p. 17) talks of discovery of old records!

⁶ Suetonius (*De Gramm.* 2) dates first Roman grammarians c. 150 B.C., after visit of Crates of Mallus; Lampadio (P.-W. xvii. 1850), one of first, published Naevius' *Bel-lum Punicum*. Varro quotes *commentarii* of Cornelius (*De L. L.* 5. 148–50) and Vergilius (ibid. 7. 39) on Naevius (plays).

reliable for c. 200 B.C., what confidence can we place in their authority for a yet earlier period?

If Andronicus *did* produce his first play in 240 B.C., when and how did he come to Rome? Many scholars believe that Accius confused two captures of Tarentum. Born c. 285 B.C., he will have been enslaved either in 275 B.C. when the town surrendered or in 272 B.C. when Milo handed over the Acropolis. But, as Beare shrewdly points out, he would have been enslaved as a mere child and how then could he have achieved his amazing work in his adoptive home? Beare's further objection that Tarentum was not really captured is less convincing. Hostages may have been taken from democratic families, or those found with Milo enslaved. If, however, Beare is right and Andronicus came to Rome of his own accord when the Tarentine stage declined, how did he obtain Roman citizenship? At that date the Romans were chary of granting it to members of another race.² On both theories Andronicus was almost eighty when he composed his hymn in 207 B.C.

Modern students have possibly made a mistake here. Livy found himself faced with a strong tradition linking Andronicus' hymn and the ceremonies for Iuno Regina in 207 B.C. In the first passage where he treats of it he uses ambiguous language, but when telling of the similar hymn of 200 B.C. he writes plainly enough: 'carmen sicut patrum memoria Livius, ita tum condidit P. Licinius Tegula' (31. 12). Clearly when he wrote that passage he was convinced that Andronicus originally composed his hymn for ceremonies c. 240 B.C. The earlier passage (27. 37) suggests that he was already puzzled. The first phrase is consistent with 31. 12: 'id cum in Iovis Statoris aede discerent (sc. 'virgines') conditum ab Livio poeta carmen'. But he resumes later: 'carmen in Iunonem Reginam canentes ibant illa tempestate forsitan laudabile rudibus ingeniis, nunc abhorrens et inconditum si referatur'. Taken alone this reads as a judgement of the poetry of that age composed for an unsophisticated and as yet unlettered people. Yet of course it *could* refer to a poem already thirty years old. Certainly, in Livy's mature view, Andronicus was no longer alive in 207 B.C. Doubtless he followed Cicero (*De Senectute* 14. 50), who made him linger on to Cato's youth (?c. 215 B.C.) as a rather old man.³ Festus' source either misunderstood Livy 27. 37—as it is still, I believe, misunderstood—or else he was following Accius.

To what occasion, then, did Livy ascribe the original hymn? I would suggest the Secular Games of 249 B.C. We know that Livy recognized the series established by Valerius Antias, in which this is the third celebration.⁴ Cichorius

¹ C.Q. xxxiv. 13; *Roman Stage*^a, p. 17.

² Philip V in his letter to Larissa stresses Rome's grant of *civitas* through manumission—the normal way then: *S.I.G.*³ 543. Ennius is perhaps first certain grant for *virtus* other than military; but his case cannot be safely used to argue for Andronicus c. 250 B.C. As freedman Andronicus could surely have kept his Tarentine name as *cognomen* (pace Beare C.Q., p. 16).

³ Beare (C.Q., p. 12) and Warmington (op. cit. p. xiii) think that Andronicus survived till c. 204 B.C., the end of Cato's *adulescentia*. But Cicero's phrase—'qui quum sex annis ante quam ego natus sum fabulam

docuisset . . . usque ad adulescentiam meam processit aetate'—suggests that survival to the first years of Cato's youth is intended. Cato was *adulescens* any time from 218 B.C. The idea that Andronicus was alive in 207 B.C. rests, as shown above, on a misreading of Livy. Beare (C.Q., p. 12) translates 'as Livius had done in the memory of the previous generation' (31. 12), without seeing that it can't apply to 207 B.C.!

⁴ P.-W. iA, 'Ludi Saeculares', cc. 1700-5; Censorinus, *De Die Natali*, 17. 8 and 10-11 (Valerii figure prominently in series, and in one 'origin' of Secular cult; see P.-W., i.C.).

(*Römische Studien*, pp. 1 ff.) has already suggested that Andronicus composed a hymn for Proserpina in 249 B.C. but Iuno Regina was also a great divinity of the Secular cult and we find her prominent in the Augustan games, though the choir of twenty-seven maidens sings and dances for Diana.¹ When the Augustan games were fixed for 17 B.C., a rival series of games was established on the basis of a 110-year *saeculum*. One celebration thus fell in 236 B.C. Significantly, the presidents were M. Aemilius Lepidus and M. Livius Salinator! (*C.I.L.* i². 1, p. 29, fr. xlv.) The Lepidi were later closely linked with the worship of Iuno Regina,² and a Lepidus was consul in the year of the supposed fourth celebration (126 B.C.). Salinator, on the orthodox view, was probably the patron of Andronicus and father of the consul of 219 B.C. It appears likely that Livy thought that the hymn to Iuno Regina was composed for the Secular Games of 249 B.C.; that the Augustan researchers took note of this tradition in their discovery of a celebration in 236 B.C., and that they recognized a re-use of this hymn in the crisis of 207 B.C.

We have perhaps disinterred the real orthodox tradition of Andronicus. Born c. 300 B.C. he was enslaved when Tarentum fell to the Romans, was freed by his master Livius Salinator, composed the Secular Hymn at fifty, at sixty had his first play produced in Rome, and died at the ripe age of about eighty-five! Little else was known of him. Livy declared (7. 2) that he acted in his plays for a time, but that the strain on his voice led him to employ a singer to accompany his mime in the *cantica* and thereby set a stage precedent. Horace perhaps was partly thinking of Andronicus in the famous lines of the Epistle to Augustus (*Epist.* 2. 1. 155 ff.);

*Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit et artes
intulit agresti Latio . . .*

Andronicus' captivity and manumission should not be doubted. The tradition is firm.³ Ennius' proud emphasis on *his* way of becoming Roman is humanly most understandable if all knew that his great predecessor was a freedman.⁴

We must choose between Atticus and Accius. If Accius was right, several disturbing questions remain! Livius must be the *first* Roman dramatist. If his first play—or any of his plays—dates to 197 B.C., what are we to make of orthodox Naevian and Plautine chronology?⁵ I believe that we must probe the

¹ *C.I.L.* vi. 32323. 119 ff.; *ibid.* 32329 (Severan Games). Maidens' choir: Livy 27. 37 (Iuno Regina), *commentarii* of third day of Games, and Horace, *Carmen Saeculare* (Diana).

² M. Lepidus, consul 187 B.C., vowed and dedicated a temple to Iuno Regina 'in circo Flaminio' (Livy 40. 52). A. Q. Lepidus was XVvir in 17 B.C. and is named immediately after Agrippa at the head of the college—followed by Potitus Messala, a Valerius! *C.I.L.* vi. 32323. 150.

³ Beare very ingeniously undermines the story of the captivity (*C.Q.*, p. 12), but does not finally dispose of the phrase in *Brutus*, 18.72 'Accius autem a Q. Maximo quantum consule captum Tarenti scripsit Livium', which reads as though neither origin nor capture was doubted. Cicero questions neither.

⁴ 'Nos sumus Romani qui fuimus ante Rudini'; Cicero, *De Oratore*, 3. 42. 168, quotes it without Ennius' name, but War-mington (l.c., p. 435, n. d) is surely right in suggesting that it comes from the *Annals* or *Ambracia*. Ennius probably told the whole story himself, for after all it redounded to his patron Nobilior's credit (see p. 160, n. 3).

⁵ Cicero's argument against Accius (*Brutus* 18. 73) has force *only* if this chronology is sound; 'in quo tantus error Accii fuit ut his consilibus (187 B.C.) xl annos natus Ennius fuerit: cui quum aequalis fuerit Livius, minor fuit aliquanto is, qui *primus fabulam dedit*, quam ii qui *multas docuerunt ante hos consules*, et Plautus et Naevius'. Beare justly says (*C.Q.*, p. 10): 'We do not know whether Accius himself shared the belief that Andronicus had been the first Latin dramatist—a

whole Roman tradition of their early literature. It may well prove contradictory and confused. In a later paper, as a first step, I hope to investigate the career of Naevius and the famous story of his quarrel with the Metelli. Meanwhile the evidence for Andronicus should surely be considered on strict merits. Accius' case has not received a fair hearing.

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belief which seems to have been generally held and which is nowhere assailed in extant literature. (If he did, then obviously he must have believed that the other dramatists lived even nearer his own time.)⁹ Understandably Beare has not gone farther and inquired

whether, if Accius *did* believe this, he had good reasons. Yet I believe this is logically necessary and that Accius' authority, rated highly by Beare also (*ibid.*), justifies adventurous rethinking about Naevius and Plautus.

PARADOXES IN PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF THE IDEAL STATE¹

THE initial paradox is simple: *The ideal state*, as Plato describes it, is composed of un-ideal individuals. Both the warrior class and the masses are deprived of reason and must be governed by the philosopher-king. How can one legitimately call a community perfect when so many of its members are imperfect? My point here is logical; the word 'ideal' is used in a self-inconsistent manner. Assume now that this paradox has been dispelled; there then arises another problem of external consistency, if this phrase be permitted. Plato populates his heaven with the forms of just individuals no less than with that of the just state. But if there be no just citizens (except perhaps for the rulers) how can there be forms of just men? The paradox seems all the more acute because Plato launches his project of constructing the ideal city for the express purpose of making the ideally just man more visible. Yet, when the edifice has been built, there are no just individuals to be seen within its walls.

A paradox may be described as a statement which has the appearance of a contradiction without its reality. In calling my problem a paradox, I have committed myself to the job of removing the appearance of contradiction and showing the consistency underneath. But first for some arbitrary definitions. I shall say that an individual is *complete* when he possesses all three parts of the soul, and *perfect* with respect to a given part when the latter is fully developed. I shall speak of a deficiency, when the individual is either incomplete or imperfect; and I shall speak of the individual as ideal when he is both complete and perfect.²

The reader will recall that the ideal state is to consist of three classes: the rulers or guardians (*φύλακες*), the auxiliaries (*ἐπικούροι*), and the farmers and workers (*δημιουργοί*), the first class embodying reason, the second *θυμός* (the spirited element), and the third appetite. It appears, then, that the members of each class will necessarily be incomplete—not whole individuals. The rulers will lack spirit and appetite; the auxiliaries, reason and appetite; the workers, reason and *θυμός*. Foster puts the matter strongly indeed.³ He says that each class is an exclusive bearer of one essential element of the soul (p. 59). Thus, 'the ruler renounces all satisfaction whatever of the third part of the soul' (p. 60); 'the guardians are maimed men' (p. 60) lacking the capacity to produce and enjoy, so that 'σωφροσύνη can find no place in the souls of the rulers' (p. 99); finally, 'the function of ruling demands the subjection or even the eradication of this (the sensuous) element, rather than its education' (p. 100).

¹ In this article I am dealing solely with Plato's political views in the *Republic*.

² Perfection obviously is what Plato calls virtue—excellence or *ἀρετή*. A person may be complete—have all three parts of the soul—and be imperfect. Conversely, while incomplete, he may be perfect, i.e. virtuous in respect of that part of the soul that he possesses. In my present statement of what makes an individual ideal, I have omitted

any reference to the harmonious co-operation of the various parts according to their rank. This last is justice, the very foundation of all the other virtues (*R.* 433 b). If I omit special mention of it here in my list of definitions, it is only because it does not affect the paradoxes which I am propounding.

³ M. B. Foster, *The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel*, 1935.

Foster is concerned with the deficiencies of the *rulers*; I am more troubled by the deficiencies of the two classes below the rulers. Foster's view may well be extreme. A more moderate interpretation would be that, in Plato's good society, any upper class contains all the parts of the soul possessed by the class (or classes) below it, but lacks whatever is possessed by any class above it. So far as the paradox is concerned, we do not have to choose between these two theories; for even adopting the moderate one, both auxiliaries and producers would be incomplete human beings, at the least lacking reason. What is embarrassing is that such incompleteness is entailed by the very conception of an ideal city as divided into higher and lower classes. How can this paradox be resolved?

A first answer may be that the issue is non-existent, because based on a misunderstanding. Why expect an ideal state to consist of ideal men? For if men are ideal, then they need no state; and conversely, the need for a state exists only because human beings are deficient. A community of saints would live in a condition of 'philosophical anarchy'. Thus the demand that an ideal state be composed of ideal men is wholly implausible.

But if so—the retort might be made—the very conception of a state which is ideal is a contradiction in terms. At best, such a state could be called ideal *under the circumstances*—not, so to say, ideally ideal. As I will revert to this point later, I will proceed to another point. It is *not* true that the necessity for a state arises only because human beings are deficient. Any group of people, when working together for a common project, need to form an organization. Even philosophers or saints, initiating a campaign for some worthy objective, would find it necessary to establish an organization with all the paraphernalia of president, treasurer, secretary, not to speak of a constitution.¹

Nevertheless this point does not affect our argument, for Plato suggests that the state is brought about in order to counterbalance human deficiencies. Individuals are not self-sufficient; they need each other and the state. Consider, especially, Plato's way of justifying government by the best (instead of by everybody): 'It is better', he says, 'for everyone to be governed by the divine and the intelligent, preferably indwelling and his own, but in default of that, from without' (R. 590 d). It is clear from this passage that Plato does not regard external authority as a good in itself; such authority is the lesser of two evils in particular circumstances. In short he would prefer a condition in which every one was ruled by himself, provided he were adequately equipped with reason. This would correspond to what I have called philosophical anarchy. Following from the above, it would seem that the ideal city is a second best. The mass of mankind need to be ruled by a philosopher-king because, in fact, they lack reason. But if so—and here I recur to my earlier point—it is improper for Plato to call his city ideal—a pattern laid up in heaven (R. 592 b).

A second possibility is that Plato did not intend to construct an ideal state at all and did not think of his city as perfect. On this view Plato took human beings as he found them, with their defects and qualities, proposing a government to suit them. Plato's state is ideal, if at all, in the sense that it is the best *possible* (attainable), not the best *conceivable*. Thus again, the answer is that the issue is unreal. Such an answer may be extracted out of Cornford's account (*The Unwritten Philosophy*, pp. 59–61). Cornford opposes the Socratic to the

¹ Plato, referring to a city consisting only of good men (*ἀγαθῶν*), implies that it would

have a government (R. 347 d); it is possible, of course, that he is speaking carelessly.

Platonic doctrine; Socrates, he says, was interested in perfecting the *individual*. 'The outcome would be a group of individuals, each one of whom would be completely self-ruled and free . . . There would be no distinction between ruler and subject, for each man would govern himself . . . The name for such a society is Anarchy. . . .' But Plato 'turns to the other possible course: takes human nature as it is and makes the best of it. Plato's commonwealth is not the City of Zeus or the Kingdom of Heaven. . . . The problem he proposes for solution is: What are the least changes to be made in the highest existing form of society—the Greek city-state—which will put an end to intestine strife and faction, and harmonize the competing desires of human nature in a stable order?'

Now it may readily be conceded that Plato speaks of approximations to an ideal political condition. But he makes clear that what is realizable and what is ideal are two different things. He tells us that what is conveyed in words (*lógois*) may be not realizable in fact, just as the painter's portrait may correspond to no man *that might possibly exist* (R. 473 a; 472 d). In the *Republic* Plato is concerned with the state which is *written in words*, not with the one spelled out in the facts; in other words, he is dealing with the ideal state. Thus, he says, 'the city whose establishment we have described . . . can be found nowhere on earth' (R. 529 a, b). In short Plato indeed does claim that his state is the City of Zeus or the Kingdom of Heaven.¹

Another objection to the type of theory under discussion is that it makes Plato guilty of operating in two different frameworks of reference at the same time; it entails that Plato, when dealing with the citizens of the ideal state, is thinking in terms of the actual world, but when describing its rulers, moves over to the realm of Platonic ideas. For, in fact, the philosopher-king is construed as an ideal man. But surely if Plato were talking within the framework of the heavenly patterns, he could have found ideal citizens no less than ideal rulers.

Incidentally what is Plato's conception of actual human beings living in space and time? We are all familiar with the passages in which he treats the masses as irrational, given over to appetite, but then what are we to make of his statement that all men love the good and love nothing else (*Symposium* 206 a) and his implicit doctrine that all men have the ideas innately? Even Meno's slave-boy, when suitably prodded, is shown to know geometry. Again, we have the myth which says in effect that, at birth, human beings are differentiated into the three different metals according to their rank: gold, silver, and iron (or brass). At the same time, the myth of the charioteer with the two horses surely implies that every man is composed of all three metals. Likewise (cf. *Timaeus* 42 e, 69 d–70 b), all men have an immortal soul—which is reason—and also a mortal soul—which is spirit and appetite.²

The best explanation of the seeming inconsistency is in terms of *degrees* of reason as suggested in *Phaedrus* 284 a–285 a; here we are told that while all men obtain a view of the forms before birth, not all souls obtain a view which is

¹ He refers to it as a divine pattern and a heavenly model (R. 500 e). Plato vacillates on the question whether his ideal state is capable of realization. Thus he says that, while difficult of realization, it is not impossible (R. 502 c). At the same time he says that the ideal city can be found nowhere on earth—as we have just cited. So with the

philosopher-king. He is found rarely; perhaps he has existed in the remote past or exists now among the barbarians (R. 491 b, 499 d). But elsewhere Plato says that the city is not like a beehive with a natural head which is recognized as superior (*Politicus* 301 e).

adequate. Some of them apprehend the forms from a distance, so to speak, and so their recollections after birth are dim. Some souls view the forms for brief periods or intermittently, or, again, obtain a glimpse of a limited number of forms.

But to return to the paradox: A third possible theory—and one which, I believe, clears the paradox away—is the following. The reader may recall that, in the beginning of the fourth book of the *Republic*, Adeimantus interposes the objection that in the state, as Socrates conceives it, the philosophers will not be happy. Although Socrates is unwilling to concede this point (*R.* 418 b), he goes on to say that he is concerned with the happiness of the whole city, and not with that of any of its parts. Socrates offers the example of a statue, saying that the statue would not be the most beautiful possible should the sculptor apply 'the most beautiful pigments to the most beautiful parts of the statue' (*R.* 420 c), namely, to the eyes. 'But observe', he goes on, 'whether by assigning what is proper to each we render the whole beautiful' (*R.* 420 d).¹

What Socrates, in effect, is saying is that the perfection of the whole requires the subordination of the parts; and that the subordination of the parts contributes to the perfection of the whole. Going farther he asserts that the parts would not be proper parts if they achieved a perfection independently of their place in the whole. For the parts are defined by their function in the whole—for instance, the eyes by their function of guiding the whole man. Plato, in the above, is expressing a conception of perfection as an aesthetic object with aesthetic value. Speaking of literature he says that 'every discourse must be organized like a living being, with a body of its own, as it were, so as not be headless or footless, but to have members composed in fitting relation to each other and to the whole' (*Phaedrus* 264 c). The pertinence of these remarks to our problem should be clear. The relative incompleteness (or imperfection) of the two lower classes—indeed of all three classes—is logically entailed by the perfection of the city as a whole. The state would not be ideal if its parts, as such, were ideal. Thus, there is no contradiction and the paradox is solved. The resulting view is that each citizen in the ideal city is like an organ in a body: he is a 'member' (to use the New Testament expression), a part identified with a specific function, and not (it would seem) a whole person, not a unity pervading a diversity of parts.²

But now, having overcome the first 'wave', we meet a second, larger wave. There is no internal inconsistency in the conception of an ideal state con-

¹ It is interesting to note that, later on (*R.* 540 c), when the account of the ideal city has been concluded, Glaucon calls Socrates a sculptor. Compare the reply of Socrates to Adeimantus with Descartes's argument that the imperfection of man does not imply imperfection in God: 'A better comparison could be drawn between the man who would like to have the whole of the human body with eyes, in order that it might appear more beautiful, because no bodily part is more beautiful than the eye, and him who thinks that no existing creatures ought to be liable to err, i.e. should not be wholly perfect.' (Reply to Gassendi's *Objections*; *Concerning the Objections to the Fourth Meditation*, p. 257 in

Selections from Descartes, edited by Ralph M. Eaton, Scribner's.)

² There is a relevant doctrine of ideality (completeness, *τέλειον*) in the *Timaeus* (41 b, c) which, while analogous to the one already explained, is different from it. We are told that the universe would be incomplete unless it contained some mortal (and hence inferior) creatures. 'In order to be complete, the universe must contain every kind of animal.' In this passage, we find an early statement of the concept of the Great Chain of Being, according to which perfection is constituted by the inclusion of all degrees of perfection (or imperfection).

sisting of un-ideal members; but we have to face an *external* inconsistency, so to speak, between Plato's statements about the ideal state, on the one hand, and those about the ideal individual, on the other. Justice in the city is identical with justice in the individual (R. 435 e, 368 e); and, as already noted, Plato constructs the just state in order to make more visible the just *individual*. Primarily, in the *Republic*, Plato is in quest of the just individual, the ideal man, the whole person. As he says: 'We set out to discover what a perfectly just man would be like in order to use him as an ideal pattern' (R. 472 c, paraphrased). In short, the Platonic heaven is populated with the form of the ideally just man. Yet, as we have seen, no citizen of the ideal state will be ideally just. Now it is fair to suppose that all individuals will be citizens, and, if so, there will be no ideal men in the Platonic heaven.

But surely the philosopher-kings will be ideal men in the city? That is doubtful. Even *they* will have to submit to self-limiting restrictions, which would deprive them of the satisfaction of some of their appetites. Clearly their duty to the state will come in conflict with private desire. Thus, the rulers will not be permitted to travel in foreign lands (R. 419 a; according to legend Solon travelled to Egypt). And even if the rulers were complete and perfect, the fact remains that one of their functions is to help produce just men among the citizens. Yet the citizens of the ideal city will develop but one part of the soul according to their class and so will be limited to one virtue exclusively. Since justice is defined as the harmonious development of all the parts of the soul, the citizens will not be just.

Our earlier paradox had been: Can a state be said to be ideal when its membership is not? The new form of our paradox is: Granted that there is no logical inconsistency in the above, it is a fact that Plato lays down the requirement of ideal citizens; nevertheless his definition of the ideal state thrusts these out of his heaven. To recur to an earlier remark: the picture of the ideal state was painted so as to give a clearer view of the just individual. Now that we look at the picture, we fail to find the just individual. Then what was the point of painting the picture in the first place? Moreover, the function of the ideal city is not only to make the just man *evident* to the eye of the mind; it is also to make the *existence* of just men *possible*, by providing a suitable social environment.¹ Finally, a just city presupposes just men. There cannot be a just city unless its citizens are just, for a just city is a product of the justice of its members. The relation of man to state is not only one of exemplified to exemplar; it is also one both of effect to cause, and of cause to effect. Thus Plato: 'Do you suppose that constitutions grow at random from tree or stone and not from the characters of its citizens?' (R. 544 d, e; also 435 e-436 a). The performance of the duties of citizenship will be a spontaneous outcome of the achievement of inner harmony (R. 433 e, 352 a). We have already noted that it is justice which makes the other virtues possible; how, then, can (for instance) the warriors be courageous unless they are just—i.e. complete persons?

Plato, as we know, paints a picture of a series of degenerate states in Book viii, and for all of these there is a corresponding type of individual. Like state, like man. The individual corresponding to the institution is not merely the ruler in that state, but the *general citizen*. Thus, the description of the democratic

¹ 'There is a pattern laid up in heaven for city in himself' (R. 592 b).
him who wills to see, and seeing, to found a

man seems to refer to the typical member of a democratic commonwealth. The tyrannical ruler is selected from among men *already* of a tyrannical nature (R. 578 c, 579 c). Now, if it be true that for any city the type of constitution is an exemplar not merely for the man at the top, but for the general citizen, it would follow that the just city depicts the character of its general citizens. In this connexion note that every man is an 'inner city', that is to say, a plurality of parts with a unity (R. 590 c). Yet no such citizen can exist in Plato's ideal state, for everyone will be limited to that part of the soul represented by his class.¹

In considering various ways of solving our new paradox, it is worth while noting that any theory which accepts the view that the ideal city will contain ideal men commits us to an even deeper dilemma; for, as already shown, an organic whole which is ideal requires parts which are not. The first solution I have in mind is one which holds that Plato, in referring to the ideal city, is speaking *metaphorically*, not literally. Plato's sole interest is to make us understand what justice is in the individual; in order to do so, he constructs a metaphor, and a metaphor only. Even an atheist might speak of this or that person as a god. There is no 'real' ideal city in the Platonic heaven.

Such an interpretation² is indeed daring to the point of being fantastic; it would eliminate altogether Plato's ideal state taken as Plato's view of the best constitution. Yet daring and fantastic though it be, it must not be dismissed out of hand. In the first place, Plato asserts not once but at least twice that he brings up the ideal city in order to enable us to visualize the just individual. A syllable written out in large letters will help us read the same syllable when written in small letters (R. 368 d). Secondly, the difficulty is so great that we should be willing to look at *any* theory which might help us to overcome it. Nevertheless I reject this interpretation, but I do so for specific reasons. These are that it does not make room for the specific details of the ideal city in Plato's description of it. To give only one instance—what could possibly be the symbolic meaning of the communistic elements in Plato's state: the community of property and of children among the two upper groups?

A second solution might be to leave the passages as they stand and not to ask for any solution. Why not assume that Plato contradicts himself and leave it at that? Philosophers, even 'great' philosophers, can blunder, and there is no point in trying to devise ingenious theories in order to save the philosopher's 'face'. While all this may be true, I would propose as a sound heuristic principle that we should not commit ourselves to the view that the 'great' philosopher has blundered until we have tried theories which might resolve the contradictions, provided of course that such theories are plausible on the data, and not forced. Now an interpretation which I believe makes good sense out of the paradox is as follows. The concern and authority of the philosopher-king in the ideal state are directed not to the *inner city*, not to the personal lives of the citizens, but to the institutional, external, formal arrangements which are fundamental to any government. To be sure, this government is not democratic but aristocratic; the citizen has no vote and no say on governmental policy. And—to put it mildly—this government is certainly not of the kind

¹ 'A city is just when the three types of nature in it do each their own work. . . . Then we shall expect that the individual has these same forms in his soul . . . if he is rightly called by the same name as the city'

(R. 435 c).

² First suggested to me by my student and friend, Edward French, in his Senior thesis at Harvard College, on Plato's *Republic*.

approved by the Manchester School. But no matter how broad the area over which the authority of the ruler extends—an extremely large area, no doubt—it has definite bounds traced by the fact that the ruler's concern is restricted to the *institutional* fabric of society.

For the Greeks the state was a moral entity with a moral purpose. Plato's analogy between the city and the individual in respect of justice would lose its point altogether unless this were so. Nevertheless today the Western democracies have gone a long way in the direction of the Greek view of the city. The government is expected today to promote welfare, equality, and justice, yet within the framework of a respect for the individual. So in Plato's city the individual will make his own decisions about the values of his life. By his 'life' I mean, of course, personal life—the administration of the inner city. However, I also mean such matters as involve the relation of one's personal life to the institutions and to the government of society. He will be the one to decide about the proper adjustment of personal duties to legal-political obligations.

Assume, provisionally, that this interpretation of Plato is correct; how does it meet and dissolve the paradox? Briefly the problem is how there can be just men in the just society—just men who are whole human beings, men who, while being members of the body politic, still are possessed of reason and are in charge of their own lives. The problem is resolved by separating the personal from the political-technical areas of control. In so far as they are citizens men in the ideal city will indeed represent one part of the soul and one function: as rulers, reason; as warriors, *θυμός*; as producers, appetite. So they will be incomplete, but incomplete only in their capacity as members of a political body. As persons, however, they remain whole and self-ordering.

I will quote a passage from the *Republic* which is most important for this argument (443 c-444 a).

'And so our dream has come true—I mean the inkling we had that, by some happy chance, we had lighted upon a *rudimentary* form of justice (*ἀρχήν τε καὶ τύπον*), from the very moment when we set about founding our commonwealth. Our principle that the born shoemaker or carpenter had better stick to his trade turns out to have been an *adumbration* (*εἰδωλον*) of justice; and that is why it has helped us. But in reality (*τὸ ἀληθές*), justice, though evidently analogous to this principle, is not a matter of *external* behaviour (*τὴν ἔξω πράξιν*), but of the inner self (*ἐντός . . . περὶ ἑαυτόν, καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ*) and of attending to all that is, in the fullest sense, a man's proper concern. The just man does not allow the several elements in his soul to usurp one another's functions. . . . Only when he has linked these parts together in well-tempered harmony and has made himself one man instead of many, will he be ready to go about whatever he may have to do, whether it be making money and satisfying bodily wants, or business transactions, or the affairs of state (*πολιτικόν τι*). In all these fields when he speaks of just and honourable conduct, he will mean the behaviour that helps to produce and to preserve this habit of mind; and by wisdom he will mean the knowledge which presides over such conduct. . . . I believe we should not be thought altogether mistaken, if we claimed to have discovered the just man and the just state (*πόλιν*), and wherein their justice consists' (Cornford's tr.).

In the above, Plato is distinguishing true justice from its adumbration; the first is the justice of the inner city, while the second is justice in social

arrangements. In other words justice in one's external relations is inferior in reality and value to justice in one's own inner life; it is thus inferior because it concerns external, or what I have called institutional, arrangements. Thus, in the ideal city, the individual, no matter how specialized he may be in function and virtue as a citizen, remains a truly just man, with all three parts of his soul fully developed and in harmonious co-operation.¹

Nevertheless the interpretation I have proposed of this important passage is not as obvious as it appears. Elsewhere, again referring to the division of labour, Plato contrasts the *economic* with the *political* division of groups (the distinction between cobblers and carpenters versus the contrast between producers, auxiliaries, and rulers) and asserts that the violation of the former arrangement would not injure the city greatly. Conversely the violation of the political order would be fatal to the commonwealth (R. 434 a-c). This passage suggests that the difference between important and trivial injustice is drawn wholly within the state, having no bearing upon the contrast between the private and political spheres.

Although there are analogies between the two passages (R. 443 and R. 434)—true justice and its adumbration in the first, and great and small injury in the second—I do not believe that they are saying the same thing. In the former there is special reference to the contrast between the 'external' and the 'internal' life, and this is surely different from the contrast between the economic and political orders. I submit, then, that true justice concerns the inner city, and that it cannot be annulled by the political justice which is only its adumbration. Plato distinguishes the task of organizing the city from that of organizing the character of the individual (R. 449 a). The ruler's authority will be confined to the former, leaving the individual full authority to fashion the inner city, in doing which he will be exercising his reason and operating as a complete and just person.

I venture to suggest that every one of the three parts of the soul has two phases (at least), one which is specialized and another not so. For instance, reason means, on the one hand, the ability to plan for the whole city, and on the other, the ability to govern one's life. While the first would be the exclusive possession of the philosopher-kings, the second (corresponding to *φρόνησις* in Aristotle's sense, or to Kant's practical reason) would be spread among all.²

¹ Cf. *Protagoras* 322 c, d. According to the myth Zeus, fearing that the race of men might be exterminated because of internal strife, sent Hermes to impart justice and reverence (*αἰδώς*) to men. Hermes then asks how he should make the distribution: whether as in the arts (*τέχνη*) where one man, say a doctor, is adequate for the needs of many who are not skilled in medicine, or whether he should distribute justice to all. And Zeus answers: to all (*ἐνὶ πάντας*). Now, although Plato has chosen to put this doctrine in the mouth of Protagoras—not of Socrates—it is not unreasonable to suppose that the myth expresses Plato's own views. Notice the similarity of some of these views to what is uttered by Diotima, *Symp.* 203 c-e.

² Plato describes the *σωφροσύνη* of the many as consisting in the double fact that, on the

one hand, they obey their rulers, and on the other that they are, themselves, rulers of their *bodily appetites* (R. 389 d). Speaking of the individual, he says that wisdom is the knowledge of what is advantageous to each of the three parts of the soul and to the soul taken as a whole (R. 442 c). Plato, in arguing that women are entitled to all the duties and privileges of citizenship, makes the point that individual natures and innate abilities are defined in terms of relevant pursuits. 'We did not mean "same" and "different" in an unqualified sense but we were attending to the sort of sameness and difference that was pertinent to the pursuits themselves' (R. 454 d). So I am arguing that the lack of intelligence in the warrior and the worker is pertinent solely to the technical pursuit of governing.

Similarly courage has two senses, the first being bravery in battle or the ability to engage in combat. This is the courage of the warrior class of which it has a monopoly. The business of fighting is a special art (*τεχνική* *R.* 374 b; also 374 d). Nevertheless a man who is brave in battle may be timid at home. (Aristotle *Pol.* 1269^b 24–26 says that military states are run by their womenfolk.) There is, then, also what I will call generalized courage (or moral strength) which is the ability to hold fast to one's convictions despite threats of pain and the seductions of pleasure.¹ Such moral courage or resoluteness will be available to every citizen, and will be necessary also for the soldier engaged in battle. That the producer will need such generalized courage is evident from the fact that he will be tempted to overlook his duties to the state by the lure of his appetites.

The appetitive part of the soul tends to be viewed by Plato as the monopoly of the producing class. Yet surely neither of the other two groups will be devoid of appetite. Let us then distinguish the specialized skill of productive labour with its special kind of appetite—namely, the love of money—from the 'necessary' appetites such as hunger, thirst, and the sexual desire. The first will be the exclusive possession of the workers, but the second kind will be available to the warriors and rulers as well, who must first live in order to live well and be able to execute their special functions.

To sum up, the members of each class will be limited and incomplete in so far as the technical phase of the parts of the soul are concerned, but they will be complete with respect to the generalized phase. Specialization in occupations (even as determined by native ability) does not involve specialization in the inner city. As citizens the producers (for instance) will have the virtue of self-control only, but as persons (while still members of the city) they will have courage and wisdom as well. A doctor today, while in his office, is operating in his capacity as a specialist; but this does not make him any the less of a person outside office hours, or even inside his office (as when he decides how many hours to stay in the office).

At the same time we can explain the special problem, cited earlier, as to how the members of the city could be complete, fully developed in all the parts of the soul, and yet have that subordination and self-limitation as parts, which is demanded by the conception of an aesthetically perfect whole. The members of the city will be limited in the technical phase of the parts of the soul while completely developed in their generalized phase. Such limitation is quite compatible with their completeness as persons. Even in our present democratic theory and practice we consent to a division of ability and labour in which some jobs are ranked as 'higher' than others, without at all renouncing the conviction that, as individuals, the citizens are complete and rational beings. If I am right, while Plato requires that every man should be a specialist, he does not reduce the man to his speciality; the man is not a tool, organ, or 'member': he is a person. As a member of the state, it is true that he is only an organ. But our activities in the state are 'abstract' in the sense that they are abstracted from the total tissue of living. Corporate living is only one aspect of a man's life; its concreteness lies elsewhere—in his personal being and in his informal relations with other persons.

I am countering the traditional assumption that, in Plato's state, *σοφία* will

¹ That the first is not the whole of courage is hinted at in *R.* 429 b.

be the exclusive prerogative of the rulers who alone will have a conception of the good life and so have control over the personal lives of the citizens.¹

In attacking this view I find strong support in Joseph's account of Plato's political doctrine.² Joseph says (*ibid.*, p. 96) that every individual in Plato's city will have to deal with two sets of relationships; he must relate the parts of his soul among themselves, and he must also relate himself as a member of his class to the other classes and to the city as a whole. In short, there are two wholes, the one of the soul with its parts, the other of the state with its classes. Analogously two plans are required, one for each whole. The philosopher alone will be in charge of the plan of the city, but every citizen will make his own plan for the other whole. Also every man will have the problem of adapting the one plan to the other; thus, the philosopher must relate his duties as a ruler to his duties to his own person. When the city faces an emergency the philosopher may have to restrain his impulse to engage in theoretical speculation (*ibid.*, pp. 164, 167). In other words the decision-making of the individual will extend over two distinct areas: first, his private good and second, the relation of his private good to that of the community.³

Of course, I am not claiming that Plato's ideal city is a democracy, nor am I defending his aristocratic ideal. I have been concerned only with a special problem of consistency. My point has been that the just city would seem to eliminate the just individual, and that the just individual would seem to make the just city dispensable. Exemplar and exemplified devour each other although they were intended to lie down meekly together. For the just city is said to be the outcome of the just soul, and the just soul the product of the just city. Plato's intentions are saved by an interpretation according to which the individual is limited only with respect to his civic functions. The theory I have proposed does not agree with all the evidence in the text, but perhaps it agrees better with such evidence than alternative theories. It is not a question of decisive proof but of probability. Since my theory has the advantage over

¹ It must be said that the evidence in the text of the *Republic* is ambiguous and not clearly in favour of the position I have taken. Plato can be quoted on both sides. (a) The philosopher-kings will be craftsmen of civic liberty (*R.* 395 c); among their duties are those of deciding who belongs to which class (*R.* 433 c, 434 a-c), of enforcing the rules of eugenics (*R.* 459 b, ff.), of conducting lawsuits (*R.* 433 e), and planning the scheme of education. Although opinions differ, these functions may be regarded as falling within the province of government. See also *R.* 484 b, 500 d, and 572 b, according to which the rulers are concerned with ordaining and preserving the laws and pursuits of the city (*νόμους καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα*). (b) But, on the other side, quite a number of passages may be cited in which Plato, instead of restricting the rulers to civic functions, includes matters of private life within their purview. Thus, we are told that the duties of the rulers involve both private and public affairs (*R.* 500 d, 501 a). Also, it is the philosopher who grasps the idea of the good (*R.* 506 a). Finally,

Plato seems to make no provision for the higher education of the masses, but this may well be because he did not propose this topic to himself in the context of the *Republic*.

² *Essays in Ancient and Modern Philosophy*, by H. W. B. Joseph; especially chapters iv and vi. The reader of this book will have noted a considerable similarity between Joseph's views and mine. In fact, the interpretation I have proposed was suggested to me from my reading of Joseph.

³ Let me emphasize that his relation to his duties as a citizen is a matter on which the individual will have to make his own decision. In this connexion we may recall that according to Plato, when a man is inwardly just, he will be well disposed towards his fellow-men; in other words, inward justice leads to external justice, to fairness, and to the discharge of social obligations (*R.* 443 e, 442 e-443 b). Also, Plato defines *σωφροσύνη* in the state as the willing consent of each class to rule the other classes or to be ruled by the philosopher-king (*R.* 431 e).

alternative interpretations that it makes sense out of the paradox, I suggest that its probability is greater than theirs and sufficient to make it acceptable.

The parallelism between justice in the individual and justice in the city is part of a more grandiose scheme in Plato's thought. The individual is a microcosm of the community, and the community is a microcosm of the ultimate macrocosm which is the universe. For the universe too is a society with its own order; it is a cosmos. Starting with the cosmos we have a series of self-reflecting ordered wholes ending up in the soul, the smallest unit of all, but still a whole. Along with the relation of image to archetype there is the relation of instrument to end. But this is not to say that any given whole has only instrumental value. 'The noblest class of goods are desired both for themselves and their consequences' (*R.* 358 a). Like the tree which, while protecting man and beast from the fierce light of the sun, has also its own beauty, so each ordered whole whether the soul, or society, or cosmos, has its own intrinsic value along with its use for the other wholes.

Since the greater whole has parts which are also wholes, the biological language of organisms would be misleading. The parts, being wholes, not only possess an intrinsic worth but also enjoy a relative autonomy. Their own order is not conditioned by the greater whole of which they are a part, but is a product of the spontaneous co-operation of their parts. The total organism is better described as a *community* of wholes, in turn also communities of smaller wholes.¹

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¹ For my various quotations from the Shorey, Lindsay, and Cornford text, I have relied on the translations of

THE CAVE AND THE SOURCE

(on the imagery of Propertius 3. 1. 1-6)

Callimachi Manes et Coi sacra Philetæ,
 in vestrum, quaeso, me sinite ire nemus.
 primus ego ingredior puro de fonte sacerdos
 Itala per Graios orgia ferre choros.
 dicite, quo pariter carmen tenuastis in antro?
 quove pede ingressi? quamve bibistis aquam?

In his recently published *Propertiana*,¹ Mr. D. R. Shackleton Bailey has given what I believe to be the correct interpretation of the first two lines. He maintains that *sacra* has no direct connexion with poetry, that it may be virtually synonymous with *Manes* or possibly signify the rites paid to the dead, or that it can be taken in the sense of their physical relics, the ashes in the urn. He reminds us that *nevus* is more than a 'poetic grove'; it must be a 'consecrated grove'. Although we do not know that worship was really paid to the shades of Callimachus and Philetas, Propertius and his readers may have taken it for granted.

Naturally it cannot be determined whether Propertius wanted to enter the grove in order to offer worship or to receive it as the legitimate successor of the two eminent Alexandrians. Both explanations are plausible; yet, reading the passage as a whole, a third possibility, not mentioned by Mr. Shackleton Bailey, nor, as far as I can see, by any of the recent editors, occurs to me. It is partly suggested by the imagery, partly by the form of the short questions in vv. 5-6.

The three questions which Propertius addresses to the shades of Callimachus and Philetas are concrete and specific. 'Tell me, in what cave did you refine your song together? With what foot did you enter it? Or what water did you drink?' A comparison of these questions with a true rhetorical question, such as vv. 25-28 in the same poem, shows that Propertius had concrete and specific answers in mind. The form of the three short questions is more like Propertius 1. 22. 1-2 *qualis et unde genus, qui sint mihi, Tulle, Penates, quaeris* . . ., where also a factual answer is expected, introducing the poet to his readers. In our passage, however, no answer is given. Propertius, as so often, interrupts himself; the scenery changes; he seems to have forgotten that he is standing at the entrance to a sacred grove, waiting for an answer to his request.

Two poems later, he resumes the imagery of 3. 1. 1-6. But now, in 3. 3., he is dreaming. Again he sees a grove;² this time, he describes its location in greater detail: it is on Mount Helicon; Apollo and the Muses are there. No mention of the shades of Callimachus and Philetas is made; but the answers to two of the questions he formulated in 3. 1 are now revealed in an unexpected form. Propertius asked about a cave (3. 1. 5)—Apollo shows him a cave (3. 3. 27); he asked about water (3. 1. 6)—Calliope moistens his lips with the 'water of Philetas' (3. 3. 51-52). The second question remains unanswered.

¹ D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *Propertiana* (Cambridge U.P., 1956), pp. 135-6.

² 3. 3. 13 *ex arbore* = 'ex nemore', where *arbor* stands for a group of trees.

It may seem pedantic or fanciful to establish such an intimate correspondence between two separate poems.¹ But another theme of 3. 1, Propertius' refusal to write an epic poem (3. 1. 7-8 and 15-20), is also resumed and expanded in 3. 3, where both Apollo and Calliope in two parallel speeches of almost equal length (15-24 and 39-50) warn the poet not to try his hand at epic poetry. In 3. 3, Propertius claims to consider this possibility much more seriously than in 3. 1; what could be dismissed casually in the first poem requires a more substantial refutation in the third.

We have seen so far that Propertius' urgent questions to the shades of Callimachus and Philetas (3. 1) were finally answered in a dream by Apollo and the Muses (3. 3). The dream, in Antiquity, is a form of *μαντική*; Apollo is the god of prophecy as well as of poetry, and the Muses, daughters of Memory, reveal to men the truths that are hidden: 'Give me an oracle, Muse, and I will be your spokesman,' says Pindar (fr. 137, Bowra). The knowledge that comes in dreams and prophecies is requested by Propertius from the shades of two great poets. At the beginning of 3. 1, he is asking them for an *oracle*; this, I think, is the purpose of his visit to their grove.

At the beginning of the *Theogony* Hesiod hears the voice of the Muses on Mount Helicon. They tell him that one of their gifts is the power of true speech. (Hesiod was awake when he had this experience.) At the beginning of the *Aitia* Callimachus, in a dream, meets the Muses and Apollo on Mount Helicon. They reveal to him the scope, the manner, and some of the material of the poem that he is to write. At the beginning of Propertius' third book of elegies the motifs of the dream, the Muses, and Apollo appear once more, together with three new motifs: the shades, the cave, and the source. From Hesiod to Propertius the symbolism has become increasingly complex; but the meaning is the same.

Half a century ago R. Reitzenstein² hinted at a new interpretation of Propertius 3. 1. 1-6, but he did so in a rather casual manner, and without supporting his point of view by any evidence: 'Dass . . . Properz III 1, 1-6 an die allgemein verbreiteten Vorstellungen von der Totenbeschwörung schliesst, wenn er zu dem *ἡρώων* des Philetas und dem Gräbmal des Kallimachos gehen will, und dass sich hieraus die befremdlichen Einzelzüge erklären, scheint . . . den Interpreten nicht zum Bewusstsein gekommen. . .'. As far as I can see, Reitzenstein's remark has found no echo among the more recent editors and critics of Propertius. Yet it contains the solution, or part of the solution, to our problem.

One of the images that Propertius had in mind is doubtless that of necromancy. He was familiar with this kind of divination; 4. 1. 106 *umbrave quae magicis mortua prodit aquis*, 'or a dead man's shade that comes forth at the magic waters'.³ It is easy to understand that he hesitated to conjure up the shades of the two great Hellenistic poets with all the wealth of horrid detail that we find in the other elegiac poets.⁴ Respect for *decorum* may be one of the reasons why

¹ I hesitate to follow Scaliger, Muretus, and others who connected 3. 1 and 3. 2. The principle of *ποικιλία*, *variatio*, explains easily why two elegies dealing with similar themes were separated in the published collection by a slightly different kind of poem.

² In the appendix to his *Hellenistische*

Wundererzählungen (1906), p. 152.

³ On Propertius' use of witchcraft as a literary motif see G. Luck, *Hermes*, lxxxiii (1955), 428 ff.

⁴ Necromancy in the elegiac poets: Tib. 1. 2. 45-48; Ovid, *Amores* 1. 8. 17-18; *Rem. Am.* 253 ff.; cf. *Met.* 7. 206.

he leaves the whole situation so vague and abandons it almost at once. In fact some of the details in our passage, contrary to Reitzenstein's assumption, *cannot* be explained by the allusion to a necromantic ceremony. The cave has obviously nothing to do with the *Plutonia* or *Psychopompeia*, those caves leading directly to the underworld, where the shades of the dead were conjured up;¹ and the water has no connexion with the *aquae magicae* in 4. 1. 106.

Nevertheless, the meaning suggested above must be maintained. We should only remember that the shades of Callimachus and Philetas were no ordinary shades. Propertius needs their permission to enter the sacred precinct. After their death, the two famous poets had risen to the exalted rank of heroes—if not officially so, at least in Propertius' imagination. The honour conferred on Orpheus, Homer, Hesiod, Archilochus, Corinna, could easily be extended to two Hellenistic poets by their Roman admirer. If the founder of a philosophical school could be worshipped, after his death, as a hero,² why not a distinguished member of the Alexandrian Museum which was also organized as a *θίασος τῶν Μουσῶν*? In Propertius' own time the philosopher Athenodorus was declared a hero by the city of Tarsus, whose benefactor he had been.³

The heroes know all the hidden truths, the future as well as the past. They bring the prayers of men before the gods. In general they occupy a position *μεταξὺ θνητοῦ καὶ ἀθανάτου*,⁴ i.e. they communicate between man (Propertius) and God (Apollo and the Muses). Heroes delivering oracles are known all over the Greek world.⁵ Philetas and Callimachus took the secrets of their craft, their knowledge, and long experience with them when they died; at a crucial point in his career, hesitating between the epic and the elegy, Propertius (speaking symbolically) turns to their divinized *Manes* for advice.

Consequently the image conveyed at the beginning of 3. 1 is that of a worshipper demanding an oracle. He will obtain it less by means of necromancy (forcing the shades to appear), than by complying with the 'rites', *sacra*, imposed on the visitor to a *ἡρώων* (addressing a prayer to them). But this distinction is not made explicitly. As usual Propertius tries to say too much; he heaps allusions upon symbols and then, involved in the difficulties he has created for himself, simply changes the subject.

What, then, is the meaning of the cave and the source? The cave in which Callimachus and Philetas once 'refined their song' is surely identical with the *spelunca* shown to Propertius by Apollo in 3. 3. Its delicately mannered description, its decorative bric-à-brac (3. 3. 27 ff.) suggest a reminiscence of the artificial grottoes of the Muses, *μουσεῖα*, that Propertius had seen at Rome in the parks of his wealthy friends. But even if we assume for a moment that such grottoes were ever used for actual readings of poetry, the vision of Callimachus and Philetas writing or reciting 'together' their poems in a grotto is a little bizarre.

Not too bizarre for Propertius, perhaps. It may be the meaning, and the whole meaning, that lies behind this image. Propertius may have transferred a Roman custom to Alexandria or translated an Alexandrian custom into more familiar terms. Or he may simply use the cave as a symbol for the seclusion and

¹ One of them is mentioned by Callimachus, fr. 278 Pf.; see in general E. Rohde, *Psyche*⁷⁻⁸, i (1921), 212-15.

³ Lucian, *Macrob.* 21.

⁴ Plato, *Sympos.* 202 c.

² Wilamowitz, *Antigonos von Karystos* (1881), pp. 263 ff.

⁵ Rohde, *op. cit.*, pp. 185 ff.; S. Eitrem, *R.E.* viii (1912), cols. 112, 116.

tranquillity which the creative artist needs. This is actually one of the current interpretations of *nemus*, the grove in v. 2,¹ now rejected by Mr. Shackleton Bailey. Again, I believe, the allusion touches the religious sphere.

In Claros, near Colophon, there was an old and famous oracle of Apollo, surrounded by a *grove*.² The prophet (*sacerdos*) heard the names and numbers of the consultants, then retired into a *grotto*, drank the water of a *sacred spring*,³ and gave his response in *verse*. The oracle is said to have existed long before the colonization of Ionia; it reached its greatest renown during the Hellenistic and Imperial period. The poet Nicander was one of its hereditary priests.⁴

Iamblichus (*De myster.* 3. 11) has a philosophical discussion of the oracle at Claros that reads almost like a commentary on some significant statements of Callimachus and Propertius concerning their craft. He mentions how the prophet prepares himself 'in certain rites inaccessible to the profane', ἐν ἱεροῖς τοῖν ἀβάτοις τῷ πλήθει.⁵ The prophet-priest is inspired by Apollo or, as Iamblichus puts it, Apollo πάρεστι δ' εὐθὺς καὶ χρήται ὡς ὄργανον τῷ προφήτῃ: 'suddenly he is present and uses the prophet as an instrument'.⁶

In an admirable chapter of *The Greeks and the Irrational*,⁷ Prof. E. R. Dodds has commented on the religious meaning of poetic inspiration in antiquity. He has shown that whenever Homer and Hesiod appeal to the Muses for help, they ask for factual truth, for first-hand evidence. He might have added that Callimachus, following Hesiod, questions the Muses at the beginning of the *Aitia* on mythological details.⁸ Propertius, too, approaches the *Manes* of Philetas and Callimachus, now the mediators between man and the Muses, because he desires concrete and specific knowledge.

Hesiod was 'mindful of the Muses'⁹ when he met them on Mount Helicon, and so was Callimachus when he adapted Hesiod's narrative. Formally speaking, Propertius' appeal to the 'shades and rites' of Philetas and Callimachus

¹ To the bibliography I should like to add J. Martin, *Würzburger Jbb. f. d. Altertumswissensch.* (1947), pp. 364 f.

² Strabo, 14. 1. 27, p. 642.

³ . . . in specum degressus, hausta fontis arcani aqua . . ., Tacitus, *Ann.* 2. 54.

⁴ In view of this we should take Tacitus' assertion (loc. cit.) that the priest was *ignarus plerumque litterarum et carminum* not too literally, at least for the Hellenistic period.

⁵ Cf. Callimachus, *Aitia* fr. 1. 25 ff. Pf.; *Hymn. Apoll.* 2; 110 ff.; *Ep.* 7. 1; 28. 1 ff., and Propertius 2. 13. 13; 23. 1 f.; 3. 1. 3; 14; 17 f.; 4. 6. 1 ff.; 10. 3 f. (see the commentators for analogous assertions in Horace and Virgil).

⁶ Cf. Callimachus, *Aitia* fr. 1. 22 ff. Pf. (and Pfeiffer's note); Propertius 1. 2. 27; 2. 1. 3; 3. 3. 13 ff.; 4. 1. 133 and the commentators.

⁷ E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (U. of Calif. P., 1951), pp. 80-82; cf. G. Luck, *Gnomon*, xxv (1953), 364.

⁸ Callimachus, *Aitia* fr. 7. 19-21; cf. 4 ff.; 31 b (Add.. II); 43. 56.

⁹ In Propertius 2. 34. 31 f. *tu satius memorem Musis imitere Philetan* | *et non inflati somnia Callimachi*, R. Reitzenstein's interpretation of *memorem Musis* = '*qui Musis memorem se praebet*' (*Hermes* xxxi [1896], 196-7), although grammatically difficult, makes excellent sense from this point of view. The pentameter refers to the beginning of Callimachus' *Aitia*; this does not mean that the hexameter refers to a (lost) work of Philetas (Rothstein, Butler-Barber, ad loc.); it is much more likely that Propertius transferred to the lesser known Philetas the context of Callimachus that he had in mind. The Muses play such an important role in the famous opening of the *Aitia* that Callimachus could be properly called *memor Musis*. An anonymous epigram, *Anth. Pal.* 7. 41, even addresses him as 'blessed one, dearest companion (*συνέσθριε φίλαστε*) of the divine Muses', cf. M. Gabathuler, *Hellenist. Epigramme auf Dichter* (Diss. Basel, 1937), pp. 6, 42, 65; F. Cumont, *Symbolisme funéraire des Romains* (1942), p. 293, n. 2.

corresponds exactly with the invocations of the Muses found at the beginning of a poem or introducing a significant new part of a poem.¹

Prof. Dodds has shown the close relationship between poetic inspiration and prophetic revelation in antiquity. He has taught us to understand in their literal sense the claims of the early Greek poets that they derived supernormal knowledge from the Muses. A part of this deeply religious feeling is still alive in the Alexandrian poets who read Hesiod and claimed him as their literary ancestor. Through their works it communicated itself to Propertius; but by now it is slightly formalized; the association appears to be more literary than religious; two literary figures, Callimachus and Philetas, have taken the place of the Muses. But the belief that poet and seer alike enjoy a knowledge denied to the *profanum vulgus*, that the seer, in a state of inspiration in a dream, or after his death as a hero, can participate in the prophetic function of Apollo and the Muses, is still as vigorous as before.

It would be dangerous to carry this kind of investigation too far. After all has been said, we still do not know whether the cave 'means' the grotto of the Muses or an oracular cave. In Propertius' mind, at this moment, both have merged into one, just as the poet and the prophet are one and the same person. The source (*aqua*) is perhaps a source on Mount Helicon, rather than an oracular source. We know now that Callimachus mentioned the Aganippe at the beginning of the *Aitia*; whether as a symbol for poetic inspiration or a mere geographic detail is still controversial.² In any event the striking analogy to the oracle at Claros suggests that both cave and source are religious symbols describing the conditions in which the poet and the seer alike receive supernatural knowledge.³ It is useless to insist on the topography.

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¹ W. Abel, *Die Anredeformen bei den römischen Elegikern* (Diss. Berlin, 1930), p. 82.

² Callimachus fr. 696 Pf. (on the Aganippe) refers to the prologue of the *Aitia* (Add. II, fr. 2 a 16 ff.); on the controversy see Pfeiffer's note on *Schol. Flor.* (p. 11).

³ Ovid was aware of the religious mood of Propertius 3. 1 and 3. 3 when he adapted these poems in *Amores* 3. 1, itself the preface to a new book: *stat vetus et multos incaedua silva per annos; | credibile est illi numen inesse loco. | fons sacer in medio speluncaque pumice*

pendens . . . (vv. 1 ff.). In this sacred grove, the poet meets Elegy and Tragedy personified; but instead of revealing hidden truths to him, as one would expect in these awesome surroundings, they plead with him in the best rhetorical manner. The religious symbols have become mere decoration; the poet does not bow to any supernatural command; he reserves his own choice. Ovid's poem, although it still uses the traditional imagery, marks in reality a very significant change in outlook.

A NOTE ON SAPPHO FR. 1¹

Sappho fr. 1, (Lobel-Page) 15-25

... ἤ]ρε' ὅττ[ι δηῦτε πέπονθα κῶττι
 δη]ῦτε κ[άλ]η[μμι] 16
 κ]ῶττι [μοι μάλιστα θέλω γένεσθαι
 μ]αινόλαι [θύμωιν· τίνα δηῦτε πείθω
 .]. σάγην [ἐς σὺν φιλότατα; τίς σ', ὦ
 Ψά]πφ', [ἀδικήει; 20
 κα]ῖ γ[ὰρ αἰ φεύγει, ταχέως διώξει,
 <αἰ δὲ δῶρα μὴ δέκετ', ἀλλὰ δώσει,>
 <αἰ δὲ μὴ φίλει, ταχέως φιλήσει>
 <κωνὸκ ἐθέλοισα.> 24
 <ἔλθε μοι καὶ νῦν . . .

19 .]. ἄγην. [pap. : .], spatium ut vid. unius litt. non amplius] . . , primo hastae apex in altum surgentis, ψ sive φ; sequitur ut vid. litt. c arcus superior, infra in linea punctulum (signo interpunctionis simile) η ex ei ut vid. factum .]. h.v., apicis ad sinistram atramenti vestigium; ν possis, quanquam non adeo prompte in mentem venit itaque .] ψ c. ἄγην[unde ἄψ σ' ἄγην possis, quanquam hac lectione nec punctum post c explicatur neque accentus nec signi ἄ ratio redditur μαι (μ delet. caud. in β corr.) σαγηνεσσαν Dion. Hal. comp. 173-9 (vi. 114-116 Us.-Rad.) cod. P; καὶ σαγηνεσσαν eiusd. cod. F (qui μαινο super. v. om.), καὶ σ. Dion. Hal. epitom. 114-16.

24 κωνὸν κεθέλουσα Dion. Hal. loc. cit. cod. F, κ' ὥνκ' ἐθέλοισ. cod. P, κῶ εἰ καὶ θέλεις Heph. Ench. xiv 1 (pp. 43 seq. Constr.) codd. R, D, V.

Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus*, pp. 3, 9-10, prints ἄψ † σάγην† ἐς σὺν φιλότατα at l. 19.

The letters σάγην are constant in the tradition of l. 19 and must be taken as genuine. It follows that we have to do either with ἄγην 'lead' or with one of its compounds. At any rate nobody has found another word of like appearance that will fit the context.²

Since the first publication of *P. Oxy.* xxi. 2288, Dr. Lobel has maintained that the surviving fragment of the letter before σ is the top of the vertical stroke of ψ or φ. If he is right, we must prefer ψ; for, unless we are to condemn σ itself, φ is impossible. And acceptance of ψ means that we must read the beginning of the line as ἄψ σ' ἄγην.

The meaning of the sentence will then be: 'whom then do I (Sappho) urge thee (Aphrodite) to bring back to the Love that is thine (Aphrodite's)?' i.e. τίνα is the object of ἄγην; σε is the object of πείθω. Sappho is in love with someone who runs away and will have nothing to do with her (cf. ll. 21-23),³ and she calls upon Aphrodite to bring this person back to her. The Love in question belongs to Aphrodite in the sense that it is the emotion which she inspires or the relationship between two mortals which she favours.

The construction as I have explained it is quite simple, and there are only two matters that call for comment. First, the order of words is a little difficult,

¹ I am indebted to Mr. A. H. Coxon, who read the typescript of this article and made several corrections.

² Page's τάγην demands an arbitrary change of σ and introduces an element of military or official jargon that is foreign to the context.

³ It is possible to regard φεύγει, διώξει in the first of Aphrodite's assertions (l. 21) as being a response to ἄγην. You ask me to lead someone, says the goddess, but that person will not need to be led; he (or she) will give chase.

or at least may not be immediately obvious to the reader. But, apart from the fact that for *αἴψ' ἀγην* one might prefer *σ' ἀπάγην* in prose, there is no means of improving it. It is a difficulty, however, that *σ'* after *αἴψ* would be inaudible,¹ and I would suggest that Sappho may have intended *αἴψ ἀγην*, without *σ'*. For the omission of the object *σε*, cf. *ὅττι κἀλήμμι 16, ὅσσα δέ μοι τέλεσαι θῆμος ἱμέρρει 26-27* (see below, n. 4).

Secondly, it is to be observed that the *τίνα δ' ἦντε πείθω . . .* sentence is in series with the three questions (beginning with *ὅττι δηῦτε, κῶττι δηῦτε, and κῶττι μοι*) that precede it; like them it depends on *ἦρεο*, l. 15. This connexion is guaranteed both by the repetition of *δηῦτε* and by the presence of a 1st pers. sing. verb (*πέπονθα, κἀλήμμι, θέλω, πείθω*) in all four sentences. There is, moreover, a bond of meaning that unites the four verbs. By way of contrast, we note that in the next sentence—*τίς σ' ὦ Ψάφ' ἀδικεῖ*—there is no connective particle, the verb is in the 3rd pers. sing., and it is unrelated in sense to the other four. Thus it is plain, despite the fact that Professor Page and others assume a change from indirect to direct speech at *τίνα δηῦτε πείθω*,² that no such change is necessary, or even likely, at that point. On the contrary, the structure of the passage suggests that this change should occur after *ἐς σὺν φιλότατα*.

The transition between *τίνα δηῦτε πείθω . . .* and *τίς σ' ὦ Ψάφ' ἀδικεῖ* is abrupt, but is not to be doubted on that account. There is a similar transition at Alcaeus fr. G 1 (Lobel-Page), ll. 8-9, where the poet jumps from a narrative about an invocation to the text of the invocation itself. What is unusual in the case of Sappho fr. 1 is that the transition occurs not in the course of a simple narrative but within the framework of reported speech. Apart from the omission of a connective particle and the change in the personal reference and meaning of the verb, there is one mark that makes this transition certain and unmistakable. This is the reinforcement of *σε* by the name *ὦ Ψάφτοι*. The vocative proclaims that, although *σύ, σός*, etc., *previously* meant Aphrodite, addressed by Sappho, *now* they mean Sappho herself, addressed (in direct speech reported) by Aphrodite.

In ll. 21-23 the goddess's address to Sappho continues. On an earlier occasion, she had promised to bring back the runaway lover. 'If . . . runs away, . . . will soon give chase; if . . . refuses gifts, . . . will give them; if . . . does not love, . . . will soon love.'³ Through divine influence, the tables will be turned. The loved one who is now indifferent or impatient of love will soon be made to love Sappho whole-heartedly. This had been the effect of Aphrodite's intervention in the past, and Sappho prays that she may now do the same again. So in ll. 25-28 she continues: ' . . . come to me even now and save me from cruel distress. All that my heart desires thee to fulfil for me, do thou fulfil.'⁴ Thyself stand by me in the fight.'

¹ Contrast *τίς σ'* 19, where the length of the syllable indicates to the hearer the presence of the pronoun. (In fr. 31. 7 *ἐς σ' ἰδω* is restored but is not certain.)

² The change from the interrogative relative to the interrogative pronoun need not be significant.

³ Editors usually supply the subject 'she', connecting it with *ἐθέλῃσα* l. 24; but see

below, pp. 182 f.

⁴ Page translates: 'fulfil all that my heart desires to fulfil'. In his note, however, he allows the possibility of the rendering I have given. To me it seems that *τέλεσαι* and *τέλεσον* should be strictly parallel, and therefore that *σε* should be understood as subject of the infinitive. See above.

The question outstanding is: what is the sense and relevance of l. 24? Lobel-Page read *κῶνκ ἐθέλοισα*, following the *paradosis*. Page does the same, but without enthusiasm. His note reveals the seriousness of the linguistic difficulty involved. In Lesbian poetry we find *θέλω* quite frequently, never *ἐθέλω*; and Bergk's emendation *κῶνκί θέλοισα* is excluded because *οὐ(κ)* occurs in this dialect, but not *οὐκί*. Lobel observed that the *paradosis* implies *κῶν κέ θέλοισα*, but admitted the strange appearance of this phrase; it is indeed too strange to be accepted.

But we have also to consider the impact of *κῶνκ ἐθέλοισα* and variants of it on ll. 21-23. Page's translation runs: '... and if she loves not, she shall love soon even against her will'. He explains this later (p. 15): 'Why *against her will*? Because her love for you will then be unrequited; she will suffer as you suffer now, and she will pray for relief as you do today.' To this we may answer first, that there is no question of Sappho *ceasing to love* and being vainly pursued;¹ Sappho summons the goddess to help her now, as in the past, and she expects that in consequence she will win the love she desires. Secondly, we may say that, whether the other person's love were unrequited or not, she would not be in love *against her will*; love and will in such a case are not separate forces, but two aspects of the same force. And anyone who is moved by the power of Aphrodite herself will neither refuse to love nor make a show of reluctance, nor yet want real enthusiasm. It seems a necessary conclusion that *κῶνκ ἐθέλοισα* etc., construed with ll. 21-23, does not make sense.

There is, however, a further difficulty involved in this construction. It would mean that the person whom Sappho loves vainly is a woman or a girl. This is accepted without question or complaint by most commentators. It is evidently in harmony with Sappho's reputation and that of her compatriots, and it is thought to be borne out by fr. 31 and perhaps also by other fragmentary poems. Professor Page has shown, however (pp. 110-46), that all charges of immorality brought against Sappho may well be due to scandalous gossip in later times and that poems other than frs. 1 and 31, although they display warm and even passionate affection (as well as passionate hatred and jealousy) for other women, need not imply homosexual practices. To this I would add that strong emotions need not imply even homosexual tendencies. In my opinion even fr. 31 should be set aside, on the ground that it is more probably concerned with love for a man and jealousy of a woman than with love for a woman and jealousy of a man.² At all events, there is not much elsewhere to confirm the initial supposition that in fr. 1 Sappho is in love with a woman. And the only evidence to be found in fr. 1 itself is the association of *κῶνκ ἐθέλοισα* with ll. 21-23, which in other respects gives poor sense.

But it is proper to ask also whether Sappho would compose a formal invocation to *Aphrodite* about her love for a woman. The rules of piety and moral convention may be somewhat relaxed in the cult of Aphrodite as compared with other deities. But it does not seem likely that she would be asked to champion homosexual relations, or still less mere friendship between two women;³ and

¹ For this reason we must reject Knox's emendation *κῶν σε θέλοισαν*, despite the fact that it is linguistically unobjectionable and achieved with minimum damage to the *paradosis*.

² I have tried to demonstrate this in an article published in *Mnemosyne*, series iv, vol. ix³ (1956), pp. 103-11, and especially pp. 109 f.

³ Page rightly rejects the notion that Sappho was a priestess of Aphrodite or an instructress in cult matters. The topsyturvy view of Aphrodite and Eros presented in Plato, *Symp.* 180 c-182 a certainly does not suggest that the goddess would be invoked in the case of a homosexual relationship in real life.

to put such a request in the form of a hymn would look like sacrilege or, at best, a poor jest. It seems safer to assume that, by invoking Aphrodite, Sappho proclaims her love for a man.

And there is nothing surprising in this. For, although she has much to say in her poems of her female friends, rivals, and enemies, she is known to have been married and to have had at least one child. If this situation is not incompatible with homosexual inclinations or practices, at least it does not point definitely towards them and might well lead in the other direction. I conclude that neither in the general context of fr. 1 nor in what is known of Sappho from other sources is there enough evidence to make us associate *κῶς ἐθέλοισα* with ll. 21-23, in face of the linguistic and other difficulties which this entails.

The solution, it seems to me, lies in reading *κῶς σὺ θέλοισα* and construing it with l. 25 *ἔλθε μοι καὶ νῦν*. We may compare the Aeschylean passage quoted by Page in his note on l. 27: *Cho.* 19 (*Ζεῦ*) *γενεὸν δὲ σύμμαχος θέλων ἐμοί*. Here *κῶς* will refer back to l. 5 *ἀλλὰ τιδ' ἔλθ', αἶ ποτα κἄτέρωτα*. The speech attributed to Aphrodite will now end at the close of l. 23, and *σὺ* in l. 24 will mean Aphrodite, addressed by Sappho. The corruption in the manuscripts might have arisen in various ways, of which I mention only the following:

OY CE

KOCCYΘ > KΩCCYΘ > KΩYCCEΘ > KΩYKEΘ

The vital mistake would seem to have been the adoption of the variants *ω* and *ου*, *σὺ* and *σε* into the text alongside each other. The restored text will mean: '... will soon love (you). Even so consent to come to me now ...'

By thus connecting l. 24 with ll. 25-28 we deprive ourselves of the only scrap of evidence for determining the sex of the subject of ll. 19-24. It is not possible for us to deny that it was a woman. The rumours and gossip that surround Sappho's life are not easily dispelled, and the evident warmth of her affection for some of her female companions does not allay suspicion. But at least we can say that fr. 1 gives no *positive* indication of a homosexual relationship of any kind or degree. I for my part would go farther and say that the invocation to Aphrodite in this poem suggests love for a man. To support this opinion I would cite the treatment of an ordinary love-theme (as it seems to me) in fr. 31 and also the failure of commentators to establish abnormality in other poems of Sappho.

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ARISTOPHANIC COSTUME AGAIN

PROFESSOR WEBSTER has replied briefly¹ to my article² on this subject, and has dealt elsewhere with the works of art.³ One point I will gladly concede. In referring (p. 69) the phlyakes-vases to 'the fourth or third century' I was quoting Pickard-Cambridge's words in *Dithyramb*, etc. (1927), p. 267.⁴ But in *Dramatic Festivals* (pub. 1953), Pickard-Cambridge, perhaps influenced by Trendall,⁵ speaks of the fourth century only.⁶ The point is important to Webster, as he wishes to connect these vase-paintings with Middle Comedy; but I was referring to Old Comedy.

I hope that the discussion has at least helped to bring into focus the points which are in dispute. Was the 'comic costume' worn (1) by *all* actors, or (2) by all actors taking male parts, or (3) by some of these only? Webster's language is precise: 'male characters must all wear the phallos on their tights or they would not be male; if the character is either naked or wearing short clothes, it is visible.' By 'naked' he means 'wearing only the tights', as he holds that these represent the skin.⁷ Pickard-Cambridge's view was never this; and even at the end of his life he would not go beyond admitting that 'the actor's dress often differed from that of real life by its gross indecency'.⁸ 'Often' is different from 'always'.

Webster's view admits of no exceptions. The great difficulty is that the only explicit reference in ancient literature (*Clouds* 537 f.) seems to mean that the phallus is not worn in the performance of this play:

οὐδὲν ἦλθε ραψαμένη σκύντων καθειμένον,
ἐρυθρὸν ἐξ ἄκρου, παχύ, τοῖς παιδίοις ἴν' ἢ γέλως.

Here Webster falls back on Körte's suggestion that the stress is on *καθειμένον*, 'dangling'. 'If it is tied up, it is inoffensive; if it "dangles etc.", it is meant to be offensive. Aristophanes means that the male characters in the *Clouds* were not meant to be offensive.'

There are several objections to this interpretation:

- (1) It is not obvious that *καθειμένον* is the emphatic word.
- (2) It is not obvious that a 'tied-up' phallus would be less offensive than a 'dangling' phallus, if both are visible and both are alike in other respects.
- (3) We can readily understand that the children would laugh at a visible phallus—they would today. It is not so easy to understand why Athenian children should be expected to laugh at the 'dangling' and not at the 'tied-up' type.
- (4) If we hold that the 'tied-up' type was sanctioned by tradition and that

¹ C.Q., N.S. v. 94 f.

² Ibid. iv. 64-75.

³ *Rylands Bulletin*, xxxvi (1954), 563-87, etc.

⁴ Cf. Bieber, *H. T.* (1939), p. 259, 'they continue far into the third century'.

⁵ A. D. Trendall, *Paestan Pottery*, 1936.

⁶ *D.F.*, p. 235: 'a period covering practically the same years as those of the Middle Comedy itself'.

⁷ Similarly Beazley, *A.J.A.* lvi (1952), 193, tells us that when a comic actor is seen to be wearing a garment with long trousers and long sleeves, we are to accept this as stage nudity. Cf. Bieber, *H. T.*, pp. 283, 292.

⁸ *D.F.*, p. 234; and compare p. 236: 'the phlyakes regularly wear tights, such as very rarely appear on Attic vases'—i.e. the tights are a distinctive, non-Attic feature of the phlyakes-costume.

the 'dangling' type was not, we are in effect making Aristophanes promise to follow established custom. But the context gives a list of stale tricks which he says he has avoided.

(5) The theme of the parabasis is not decency versus indecency, but cleverness versus stupid mechanical stage-business.

(6) Pickard-Cambridge himself tried, but apparently without success, to accept Körte's view. In 1907 he quoted it with the qualification 'possibly'.¹ In 1927 he said 'probably . . . Aristophanes only modified the grossness of the custom without entirely abolishing it'.² In his last book³ he evidently took the passage as referring to the wearing of the phallus, not to the way in which it was worn: 'Aristophanes' resolution . . . to avoid such indecencies does not seem to have lasted long', a remark which is evidently based on the presence of indecent passages in later plays. Indecent passages in the text have indeed been used to show that the phallus was worn, but I have not seen them used to show that it was worn in any special way. Indeed Körte used *Clouds* 734 to show that the phallus was worn even in this play. But according to Körte's own argument it must, at least in the *Clouds*, have been of the 'inoffensive tied-up' kind.

No doubt readers will differ widely as to whether jokes about the *néos* should be interpreted not in their literal sense but as references to a supposed feature of the comic costume. I dealt in my article with all the passages in Aristophanes which I have seen quoted as examples; some, at any rate, turned out to be very unconvincing, and I hope I may infer *ex silentio* that Webster accepts my argument with regard to *Clouds* 734, *Peace* 1349, *Thesm.* 141 ff. I added other equally indecent passages—e.g. *Wasps* 1374 ff. (some of which also 'use the deictic pronoun')—which cannot be explained in terms of the phallus. (I might have added another series of indecent jests similar to *Ecll.* 329.) Do these imply *visible* indecency? If they do not, if we allow that in these cases at least the spectators must have been content with words and gesture, can we be quite certain that similar reasoning does not apply to the passages in Körte's list?

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W. BEARE

A REPLY ON ARISTOPHANIC COSTUME

In answer to Professor Beare's note, which he has generously shown me, I would make the following points: (1) I think it unlikely that Middle Comedy was more obscene than Old Comedy, and the Attic vases go back to about 420 B.C. (see my *Greek Theatre Production*, pp. 56 f., particularly 66, and *Wiener Studien*, lxi (1956), 110 f.). (2) *Clouds* 537 f.: the 'dangling' phallus is more offensive because it is 'a symbol of a sexually dissipated life', and it is funnier because it wobbles about. (3) *Clouds* 734, *Thesm.* 141 ff. do not come into the argument because in both cases the relevant part is covered up. *Peace* 1349 is a description of the generalized future rather than of the particular present. (4) *Wasps* 1374: I believe that women's parts were played by men wearing white tights, which supported padding and breasts, and female masks. But the real point is, I think, that the phallus continues to be worn because it is an emblem of Dionysos.

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¹ *A.T.* 259, n. 1.

² *Dithyramb*, etc., p. 237, n. 1.

³ *D.F.*, p. 234, n. 2.

MANILIUS 1. 466-8 AND 515-17

ASTRONOMY has been known to profit on occasion from the observations of amateurs; and so perhaps, in its less technical passages, could the *Astronomica*. I venture to dispute the emendations of Mr. Shackleton Bailey (hereinafter S.B.) in the first two items of his learned Maniliana (*C.Q.*, N.S. vi. 81).

466 linea designat species, *atque ignibus ignes*
respondent; media extremis atque ultima summis
 creduntur; satis est si se non omnia celant.

'Housman finds *respondent* unintelligible' S.B.; well, not that verb in itself, but the three-word phrase. *se spondent* S.B.; 'fires pledge themselves by fires' etc.—see his explanation. Both the Latin and the idea are far too enigmatically artificial even for this author. *respondent* is in perfect accord with the present context; what is not so is 'fires'. True, fires have been prominent in 459-63: *fulgentia, lumine, incendia, ardebunt, flammis*, each word was there to the point; here, after the sense of 463-5, 'fires' is a scribal carry-over. The five neuters plural in 467-8 refer, not (as for S.B.) to stars as such, but to parts of the constellation concerned; so what we require is another neuter plural, *et singula signis* (whence presumably *etsi ignibus ignes*, with *atque* later substituted for 'sense'). 'And particular parts' i.e. *groups* of stars 'do correspond (cf. e.g. V. *Aen.* 1. 585) to the pictures (figures, objects represented); middle parts, (however,) are inferred from extremities' (what *could* be more lucid, *pace* Housman, than *creduntur*?) 'and'—but I am puzzled by the following pair, for *ultimus* is no antonym to *summus*, it is more like a synonym. 'And'—of course—'lower limbs are inferred from upper'; read *infima summis*; and, sure enough, at this point I discover that such was the conjecture of Ellis.

515 omnia mortali mutantur lege creata;
 nec se cognoscunt terrae uertentibus annis
 exultas, uariantque uicem per saecula gentes.

This text is Housman's of 1903 (italics of course excepted). His *uariantque uicem* 'may well be right' says S.B.; I feel sure it is; cf. 509-12, particularly *fortuna* and *uarie*. 'But in that case *exultas* must surely be wrong', proceeds S.B., and goes on to propose *excultas*. He complains that Housman's citation, *Hor. Ep.* 2. 2. 55, 'does not explain how lands are "stripped with the passing years" '; I quite agree. But *excultas* is out of tone with the whole context. Since 501 the poet has been contrasting the insecurity and evanescence of historic empires—and now, by extension, of terrestrial Nature—with the stability and permanence of the ordered heavens. *excultas* with *uert. ann.* would imply progressive amelioration; even within these three lines it must constitute a stumbling-block after *mortali*!

To me, *exultas* is about as convincing as a word of Latin verse could be. Consciously or not, Manilius in 516-17 is echoing *Iliad* 6. 146-9, presumably not without some general influence from the series of 'imitations'; and to me, γεγενῆσθαι ἢ μὲν . . . ἢ δὲ . . . confirms *gentes* as against Housman's strange *uariamque* . . . *agentes* (of 1932)—and at the same time supports his *uariantque uicem*. But I agree with S.B. that something is wrong. *annus uertens* was a stock phrase—and that will be why a scribe has seen it here. The poet will have written *uergentibus*, with the sense seen in, for example, *uergente iam die* (Suet. *Oth.* 7).

At Hor. *A.P.* 60 I still (cf. my 1945 ed. of *Odes*, last page of notes) firmly believe in (Bentley's disowned) *nudantur*, and in the view (disputed by Bentley) that *prunos in annos* is sound and that the sense is 'woods are stripped of their leaves every autumn'; there too the symbol is of mutability, and I suggest that that line also was influential with Manilius here. Cf. too Verg. *Aen.* 6. 309 *autumni frigore primo lapsa cadunt folia*. Since Housman on Horace's line agreed (*J. Phil.* xviii. 26) with Bentley and accepted his *priuos*, it is strange that for his defence of *uert. ann. ex.* he did not cite that line in place of the one which surprises Mr. Shackleton Bailey. Let others, then, do so, if they will. But the objections to *priuos* of Wilkins (in 1892 appendix) are sound; and what cannot be reconciled with Bentley's 60 is 61.

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SPLIT ANAPAESTS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SOME PASSAGES OF ALEXIS

I

THE aim of this paper is the discussion, and in some cases also, it is hoped, the clarification, of several passages in the fragments of the comic poet Alexis, where either the traditional text has been attacked because there occurred in it an allegedly objectionable split anapaest, or alternatively an excellent emendation has been rejected because laws framed by modern scholars have wrongly been applied to the passage being emended. Consequently it will be plain that although the scope of this essay precludes a detailed discussion of the problems which relate to split anapaests in the comic trimeter, yet a sketch of the general principles that appear to govern their permitted occurrence will be both relevant and necessary before an examination is made in detail of those passages in Alexis where the transmitted text allegedly runs counter to the commonly accepted rules.

These rules were first coherently formulated by K. Bernhardt,¹ although heated arguments had gone on for many years over the question; a summary of the discussions, with their bibliography, is to be found in the earlier pages of Bernhardt's dissertation. Bernhardt's rules, which owed much to earlier work by Reisig, were framed too strictly, giving rise to a host of exceptions²—exceptions that were ruthlessly eliminated by emendation, after the example of Elmsley.³ Years elapsed before common sense supervened, and it was realized that the rules were too rigid, and the practice of emendation too rife; not even Perschinka,⁴ who reconsidered many of the eliminated exceptions, was blameless in this respect. The return to level-headedness was led by White,⁵ whose new formulation of the rules contained a warning against rashness: 'wholesale correction (i.e. by emendation) merely because the rhythm is supposed to be objectionable is not to be countenanced'; his more cautious approach was fol-

¹ K. Bernhardt, 'De incisionibus anapaesti in trimetro comico graecorum', *Acta Soc. Phil. Lipsiensis*, i (1872), 245-86, of which pp. 245-76 = *Dissert. Lipsiensis* (1871), pp. 3-34. His rules may here be briefly stated: (i) Polysyllables are not terminated after the first or second short of an anapaest in the third and fifth feet, but may be in the second and fourth, provided there is 'close connexion' between the words involved in the split anapaest, and that there is penthemimeral caesura. (ii) Mono- and disyllabic enclitics, and the particles *án*, *ápa*, *yápa*, *δέ*, *μέν* may not begin an anapaest, except in the second and fourth feet, under the same conditions as polysyllables. Other mono- and disyllables may occur in an anapaest with some freedom, but except for the article, prepositions, and oaths such as *νῆ τὸν Δία τὸν σωτήρα*, their occurrence in feet other

than the first is allowed only if they follow a punctuated pause. (iii) A strong pause does not occur after the first or second short, except in the first foot. (iv) Elision of a polysyllable is allowed freely after the first or second short of an anapaest in all feet except the last; but punctuation there is allowed only in the first, second, and fourth feet.

² B. Snell, *Griechische Metrik* (Göttingen, 1955), p. 11: 'Ausnahmen etwa alle 700 Verse einmal'.

³ On Ar. *Acharnians* 178.

⁴ F. Perschinka, 'De mediae et novae quae vocatur comoediae atticae trimetro iambico', *Dissertationes Philologiae Vindobonenses*, iii (1891), 355-60.

⁵ J. W. White, *The Verse of Greek Comedy* (London, 1912), pp. 45-48; the quotation is p. 47, n. 1.

lowed by later editors such as Elliott.¹ White added further a list of the more glaring exceptions which no law could satisfactorily explain away, and this was done also by Descroix² later, with little accretion. As a result little remains to be done in the way of general rule formulation, except to emphasize that laws which tell one what is permitted are generally more successful than those which are a catalogue of 'don'ts'. The following summary is rather a positive recapitulation of White's own rules with a few amendments than a new conflation:

1. In comedy the rules defining enclitics, proclitics, and their equivalents are much broader than in tragedy. For our purposes the following can be considered as proclitic: (a) monosyllabic: parts of the article, prepositions, relative and interrogative pronouns, accented personal pronouns, provided they may all be scanned as one short syllable; and (b) disyllabic: prepositions, the word *Δία* in oaths, many common adverbs, conjunctions, and pronouns, several common imperatives of verbs (e.g. *ἄγε, φέρε*), provided they may all be scanned as two shorts. Between these words and the words following them any break may be ignored.
2. If at the incision in a split anapaest there is also elision, breaks generally may be ignored.
3. In cases where rules 1 and 2 do not apply: (a) In the first foot a break after the second short is frequent, even with punctuation at the break. (b) In the second and fourth feet a break after the first or second short is not uncommon; there is often (but not invariably) a penthemimeral caesura, and relatively often there is a 'close connexion' (see p. 192, n. 4) between the two words involved. Breaks in the third and fifth feet are less common, but do incontrovertibly occur. (c) In general, cases of a break after the second short are about twice as frequent as cases of a break after the first short.³

These rules are guides, not tyrants, and to be used only as secondary evidence when one considers the liability to corruption of a particular word or passage. Three other factors are of greater general significance: the value of the

¹ See especially his note, p. 140 of his ed. of Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, (on. 178). His great contemporary editor of Aristophanes, W. J. M. Starkie, tended unfortunately to make the same mistakes as Bernhardt. The rules he gave in his edition of the *Wasps*, pp. xxxvii-ix, require the postulation of corruption in *Vesp.* 25, 967, 1369 and *Lys.* 927 (where all the manuscripts agree, providing texts that it would be difficult to 'improve'); special pleading is needed to defend *Av.* 20 and *Thesm.* 637; in *Nub.* 62 and *Ran.* 1307 it seems difficult to explain how the readings of R and U respectively could have become corrupted; Elmsley's *πλέωνες* in *Ach.* 1078 would give us a spelling unparalleled in Aristophanes for the plural of *πλείων*; in *Nub.* 876 *καίτοι γε* without a word intervening is not impossible: see Denniston, *Greek Particles*, ed. 2, p. 564; only at *Av.* 93 (intrusion of article into the manuscripts: see p. 197, n. 1) and at *Nub.* 238 (*ἐνεν* is *difficilior lectio*: *οὐνεκα* is over twice as frequent in Aristophanes) is Starkie justified.

² J.-M. Descroix, *La Trimètre Iambique*, Mâcon, 1931, pp. 210-11. I find that there is another paper whose title suggests that it may have touched on this subject: Sacht-schal, *De com. gr. metro accommodato* (Vratislava, 1908). I have, however, not come across a copy.

³ This does not appear to have been sufficiently emphasized. A fair sample even of punctuated pauses after the second short can be given; Bernhardt himself admitted *Sotades* 2. 447-8, 1 v. 23 (2nd foot), and *Ar. Aves* 1226 (4th foot); Perschinka noted *Dionysius* 2. 423-4, 2 v. 19 (2nd foot); further examples are *Ar. Lys.* 731 (2nd foot), *Plut.* 417 (3rd foot), and *Menander, Pk.* 184 (3rd foot). It would have been attractive to add also *Menander fr.* 11 v. 2 (*Demiańczuk*), but the editor appears to misinterpret the fragment: see Körte-Thierfelder, *Menander* ii fr. 368: yet cf. p. 293.

manuscript tradition of the text involved,¹ the presence or absence in the passage of additional indications of corruption, and the rhythm of the word groupings when they are read aloud. The last factor deserves greater study than it has hitherto received.

So much for the general survey. In Alexis, though one may count eighty-four² instances of split anapaests if one does not discriminate according to the given rules, there are only some eight instances among them which seem to require comment. These I propose to discuss, together with four other passages that seem pertinent: frs. 16 v. 11, 25 v. 5, 187 v. 6, and 279 v. 4.³

II

The passages for discussion are, in addition to the four given above, frs. 56 v. 4, 108 v. 1, 135 v. 6, 155 v. 3, 173 v. 15, 209 v. 7, 255 v. 3, and 257 v. 2.⁴

1. Kock, ii. 303, 16 v. 11; Meineke, iii. 391, *Apegl.* ii.

Kock prints 'ὦ τᾶν,⁵ λαβέ καὶ μὴ παῖζε.' 'τοσοῦδ'; παράτρεχε.' The situation is an attack on fish-sellers and their grasping ways. A man asks the price of two grey mullets and is told 'ten obols'; the buyer tries to bargain the price down to eight obols, but is told 'only if you take both of them'. Then our line of text, which in Kock's versions would mean, 'My dear sir, take (the eight), and don't fool.' 'At such a price? Get away!' The sense is perfect, and the syntax impeccable; admittedly the line breaks Bernhardt's rules, having a break after the first short in the fourth foot, without a penthemimeral caesura, while instead of the required close connexion in thought required between the words that break the anapaest we find interpunctuation and a change of 'speaker' in the imaginary conversation which forms our text. Yet this rhythmic irregularity would, I feel, give anyone few qualms in accepting the text as it stands, since sense and syntax are so good, if only we could say that the text was based on a unanimous manuscript tradition. Unfortunately, however,

¹ Hence the text of a fragment cited by Athenaeus, for all that he is a careful excerptor (see K. Zepernick, *Philologus*, lxxvii (1921), pp. 311-63), is always more liable to suspicion than a passage of Aristophanes with a unanimous textual reading, or, for that matter, than the papyrus text of a continuous passage of Menander. For a neat example of this see P. Maas, *Textkritik*, 2nd ed. (Leipzig, 1950), p. 24, para. 40.

² For my computation I include ἐνὶ κῶμον in fr. 107 v. 1, since Leo's conjecture (*Hermes*, xliii (1908), 308), which completes the line, seems most plausible; in fr. 135 v. 6 I read Ἐπίχαρμος, Ὀμηρος, *vide infra*; fr. 155 v. 3 is to be scanned σπηιδιά καὶ, see p. 194, n. 3; in frs. 186 v. 1 and 189 v. 3 there is slight corruption, but it seems likely that we have split anapaests in the fourth and first feet respectively; I have included also fr. 340, where there is doubt over the attribution. Excluded are fr. 25 (see below, II. 2, and p. 192, n. 1), fr. 77 v. 3, where ἐνὶ τᾶν are the words of Athenaeus, not of Alexis; frs.

16 v. 11, 187 v. 6, and 279 v. 4, which are discussed below with fr. 25 v. 5, are excluded, as well as the papyri fragments (Pack, nos. 1291 and 1293) which have been attributed to Alexis on unconvincing grounds.

³ All references to comic fragments, unless it is otherwise stated, are to Kock, *C.A.F.*, except those of Menander (*Körte-Thierfelder*).

⁴ It will be seen that fr. 210 v. 3, cited as an exception by Descroix, pp. 220-1, is allowed under Bernhardt's third rule, and hence does not require discussion: Perschinka, p. 358, cites as parallels Antiphanes 2. 124, 275 v. 1 and Epicrates 2. 282-3, 3 v. 9; add Ar. *Nub.* 3: all these, instances of elision in the third foot. Fr. 222 v. 7 is cited by Perschinka, p. 355, as an exception; but similar first-foot inter-punctuated breaks occur even in Menander (*Epir.* 384); and cf. Ar. *Vesp.* 998, *Lys.* 731, *Ecc.* 1056, *Ran.* 1462 (all these cases before ἀλλά).

⁵ Kock in fact prints τᾶν, but the common orthography is τᾶν: see L.S.J., s.v. τᾶν.

Kock's text is not based on the manuscripts, but rather on Dobree's conjecture in his edition of Aristophanes' *Plutus* 361. The text in Athenaeus gives instead of *τοσουδί, τοὺς οὐδεῖ* (A), and *τοῦ σοι δεῖ* (epitome).¹ The manuscript readings suggest an original and already corrupt but undivided *τοσουδαι* in an ultimate common ancestor.

Dobree's conjecture won the support of both Kock and Kaibel, and the excellence of the sense it gives combined with its closeness to the manuscript reading prevents any off-hand rejection of it purely on metrical grounds. We must at least see if there are any parallels for an anapaest broken under the same conditions. Aristophanes provides one example of a fourth-foot anapaest broken after the first syllable, also with a change of speaker at the break: Ar. *Vesp.* 1369, a passage which editors have sought to emend, despite the good idiom, excellent sense, and complete unanimity of the manuscripts.² Here also there is no penthemimeral caesura. In addition to this passage there are a number of passages where the manuscripts of Aristophanes generally present the verb *ἐστίν* or other verbs ending in *ε* and the 'nu ephelkystikon' as the first component of an irregularly split anapaest, followed by a change of speaker and a word beginning with a vowel. Radermacher discusses this class of examples in his edition of the *Frogs*;³ his plea for an unpedantic treatment of them, and his conclusion that generally *ἔστ'* or *ἔστι* is probably correct, and anything else unlikely, seem reasonable. At any rate we should be very unwise to accept examples of this sort as relevant evidence here. Ar. *Vesp.* 1369 seems therefore to be the sole reliable example of a change of speaker or a strong pause in a fourth-foot anapaest broken $\cup | \cup -$, without penthemimeral caesura; unless, that is, we are willing to accept Ehippus 2. 260, 17 v. 1, *οὐ Μενεκράτης μὲν ἔφασκεν εἶναι Ζεὺς θεός*, where already *Ζεὺς θεός* is a correction of the manuscript reading *ὁ θεός*, and the *μὲν* which forms part of the split anapaest looks remarkably like a dittography of the *Μεν-* in *Μενεκράτης*.

It is hard, therefore, to justify Dobree's⁴ emendation on metrical grounds, and unless we can show that it is the only one that makes good sense and explains the manuscript corruption, it will be even harder to justify our acceptance of it. This we cannot show. Kock attempted to preserve Dobree's conjecture and at the same time to restore metrical regularity by suggesting *λαβέ, μή παίσις* before the *τοσουδί*; but to emend where the text seems healthy in order to save a conjecture that is metrically doubtful is hardly good textual criticism. Bernhardt's *τοσουδί*,⁵ however, has much to recommend it. It takes into account the manuscript readings; and it makes excellent sense—sense in fact just as good as that of Dobree's conjecture: '... and don't fool.' 'Those? (sc. *hos octo obolos*) Get away!' In choosing between a conjecture that presupposes an inter-punctuated splitting of the anapaest which is probably unparalleled after old comedy, and one that avoids such an anomaly, other things being equal, we shall prefer the latter. This fragment therefore does not present us with an example of an irregularly split anapaest.

¹ Athenaeus 6. 225 a: ed. G. Kaibel (Leipzig, 1887-90), ii. 6; S. P. Peppink (Epitome) (Leyden, 1937), i. 85.

² But rightly printed by Coulon, and defended by E. Fraenkel, *Aeschylus' Agamemnon*, iii. 579 (on vv. 1256 f.).

³ 2nd ed. revised by W. Kraus (Vienna,

1954), pp. 312 f., on v. 1220. Cf. also the remarks of Elliott, loc. cit., p. 189, n. 1.

⁴ Or, for that matter, Coraes' (in Schweighaeuser's ed. of Athenaeus) *τόσου δεῖ*, which also splits the anapaest, while giving less acceptable sense than Dobree's.

⁵ Op. cit., p. 256.

2. Kock, ii. 306, 25 v. 5; Meineke, iii. 394, *Asotod*.

χαίρωμεν, ἕως ἔνεστι τὴν ψυχὴν τρέφειν.

I have attempted elsewhere¹ to assemble the evidence suggesting that this fragment does not derive from any play of Alexis, but is probably a forgery written at Alexandria little if at all before the time of Sotion. Under these circumstances we should be unwise to demand the same obedience to metrical laws as we find, for instance, in Menander. Nevertheless it can be argued that this verse does not offend against Bernhardt's metrical canons at all, and that the second foot is not to be scanned as an anapaest, but by synecphonesis of the ἕως as a simple iambus. This point was first made by Bernhardt (pp. 260-1) who defended it as tragic colour; Jebb's generally accepted conjectures at Sophocles *Phil.* 1330 and *O.C.* 1361 would provide exact parallels. However, the 'tragic colour' need not be postulated here; such synizeses are found in comedy.² Apart from the common licence allowed with the genitive singular in -εως and the plural in -εων, and parts of the word θεός, Aristophanes has the following certain examples at least: ἐῶ (subj. of ἔδω: *Lys.* 734, Iambics), ἔα (part of ἔδω: *Nub.* 932, Anapaests [unless the δ' is a scribe's insertion]); *Ecc.* 784, (Iambics), νῆανικὴν and νῆανιών in lyrics (*Vesp.* 1067 and 1069 respectively). We may consider as probable also several places that exactly parallel the passage we are discussing: where synizesis would remove the need to postulate an irregularly split anapaest. Such are *Pl.* 824 (ἔα as interjection), and *Av.* 1495, *Thes.* 64 and 176 (ἔα as part of ἔδω). ἔα (as part of ἔδω) is scanned as a monosyllable in Soph. *O.R.* 1451 (see Jebb, ad loc.) and *Ant.* 95, and ἔασον is conjectured by Jebb at Soph. *O.C.* 1192 to be scanned as a disyllable.

3. Kock, ii. 316, 56 v. 4; Meineke, iii. 407, *Dork.* i.

ἔχουσιν ὁππὸν κάραβον ἐν τῇ δεξιᾷ.

The reading is unanimous;³ the sense unexceptionable. And the disobedience to Bernhardt's first rule is not serious: we have the penthemimeral caesura, even if the required 'close connexion'⁴ between κάραβον and ἐν is rather difficult to maintain. In this case it would appear that the fault lies in the excessive stringency of Bernhardt's rule; certainly there are a fair number of well-attested examples of anapaests broken after the second short in feet other than the first, where the 'close connexion' of Bernhardt's rule is not to be found;⁵ and Descroix (p. 218) tries to make a case for allowing a break after the second short before certain monosyllables such as ἐν, ἐκ, οὐ, καί, etc., which, however, is considerably weakened by the author's failure to take into account the different degrees of licence granted to a comic poet depending on the presence or

¹ *C.Q.* xlix (1955), 210 ff.

² See Descroix, op. cit., p. 31, and Kühner-Blass, i. 227-8.

³ Athenaeus iii. 104 d: Kaibel, i. 239; Peppink *Epit.* i. 21.

⁴ The trouble is mainly that Bernhardt nowhere defines what he means by this 'close connexion'; and so leaves room only for a subjective interpretation of his words. Most probably we must assume the reference is to a degree of closeness less strong than that of enclitic, proclitic, and equivalent words, but

at least as strong as the relationship between noun and adjective (ἐμὸς υἱός, II. 4 of my group of passages) or between verb and adverb (Menander *Samia* 97, βλέπε δεῦρ').

⁵ Certain fourth-foot examples are Ar. *Ach.* 107, Cratinus 1. 89, 250 v. 2, Philemon 2. 536, 228 v. 2, Menander fr. 397 v. 3 (Kö.-Th., p. 141), without punctuation; Ar. *Aves* 1226 and Eubulus 2. 166, 7 v. 9 with punctuation; and Ar. *Pax* 233 with punctuation and change of speaker.

absence of elision and the position of the split anapaest, first foot or otherwise. Yet if we pay due attention to the passage of P. Maas's *Textkritik* cited in n. 1, p. 190, we shall not deny that possibly Alexis may have written *κάραβον ἔχουσιν ὅππὸν ἐν τῇ δεξιᾷ*.

4. Kock, ii. 334, 108 v. 1; Meineke, iii. 428, *Kour.* ii.

ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐμὸς υἱὸς κτλ.

Again a unanimous reading¹ and perfect sense, and no question as to our acceptance of the 'irregular' split anapaest. The penthemimeral caesura and the 'close connexion' between adjective and noun (see p. 192, n. 4) relieve us of any necessity to defend it; we may compare Metagenes 1. 706, fr. 6 v. 6, and the poet of D. L. Page's *G.L.P.*, p. 296, fr. 64 (5) v. 34. The same words ἐμὸς | υἱὸς occur in the first foot of Men. *Samia* 132; cf. also Ar. *Lys.* 838 (fourth foot).

5. Kock, ii. 345, 135 v. 6; Meineke, iii. 443, *Lin.* i.

In Athenaeus, the citer of the fragment, the Codex Marcianus reads:² *Χοίριλος, "Ομηρος, 'Επίχαρμος, συγγράμματα*, giving an impossible line; in the fourth foot, -αρμος cannot be scanned otherwise than as a spondee, and there is no evidence for an orthography *'Επίχαρμος*.³ The line is corrupt, and the nature of the corruption is made clear by the paraphrase of the passage in the Epitome:⁴ 'ἐντυχεῖν Ὀρφῆως, Ἡσιόδου, Χοιρίλου, Ἐπιχάρμου, Ὀμήρου, ὡς ἂν δηλώσῃ κτλ'. Two points here are worthy of note. First, although the epitomizer has omitted the *τραγωδία* and *συγγράμματα παντόδαπα* of A, he has preserved all the named authors without any alteration, and spelled them all correctly, even the less well-known name Choerilus; from this fact we may infer that the manuscript corruption does not lie in the actual selection of names in the text.⁵ Secondly, in the epitomizer's list the names *Ὀμηρος* and *'Επίχαρμος* have their order interchanged. Consequently it appears very likely that the corruption in our manuscripts is nothing more serious than a change of order, possibly involving *'Επίχαρμος*; and if we interchange *Χοίριλος* and *'Επίχαρμος* (a conjecture first made by Jacobs⁶), all the objectionable elements in the line are removed:

'Επίχαρμος, Ὀμηρος, Χοίριλος, συγγράμματα . . .

J. W. White (p. 49) counts 80 lines in Aristophanes alone beginning with two anapaests, and Descroix gives a figure of 126 (p. 202), which presumably includes all the comic poets. And the split ∪ | ∪ - in the second foot does not after all break Bernhardt's rules, since there is a penthemimeral caesura, and Bernhardt admits relaxation of his rule requiring a close tie between the component parts of the broken anapaest and excluding interpunctuation when we have a list and especially a list of proper names (Bernhardt, p. 258). Ar. *Nubes* 684: *Δυσύλλα, Φιλύνα, κτλ.*, is an unshakeable parallel.

¹ Athenaeus 10. 443 d; Kaibel, ii. 464; Peppink Epit. ii. 42.

² Athenaeus 4. 164 c; Kaibel, i. 370.

³ As suggested by Naeke, *Choerili Samii quae supersunt* (Leipzig, 1817), p. 5.

⁴ Peppink Epit. i. 53.

⁵ Hence we shall reject any conjectures that introduce new names in place of those in the manuscript, such as Erfurdt's *Αισχύλος* for *Χοιρίλος*.

⁶ Add. Ath., pp. 103 f.

⁷ Two lines sometimes cited as parallels [Ar. *Thesm.* 1184, *Ran.* 1393] are not lists; on the former, in any case, representing as it does a Scythian's broken Greek, no arguments can safely be based, while the latter has been emended with some plausibility to *μέθετε*. | *μεθεῖται*: see Rademacher and Coulon, ad loc. Certainly Aristophanes seems normally to avoid amphibrach rhythm at the beginning of a trimeter, as Starkie (op. cit., p. xxxviii, n. 3) shows.

Naeke's argument (op. cit. p. 193, n. 3), which would invalidate this emendation, just does not hold water. He claims that Choerilus cannot be removed from his position in the text as given by such manuscripts as A, because there is allegedly a kind of order in the sequence of names: Orpheus and Hesiod come first as ancients, then tragedy and its first Attic writer Choerilus, then Homer, and last comedy and its author Epicharmus. But Choerilus of course was never considered the first writer of tragedy, and if we had a logical order, comedy and tragedy would hardly be separated by Homer, whose place is with the 'ancients', Hesiod and Orpheus. The order of names is in fact random, and the manuscript errors in the first place were caused in all probability by a scribe's attempt to achieve a more significant order.¹

6. Kock, ii. 354, 155 v. 3; Meineke, iii. 455, *Od. Hyph.* ii.

τρυγίδια καὶ σπηγίδια καὶ φρυκτούς τῖνας.

σπηγίδια C, σικχηγίδια A.²

It would be idle to discuss this line without being aware that in the following line there seems to be a crux in the manuscripts, since the text they present appears to contradict directly the sense of what precedes. In our line, however, the textual divergence is unimportant; the peculiar nonsense of A is perhaps due to an unconscious telescoping of the correct σπηγίδια with the word that would be in a Byzantine scribe's thoughts as he read about the squeamish and fastidious eater who despises the fish in our verse 3: σικχός. Under the assumption that the line is sound, therefore, and that the second syllable of σπηγίδια is long,³

¹ On such transpositions in our manuscripts see Headlam, *C.R.* xvi (1902), 243 ff. ² Athenaeus 7. 302 f: Kaibel, ii. 167; Peppink *Epit.* i. 135.

³ The second syllable of σπηγίδιον is always long whenever the word occurs in a non-corrupt and checkable passage of comedy: Ar. frs. 247, 318 (σπηγίδιον, σπηγίδια at end of the line); Ephippus 2. 251-2, 3 v. 9 (a passage almost identical with Eubulus 2. 214, 150 v. 6: possibly Ephippus borrowed lines from Eubulus, or possibly Athenaeus made an error in one of the two places concerning the attribution, citing Eubulus at 2. 65 c [Kaibel, i. 153], and Ephippus at 9. 370 c, d [Kaibel, ii. 309, Peppink *Epit.* ii. 4, where the epitome's text *κουή τ' ἐναύειν* is incorrect); Ephippus 2. 258-9, 15 v. 4 (where vv. 3 and 4 are again almost identical with Eubulus 2. 204, 110 vv. 1 and 2, except that in the second line—the relevant one—the text of Eubulus is *δόσις ἔνεκα, σπηγίδι' ἢ τευθίδια*. If this is to scan we must allow the solecism of *τευθίδια* with a long antepenultimate; the line therefore is probably corrupt, and ought to be restored, as L.S.J. suggests [s.v. *τευθίδιον*], to *δόσις ἔνεκα' ἀρκεῖ τευθίδια, σπηγίδια*, which is the corresponding line of Ephippus).

W. Petersen, *Greek Diminutives in -ION* (Weimar, 1910), p. 217, suggested an interesting rule for the length of the iota in the

antepenultimate of *-ίδιον* diminutives—that the iota is lengthened in comedy when it bears the ictus; this rule does not always work, however. For instance in Ar. fr. 204, the ictus is on the second syllable of *κυνίδιον*, but it remains short; cf. also Ar. *Pax* 202, *Ran.* 60, Antiphanes 2. 23, 33 v. 4, and Menander fr. 793 Kō.-Th. (= 765 Kock), in all of which places we should be compelled to postulate both irregular broken anapaests and the anomaly of allowing the antepenultimate iota to be long here alone and nowhere else for the word in question, if we followed Petersen's canon. In fact the reasons which govern the lengthening and shortening of the antepenultimate iota in *-ίδιον* diminutives are by no means as simple as Petersen would make them. Often with words such as *σπηγίδιον*, where there is an iota in the stem of the primitive, contraction to *-ίδιον* may have been felt to take place (Schwyzer, *Gr. Gr.* i. 471), and once some diminutives had been formed on this principle, popular analogy might extend the lengthening to other nouns without an iota in the primitive stem. Vice versa, when we meet such formations as *κωβίδιον*, it is not impossible that common usage irrationally pronounced the antepenultimate iota short from a fallacious analogy of words such as *κυνίδιον*, where the primitive has no iota in the stem.

we are presented with an anapaest broken after the second short in the fourth foot, as in 56 v. 4, but on this occasion without penthemimeral caesura: according to Bernhardt's rules, the more objectionable of the two cases. Descroix,¹ however, shows that just as a monosyllable quasi-proclitic preposition often forms the second member of a regular split anapaest—56 v. 4 is an excellent example—so also occasionally the licence is extended to proclitic particles such as *καί*. Certain parallels are Ar. *Plutus* 476 (no penthemimeral caesura, *τύμπανα καί* in second foot), Menander fr. 303 Kō.-Th. p. 113 (penthemimeral caesura, *νῆ Δία, καί* in fourth foot of v. 5, and interpunctuation).² Bernhardt was consequently worried unnecessarily about this line when he suggested (p. 275) an intolerable emendation, *σηπιδι' ἦ*, but Perschinka tolerates the lines, as well as others where there is no penthemimeral caesura: cf. Bato, iii. 326, 2 v. 1 and Menander fr. 397 v. 3 Kō.-Th., two passages where there is no question of manuscript corruption, so far as we can see.

7. Kock, ii. 361-2, 173 v. 15; Meineke, iii. 464, *Pann.* ii.

A: . . . ἀλλ' ἔχει κάπνην;

B: ἔχει. A: κακόν, εἰ τύφουσιν. B: ἀπολεῖ μ' οὔτοσι.

'A' is a cook pestering his interlocutor about the condition of his *σπῆνιον*. Athenaeus' text raises no problems, but we have only the Codex Marcianus to fall back upon; the fragment is omitted by the epitomist.³ By Bernhardt's canon, the break in the anapaest is objectionable because of the interpunctuation, which emphasizes the absence of any tie between the words that form the split anapaest. So Bernhardt (p. 283) rejects the text as we have it, and wishes to write *κάπνην τύφουσιν*; (cf. Kock), or *κάκ', εἰ τύφουσιν*. This of course is foolhardy. The text is otherwise unimpeachable, and the sense ideal as the passage stands: it presents us with lively dialogue that is in tone with the speakers, a fussy cook and a disgruntled householder; change can only weaken the effect. Passages such as this are allowed by Perschinka (p. 357); for parallels we have Dionysius 2. 423-4, 2 v. 19, and Ar. *Lys.* 731 (where there is also change of speaker), and possibly also Tim. 2. 464, 29 v. 2 (where the manuscript reading is altered by Kock and Kaibel).

8. Kock, ii. 367, 187 vv. 5-6; Meineke, iii. 471, *Pon.* iii.

δειπνούντων ἄμα

ἐπὶ τὸ τάγηνον σίζον ἐπεισιῶν φέρω.

I print the manuscript text: there is no divergence between A and the epitome.⁴ A cook is describing his preparation of the *σηπία*. While the diners are still eating, he brings τὸ σῶμα of the fish ('*σίζον coniungendum cum σῶμα*', Kock) sizzling to the frying-pan,⁵ as he *ἐπεισέρχεται*.

¹ Op. cit., p. 218.

² The example that might be quoted from tragedy (*ἔδῃσ' αὖ καί* in fourth foot, Eur. *Iph. A.* 1596) is probably a Byzantine forgery: see Professor D. Page, *Actors' Interpolations in Greek Tragedy* (Oxford, 1934), p. 196. Certainly, apart from the *Iph. A.* and the *Cyclops*, and excluding proper names, we do not find anapaests—let alone split ones—in Greek tragedy except in the first foot; for Eur. *Heraclid.* 223 is desperately corrupt (Murray

in O.T., and G. Zuntz, *Political Plays of Euripides* [Manchester, 1954], p. 108).

³ Athenaeus 9. 386 b, c: Kaibel, ii. 342.

⁴ Athenaeus 7. 324 c: Kaibel, ii. 213; Peppink Epit. i. 150.

⁵ This must be the way to interpret *φέρω*; it is the only word in the text as we have it which can govern *ἐπὶ τὸ τάγηνον*, since *ἐπεισιῶν* and *σίζον* cannot (the latter verb would require *ἐπὶ τῷ τάγηνῳ*).

The metrical irregularity of v. 6 is the split anapaest in the fourth foot. There is, however, a penthemimeral caesura, even though a strong tie between the words forming the anapaest which would normally excuse the irregularity is completely lacking. But parallels to our line are not hard to find; in addition to the ones usually cited,¹ Eupolis (Prof. D. L. Page, *Gk. Literary Pap.*, p. 208, fr. 40 v. 33) gives us a case with punctuation emphasizing the split of the anapaest. Yet all the parallels come from Old Comedy, with the exception of Antiphanes 2. 45, 85 v. 2; this passage has been attacked, but the clarity of the manuscript text and its complete appositeness make alteration unnecessary. There is no warrant therefore for changing our text purely on metrical grounds.

But there is a difficulty with the sense of the line, too. Meineke first noticed it, and Perschinka (p. 359) consequently was able to base his suspicions of corruption on more than metrical evidence. The trouble lies in the word *ἐπεισιών*: what can the word mean in the context? L.S.J. shows that its Attic usage is confined to the meanings (a) 'coming in besides / in addition', and (b) 'coming in after / behind'. Neither meaning here appears particularly apt, though the second is just possible, if we postulate a not entirely uncharacteristic vagueness of expression on the part of the writer, leaving us to supply some such notion as '(coming in) after the guests' from *τῶν δειπνούντων*. Gulick's interpretation,² deduced from the extended use in Aeschines 3. 153, 'coming next upon the stage', I find difficulty in accepting in a context where this metaphorical use of the word is not suggested by any other expression in the sentence.

The difficulty of both metre and sense is solved if we accept Meineke's brilliant conjecture *ἐπισείων*: 'I bring the body of the fish sizzling to the pan, shaking it on to it.' *ἐπὶ τὸ τάγηνον* is now governed jointly by *φέρω* and *ἐπισείων*, by the common idiom. Kock's laconic objection to *ἐπισείων* in this sense and construction—*exempla desidero*—can hardly be maintained. The verb *ἐπισείω* means (1) 'shake on / against'; (2) 'urge on' (cf. Alexis 2. 298, 3 v. 1 quoting Eur. *Orestes* 255); in the present passage the meaning (1) is in place. Admittedly there is a shortage of exact parallels, but this is probably accidental. Perhaps it is not irrelevant to point to Pollux 4. 107, where it is explained of the mask name *ἐπίσειοτος* that the hair *ἐπισείονται* on to the forehead.

9. Kock, ii. 373-4, 209 v. 7; Meineke, iii. 478, *Strat.*

B. ἀπεδώκαμεν. A. τὸ μὴ προσήκον ἐμοὶ λαβεῖν.

Casaubon has corrected A's *ἀποδεδώκαμεν*,³ but otherwise the line presents the manuscript reading.⁴ The context is the quibble *δοῦναι* / *ἀποδοῦναι* in which Alexis is comically imitating the Demosthenic casuistry of the Halonnesos debate.

Bernhardi, pp. 246-7, following Reisig,⁴ repudiates all forms of irregularly split anapaests in the fifth foot, except where an elision softens the break; and leaving the present passage aside, I know of only one reasonably certain excep-

¹ e.g. Ar. *Aves* 441, 1644, *Ran.* 652, 658, *Ecl.* 998; Plato *Com.* 1. 607, 28 v 1 (cited by J. W. White, op. cit., p. 48, or Descroix, op. cit., pp. 220-1): passages sometimes wantonly altered by Bernhardi, against a unanimous manuscript tradition.

² In the Loeb edition of the passage (see

his translation, and n. b on it).

³ Athenaeus 6. 223 e (citation only in A (and derivatives), not in the Epitome): Kaibel, ii. 3.

⁴ *Diar. Jenens.*, Dec. 1817, pp. 393 ff. This article I have not seen.

tion to the rule: οὐκ ἂν ἐσώζετο at the end of Ar. *Ecc.* 219 (MSS. unanimous).¹ Consequently we are probably not justified in retaining the ἐμοί, especially in a case where emendation is so easy: whether we accept in its place the enclitic μοι or ἐμέ (Meineke, followed by Bernhardt p. 247). The latter is the more attractive solution, if we compare a precisely parallel corruption to the one we postulate in Plato, *Gorgias* 491 c, d, where the first hand of F has corrupted the correct reading of BTP τούτους γὰρ προσήκει τοῦτοις γ. π.

10. Kock, ii. 390, 255 vv. 2-3; Meineke, iii. 500, *Phryg.* i.

οὐδ' ἂν εἰς οἶνόν ποτε
προσίετο πλείω τοῦ μετρίου . . .

'A' reads πλείων, but is corrected by the epitome.² Although examples like this seem in general objectionable according to Bernhardt's first rule, which demands that the link between the two words across which the anapaest is split be 'artius', we have shown above that this part of the rule is itself objectionable because it requires subjective interpretation (see my n. 4 on p. 192), and it cannot be allowed to stand without modification since interpunctuated examples (see on fr. 173 v. 15) certainly exist. Hence it remains only to indicate some of the many parallels for a break after the second short in the second foot, with penthemimeral caesura, where the relationship between the two component words is that of verb to subject, object, or word in agreement with one of these two: Ar. *Aves* 1022, 1228; *Ecc.* 1027; Eubulus 2. 209, 126 v. 2, possibly also Xenarchus 2. 468, 2 v. 5.³

11. Kock, ii. 391, 257 v. 2; Meineke, iii. 501, *Phyg.*

καὶ νῦν πορίζεται γε τὰ δεῖπν' ἀσύμβολα.

Both A and the epitome agree on the reading,⁴ but the break of the anapaest after the first short (the break between τὰ and δεῖπν' of course being legitimate) aroused the objection of Meineke and Bernhardt (p. 264). Against Meineke and Bernhardt, who proposed the regularization of the metre by deleting γε, it may be argued: (1) Ar. *Lys.* 760 provides an ideal parallel to our line, ἐγὼ δ' ὑπὸ τῶν γλαυκῶν γε τάλαυν' ἀπόλλυμαι,⁵ where the γε is required by the sense; and (2) in such couplings of general and particular as this passage offers

¹ For we may not cite cases such as Ar. *Nub.* 1192 or *Aves* 90 (Descroix, pp. 214, 220, White, p. 47), where a change of speaker is involved, the first short of the anapaest consists of a verb ending with nu-epheky-stikon, and the next word begins with a vowel: on these cases see Radermacher on Ar. *Ran.* 1220 (cited in my n. 3, p. 191). Ar. *Aves* 93, cited by White, p. 47, is probably to be read without the article before θηρίων (so ΑΓ, followed by Coulon; τὸ θηρίων RMVU, where the article may be the addition of a 'prosimifying' scribe [see Headlam, article cited p. 194, n. 1]). In Ar. *Aves* 23 I see no objection to the 'τῆς δδοῦ τί λέγει πέρι;' of RVAUT, and τί is there of course to be considered as a quasi-proclitic (Bernhardt, pp. 261-2). Finally, the text of Antiphanes 2. 71, 148 v. 6 is either desperately corrupt, or else a paraphrase merely of the poet's words

(cited by Clemens Alex. *Paed.* 3.2/7, Stählin i. 240).

² Athenaeus 10. 429 e: Kaibel, ii. 434; Peppink Epit. ii. 33.

³ These cited variously by Perschinka, p. 356, White, p. 46, Descroix, pp. 220-1.

⁴ Athenaeus 4. 164 f: Kaibel, i. 371; Peppink Epit. i. 53. Kaibel prints his own conjecture in the text, but gives the manuscript reading in his apparatus.

⁵ Cited by White, p. 48, Descroix, p. 220. Cf. also possibly Strattis 1. 728, 60 v. 2 (σε begins fourth foot), though the sources for this verse (Ald. Scholia of Ar. *Ran.* 303, and Scholia of Eur. *Orestes* 279) are not of the most reliable; and Ephippus 2. 260, 17 v. 1 (μέν begins third foot), though the end of the line as we have it is clearly not what Ephippus himself wrote.

(ἀεὶ . . . καὶ νῦν), Greek tends to emphasize the particular, and this emphasis is often given by the use of γε.¹ Incidentally the idiomatic nature of couplings of general with particular makes Kaibel's conjecture here very improbable, and this in any case would still leave us with our irregular anapaest. The only sensible way to regularize the metre—if we must—is to delete the τὰ before δεῖπν', in the confidence that scribes often added to their copies articles which had no place in the original.² On the other hand, the presence of the article here is helpful in emphasizing the predicative nature of ἀσύμβολα. As a result, I am inclined to believe that the split anapaest here is due to Alexis himself, and the charge of irregularity attributable to his own carelessness of rhythm.

12. Kock, ii. 399, 279 v. 4; Meineke, iii. 513, *F.I.* xviii.

The text of the line is found in the Epitome of Athenaeus³ as follows:

ἐρῶντι ἐταίρας ἑτέρα χρησιμώτερα.

If this is the correct reading, one must allow in addition to the broken anapaest either hiatus or elision of the final iota of a dative singular. To justify the hiatus Meineke refers to his note on Antiphanes (3. 81), but his attempt there at justification fails because he makes no distinction between the common licence of hiatus after certain words (περί, τί, etc.) or in certain phrases (e.g. μὴ ὄρασι), and unparalleled instances such as the manuscripts provide here. For these latter there can be no support; a full list of the allowable cases is given by Descroix,⁴ that shows how strict the rules were. Alternatively, then, can one read ἐρῶνθ' ἐταίρας, the suggestion of certain vulgate manuscripts, and elide the dative singular? Lobeck (on Sophocles, *Ajax* 801-2) answers for Aristophanes: 'In Aristophanis fabulis iota dativi nunquam eliditur', and the verdict is confirmed by Holzinger on *Ar. Plutus* 689. And what goes for Aristophanes, must probably go for later comedy, too: certainly I have not come across an instance myself of an elided dative iota.

The sense further is not perfect, and I am inclined to believe that Jacobs⁵ hit on what Alexis wrote when he suggested ἐρῶν for ἐρῶντι. The corruption could be explained as a scribe's desire to have an apparently more simple syntax with a dative depending on χρησιμώτερα rather than a nominative agreeing with τῆς. Any other attempt at a solution involves complete rewriting of our text.

If there is nothing new in the proposals that have been put forward in the discussion of some of the above passages, it is at least hoped that the passages themselves will now be clearer as a result, and that sufficient demonstration has been made of the necessity of dealing with each case on its merits, without formulating general laws that admit of no exceptions, and without aggregating lists of 'parallel passages' unless one first makes sure that the instances cited are really parallel, and secondly that their text is not suspected of corruption.

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¹ Denniston, *Greek Particles*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1954), p. 291; cf. also pp. 157 f.: 'The effect of γε in καὶ . . . γε is to stress the addition made by καὶ.' Among Denniston's citations is *S. Ajax* 1376, καὶ νῦν γε.

² See on p. 197, n. 1 with reference to *Ar. Aves* 93. Quotation for such a common trait is superfluous; but one instance may be worth noting: the partiality of Triclinius'

text for adding the article before nouns in the choruses of the *Agamemnon*.

³ 2. 63 e, f: Kaibel, i. 149 (both C and E).

⁴ pp. 26-29. The list contains all the defensible instances in comedy, with one possible exception: after the unaccented τι. That hiatus is allowed after τι I hope to show elsewhere.

⁵ In his edition of the *Anth. Pal.* viii. 234.

THE SUPPOSED COMMON PEACE OF 366/5 B.C.¹

At Book 15, chapter 76, Diodorus Siculus says that during the Attic year 366/5, at the same time as the Thebans won possession of the Attic border district of Oropus, the King of Persia sent ambassadors and persuaded the Greeks to put an end to their wars and to conclude Common Peace (*κοινὴ εἰρήνη*); this peace, he adds, was more than five years after the battle of Leuctra.

Diodorus' wording is the same as that with which he described the conclusion of Common Peace treaties in 375/4,² in 371 before Leuctra³ and in 362/1,⁴ and there can be no doubt that he intended to say that a new Common Peace treaty was at this time concluded by the Greeks. As Ephorus was his chief source for Greek affairs in this book where these references to Common Peace treaties occur, we should be disposed to believe him.⁵

Common Peace (*κοινὴ εἰρήνη*) treaties were multilateral agreements which, though they were usually concluded to put an end to a particular war, were not limited to the two sides involved in the war—the principals and their allies—but were open to all Greeks of the mainland and the Aegean on the basis of a general principle, the freedom and autonomy of all cities large and small, and which were accepted by at least a substantial majority of the important cities. A Common Peace treaty, then, theoretically produced peace throughout Greece: an ordinary bilateral treaty a settlement limited to two defined groups of cities. A city that adhered to a Common Peace treaty swore to respect the freedom and autonomy of all Greek cities: a city that entered into an ordinary bilateral agreement was bound by obligations towards only such cities as were included in it. The conclusion of Common Peace must have affected the policies of the leading States; and so the question whether there was or was not a Common Peace at a particular time is of considerable importance as much for our evaluation of the policies of individual cities as for our estimation of the Common Peace idea itself.

There are, however, two considerable difficulties about Diodorus' account: first, not insurmountable but certainly suspicious, the absence of any details other than the inspiring role of the Persian ambassadors; second and much more troublesome, its context in the events of the middle sixties.

Xenophon provides more information for these years. First, at *Hellenica*, Book 7. 1. 33–40, he tells how embassies from Sparta and then from Thebes, Arcadia, Elis, Argos, and Athens went up to the King of Persia to seek his support; Pelopidas, the Theban, won the favour of the King and obtained his support for a general settlement in Greece which would benefit the Thebans and their allies. At this decision the Athenians were dismayed and the Arcadians indignant, and, when the Thebans convened representatives of the cities to ratify the settlement, the Arcadians led the opposition and the congress broke up. Then the Thebans tried to persuade the cities one by one to accept

¹ I should like gratefully to acknowledge the advice and assistance of Mr. G. T. Griffith in the preparation of this article.

² 15. 38. 1.

³ 15. 50. 4.

⁴ 15. 89. 1.

⁵ Cf. the remarks of G. T. Griffith, 'The so-called *κοινὴ εἰρήνη* of 346 B.C.', *J.H.S.*

1939, p. 73. It is generally accepted that Ephorus was the principal source for Greek affairs in Diod. books 11–16; cf. C. A. Volquardsen, *Untersuch. über die Quellen der griech. und sizil. Gesch. bei Diod. XI bis XVI* (Kiel, 1868) and Schwartz, P.–W., s.v. 'Diodoros', 38, cols. 679–82.

the terms, but the Corinthians and others refused their overtures and the Theban plan was finally wrecked. In his life of Pelopidas, chapter 30, Plutarch gives a similar account of the Greek embassies to Persia with some different though not conflicting details, but says nothing of the conference at Thebes and its consequences. Diodorus has nothing of all this, except a retrospective reference in his appreciation of Pelopidas to his mission to Persia, recording only his success and his provision for the autonomy of the Messenians.¹

Xenophon next describes a Theban invasion of Achaea and its consequences, and then an account of faction in Sicyon leads him into digressions about that city and about Phlius, before (at 7. 4. 1) he comes to the capture of Oropus. He tells how the Athenians asked their allies for help, but without success; Lycomedes, the Arcadian, took note of the disappointment of the Athenians and persuaded his people to open negotiations with them; after some hesitation, because the Arcadians were the enemies of the Spartans who were already their allies, the Athenians agreed to make an alliance. The Athenians then tried to seize Corinth, but their plan miscarried; the Corinthians now found themselves in conflict with both Thebes and Athens and tried for a time to sustain themselves with a mercenary army; eventually they approached the Thebans in search of peace and, finding them favourable, asked and obtained leave to find out whether any of their allies wished to join in. They sent ambassadors to the Spartans to obtain either their participation or their permission to make a separate peace; the Spartans replied that they could not surrender their claim to Messene, but that the Corinthians and their other allies could make peace if they wished. The Corinthians then sent another embassy to Thebes, which refused an alliance but concluded peace on condition that all should possess their own territory; they were joined in the peace by the Phlians and some of the other allies of Sparta in NE. Peloponnese² and by the Argives, allies of Thebes (*Hellenica* 7. 4. 2-11). None of these events appears in Diodorus, who goes straight on from the capture of Oropus and the Common Peace to the outbreak of war between Elis and Arcadia (15. 77. 1), which, apart from a brief account of the arrival 'at about the same time' of succours for the Spartans from Sicily, is the next event mentioned by Xenophon (7. 4. 12). Plutarch, of course, is not concerned with anything which does not come within the scope of his biography of Pelopidas.

Now there are two possible ways to a solution of the problem of making these two versions of events compatible. Either Diodorus is talking about something which Xenophon completely ignores; or his story is a different version of the events which Xenophon describes in 7. 1. 33-40 and 7. 4. 1-11.

If time has to be found for both series of events described by Xenophon and for Diodorus' treaty, the chronology becomes uncomfortably tight. *Hellenica* 7. 1. 33-40 cannot have started earlier than the first months of 367³ and

¹ 15. 81. 3.

² Xenophon says 'those who came with them' (τοῖς ἐλθοῦσι μετ' αὐτῶν); Isocrates 6. 91, usually associated with these negotiations, specifies the Epidaurians. Apart from Athens, Sparta's allies were limited after the disasters of 371-369 to Corinth and the smaller cities of this region; I doubt whether Achaea became formally allied to Sparta after the Theban invasion (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 43).

³ On his second expedition to Thessaly Pelopidas, after visiting Macedonia, had been arrested by Alexander of Pherae and rescued only at the second attempt (Plut. *Pelop.* 27-28, cf. Diod. 15. 71. 2-7). These events were in 368 (cf. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, 2nd ed., III. ii. 238) and the final rescue was probably not before the beginning of 367, when Epaminondas was again a Boeotarch (cf. Plut. *Pelop.* 29. 1).

Hellenica 7. 4. 1-11 cannot have ended later than the summer of 365.¹ Moreover, the generally accepted date for the capture of Oropus (midsummer 366)² means that the second part becomes even more tightly packed, if a Common Peace treaty has to be concluded and then broken in the weeks after that date. Apart from this difficulty this is for Xenophon a very detailed section of his work;³ so that, though he passed over the refounding of Messene and the formation of Megalopolis in silence, it does not seem possible that he could have made no mention of a general peace-treaty.

Similarly Xenophon may suppress some facts, but he does not invent on a large scale. So we must accept his account of the congress at Thebes and of the failure of the Thebans to have Pelopidas' settlement ratified, though Plutarch and Diodorus have nothing of them.

In fact those scholars who have discussed this problem in any detail—Hampf⁴ and Accame⁵—have both found that Diodorus' Common Peace and Xenophon's treaty between Corinth and Thebes (*Hellenica* 7. 4. 6-11) are different accounts of the same events; and others have thought likewise.⁶ Diodorus' statement that the Common Peace was at the same time as the capture of Oropus need not be taken too seriously. He probably found the two events in his sources under the same Attic year and loosely reckoned them to be simultaneous;⁷ they are in fact the only events in mainland Greece which he does record for this Attic year. Diodorus' chronological indications, then, are misleading, if not inaccurate. Moreover, his only other detail of the Peace, that it was concluded through the offices of Persian ambassadors sent to Greece, is distinctly suspect. It is not even known whether any Persian ambassadors came over to Thebes with Pelopidas to the unsuccessful congress of 367;⁸ and there is no hint at all of subsequent diplomatic activity from Persia; rather the King seems to have accepted the indirect rebuff which he had received at Thebes and to have tried to placate the Athenians by recognizing their claim to Amphipolis, which he had rejected at the gathering of embassies in Persia.⁹ In this reference to Persian ambassadors Diodorus' account recalls those which he gives of the Peaces of 375/4 and 371 (before Leuctra),¹⁰ where he has already

¹ The war between Elis and Arcadia must have broken out in late summer 365, the year before the Olympic festival. Xen. starts the war at 7. 4. 13 and describes it continuously until at 7. 4. 28 he observes that an Olympic year was 'coming in'. Diod. 15. 77. 1 puts the outbreak of war under 365/4.

² Cf. Beloch (iii. ii. 242) and Niese ('Beiträge zur griechischen Geschichte 370-364', *Hermes* 1904, p. 106); Schol. Aesch. 3. 85 puts it in 367/6, Diodorus in 366/5.

³ Xen. covers the period between the morrow of Leuctra and the Olympic games of 364 (July 371-Aug./Sept. 364) in 182 chapters (*Hell.* 6. 4. 16-7. 4. 27). He takes only 116 chapters over a similar period of warfare between spring 378 (the morrow of Sphodrias' raid—*Hell.* 5. 4. 34) and the eve of Leuctra (*Hell.* 6. 4. 5).

⁴ *Die griechische Staatsverträge von 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (Leipzig, 1938).

⁵ *La lega Ateniese del secolo IV a.C.* (Rome,

1941).

⁶ e.g. A. Wilhelm, *Ein Friedensbund der Hellenen*, *Oesterr. Arch. Inst.* (1900), p. 157; F. H. Marshall, *The Second Athenian Confederacy* (Cambridge, 1905), p. 90; E. Meyer, *Gesch. des Altertums*, v. 447-9; A. Momigliano, 'La κοινή εἰρήνη dal 386 al 338 a.c.', *Riv. di Filol.* (1934), p. 489 and *Filippo il Macedone* (Florence, 1934), p. 84 n. 1; G. de Sanctis, 'La Pace del 362/1', *Riv. di Filol.* (1934), pp. 149-50; P. Cloché, *La politique étrangère d'Athènes de 404 à 336 a.C.* (Paris, 1934), p. 121.

⁷ In addition to his main source (Ephorus) Diodorus would have used a chronographic source which provided a few outstanding events under each Attic year; cf. Schwartz, *R.E.* s.v. 'Ephoros', col. 10.

⁸ Accame assumes that they did.

⁹ Dem. 19. 137—cf. his misgivings after Leon's complaints in Persia—Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 37. ¹⁰ Diod. 15. 38. 1 and 50. 4.

introduced or been misled into introducing a doublet; and it may be that peace-negotiations in Persia followed, in time, by a Peace in Greece led him into over-simplification.

Accame excludes the possibility of Persian intervention, but retains the Common Peace. He suggests that the Greeks rejected Pelopidas' terms because they were linked with the King of Persia¹ and later accepted them when the Thebans renewed their efforts on their own account, and that Xenophon obscures the general nature of the agreement (as admittedly he does in his account of the Peace of 375/4).² None the less this solution amounts to a rejection of Xenophon's detailed narrative in favour of Diodorus' inaccurate generalities; but Hampl's equally direct rejection of Diodorus' Common Peace in favour of Xenophon is no more satisfactory, for, as I said, we have good reason for respecting Diodorus when in this book he uses the expression *κοινὴν εἰρήνην συνθεσθαι*.³

On closer examination it seems fairly certain that Xenophon was right when he limits his Peace to Thebes and Corinth and their allies in NE. Peloponnese. The Spartans, he says, were definitely not included.⁴ Though the Arcadians were still nominally allies of the Thebans at the time of the congress at Thebes in 367,⁵ they were already resentful of Theban leadership and on this occasion refused Pelopidas' terms and led the opposition to them. Since then the Thebans had interfered in Achaea and had made things worse for the Arcadians,⁶ who had in turn become allies of Athens. It is thus unlikely that the Arcadians would have accepted in 366/5 the settlement that they had helped to wreck two years before without the certainty of Athenian backing, or that they would have accepted any terms dictated by the Thebans, unless they had been particularly hard pressed; and their vigour in the war with Elis the next year indicates that they were not. Also it seems scarcely possible that the Athenians could have subscribed to a general peace-treaty in 366/5, especially one sponsored by the Thebans, whom they regarded as breakers of the Peace sponsored by themselves in 371, and certainly not on Pelopidas' terms, which ruled that Amphipolis should be autonomous and that the Athenian fleet should be laid up. Though the first reaction of the Athenians to Pelopidas' success in Persia was one of dismay,⁷ the failure of the Thebans to enforce the

¹ Stressing *πρὸς βασιλέα* in Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 40.

² *Ibid.* 6. 2. 1.

³ Meyer, l.c., notes Xen.'s version, but follows Diod.; Momigliano, l.c., *Riv. di Filol.*, follows Meyer and suggests also (*Filippo*, l.c.) that the King of Persia intervened to turn the peace into a *κοινὴ εἰρήνη*; de Sanctis, l.c., mentions Xen., but follows Diod.

Wilhelm, l.c., prefers Xen. to Diod. without argument; Beloch (m. i. 189) follows Xen. without citing Diod., and in m. ii. 241 seems to take Diod. as a wrong version of Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 33-40 (cf. above, p. 199); Marshall, l.c., prefers Xen., but thinks it probable that Athens joined in the peace; M. Cary (*C.A.H.* vi. 96-97) and M. Laistner (*A History of the Greek World from 479 to 323 B.C.* (Methuen, London, 1936), p. 210) follow Xen. without citing sources; Cloché,

l.c., was undecided between Xen. and Diod., but in *Thebes de Boeotie* (Namur, 1952), pp. 151-5 follows Xen. without citing Diod.; as does H. Bengtson (*Griechische Geschichte* [Munich, 1950], p. 264), who observes that the time was not ripe for a *κοινὴ εἰρήνη*.

Glötz-Cohen, *Histoire grecque*, iii. 166-7, seem to believe in a general peace without the King's intervention; they do not cite Diod. and regard Xen.'s narrative as indicating *une paix générale* by which the Peloponnese was *neutralisé*. A. Heuss in his review of the Common Peace treaties ('Antigonos Monophthalmos und die griechische Städte', *Hermes*, 1938) makes no mention of a peace in 366/5 (p. 166).

⁴ *Ibid.* 7. 1. 39.

⁵ *Ibid.* 43 end.

⁷ Execution of Timagoras: Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 38, Dem. 19. 137.

⁴ *Hell.* 7. 4. 9.

settlement and the readiness of the King to give way, for instance over Amphipolis, led them within a few months to take liberties with the interests of the King such as they had not dared to take for twenty years.¹ Timotheus was elected general in January 366 for the first time since his disgrace in 373² and his campaign on behalf of Ariobarzanes against the King came before the capture of Oropus in midsummer 366.³ The siege of Samos, held by a Persian protégé, lasted for ten months over the winter of 366/5⁴ and the Athenian campaign of strength in the Aegean continued until the Theban fleet put to sea in 364, when Timotheus was attacking Amphipolis.⁵ These operations are best interpreted as Athenian efforts to strengthen their position in the Aegean against the naval offensive that the Thebans began to prepare probably in 366;⁶ at any rate the chronology shows that they were not taken in hand after the time when the Athenians are supposed to have become free of war on land through a general peace,⁷ and it is at least doubtful whether they could have legitimately taken such operations in hand, if they had just been party to a general treaty. There is, then, certainly no indication that Athens or Arcadia was involved in any treaty in 366/5 with Thebes, and strong grounds for supposing that they were not. A Peace which did not include Sparta, Arcadia, or Athens (or, therefore, Athens' allies) was surely not a general settlement.

But in spite of this conclusion it remains possible that Accame was right when he suggested that Pelopidas' terms were now accepted by the Corinthians and their friends, that is, so far as they were applicable. Pelopidas had evidently proposed a Common Peace treaty which included rulings in the controversial cases—Triphylia, etc., to be ceded by the Arcadians to Elis, and Messene and Amphipolis to be autonomous—and which specified that the Athenian fleet should be laid up.⁸ In Xenophon's treaty of 366/5 the Spartans would again have had to recognize the autonomy of Messene, if they had wished to be included.⁹ Otherwise all that Xenophon says about the terms is that it was agreed that each should possess their own territory (*ἐφ' ᾧτε ἔχειν τὴν ἐαυτῶν ἐκδοτοῦς*)¹⁰ and the territorial provisions of Pelopidas' settlement presuppose a similar clause there as the concomitant of the autonomy principle. The use of *ἐκδοτοῦς* instead of *ἐκατέρους* (each of two) suggests that this clause was in fact

¹ This seems the most likely occasion for the erasure of lines 12–14 of Aristoteles' decree, the charter of the Athenian Confederacy (Tod, no. 123). These lines must have contained some reference to the King's Peace. Now, for the first time since the decree was inscribed, a King's Peace had been proposed of which Athens disapproved.

² Mentioned as general in *I.G.* i². 108—December 366. For the date of the elections cf. Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 44.

³ Nepos, *Tim.* 1. 3; Dem. 15. 9.

⁴ Dem. 15. 9; Isocr. 15. 111–12.

⁵ Dem. 23. 149, cf. *C.A.H.* vi. 105.

⁶ They had a substantial fleet at sea by 364; Diod. 15. 78. 4 cannot be right in placing the decision to build a fleet shortly before its sailing.

⁷ As Meyer suggested (*Geschichte des Alter-*

tums, v. 453).

⁸ Autonomy for all the Greeks—Plut. *Pelop.* 30. 7, 31. 1. Xen. gives only the rulings on Messene and the Athenian fleet (7. 1. 36), but these must be details of a general scheme, for it was to be a general settlement. Triphylia, etc.—Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 38 (taken with 6. 5. 1, 7. 1. 26, 7. 4. 12). Amphipolis—Dem. 19. 137—which definitely refers the King's recognition of Amphipolis as his friend and ally to the time of Timagoras' embassy. The provision in the Peace of 371 (before Leuctra) that armies and fleets should be disbanded (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 3. 18) could have been a reasonable precedent for the clause about the Athenian fleet.

⁹ *Hell.* 7. 4. 9.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 10.

drawn from a many-sided treaty¹ (if Xenophon records it accurately), and it may well have been the case that the signatories reaffirmed the autonomy principle, though it would have made no difference to their position. Xenophon notes only the territorial clause because it was important to the states concerned.²

If, then, the Thebans offered to the Corinthians and their friends the same terms as they had rejected in 367 as the basis of the Common Peace settlement then proposed by Pelopidas,³ it begins to be possible to see how Diodorus might have been misled into thinking that there was in fact a Common Peace treaty—especially since in the summer of 365 there was probably very little fighting in Greece. The Eleans and the Arcadians had both been allies of Thebes and, though she had taken sides in their dispute in 367, they had not yet come to open war; nor had the Arcadians and the Thebans. Now the area of peace in NE. Peloponnese divided them, as it divided also the Thebans and the Spartans. The war between Arcadia on one side and Sparta and Achaea on the other was languishing through weariness and through the peculiar Athenian device of allying themselves with both sides. Finally, Athens and Thebes may never have been formally at war. It was quite possible for the troops of two Greek cities to clash in the territory of a third party without involving them in direct hostilities;⁴ and there is nothing known of any fighting over the border between Attica and Boeotia. Oropus was seized in the first place by the tyrant of Eretria and then handed over to the Thebans, who apparently might have submitted the dispute to arbitration.⁵ As I have said, both cities were busy at sea or in preparation for naval warfare, and such activities could easily have been passed over by Diodorus' sources. Though war broke out between Elis and Arcadia in the late summer of 365, nothing else occurred that we know of before the summer of 364.

It is possible, though not very likely, that Diodorus was following not Ephorus, but a pro-Theban source who some years after the events invented a Common Peace here; more probable that the Thebans themselves proclaimed at the time that this was a Common Peace treaty, even if most of their enemies had boycotted it. The Thebans certainly claimed later, if not at the time, that their invasions of the Peloponnese had been undertaken in the cause of freedom.⁶ The Spartans had invoked the autonomy principle of Common Peace in the King's Peace of 387/6 to break up Thebes' control of Boeotia,⁷ and had tried to do so again in 371.⁸ After their defeat at Leuctra and the failure of the

¹ Cf. Ps.-Dem. 7. 18, where the use of *ἐκαστέων* makes it clear that a bilateral treaty (the Peace of Philocrates) is being discussed. Underhill, *Commentary on Xen. Hell.* (Oxford, 1900), observes at this passage 'i.e. on the basis of the Persian rescript that each state should be autonomous and Messene independent'.

² Cf. the quarrel between Phlius and Argos over Tricaranon (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 4. 11, Dem. 16. 16, and see Wilhelm's restoration, art. cit., p. 162, of the opening lines of what is now Tod, no. 145 and lines 19–21 of the same inscription with Accame's comment, p. 175).

³ Grote (*History of Greece*, new ed. [London, 1884], x. 52) in a note to his account of Xen.'s treaty discounts Diodorus' narrative

on the grounds that no Persian envoy had visited Greece since Pelopidas had returned and that the peace was not universal. He comes nearer the truth than any of his successors but Underhill (cf. note 1) when he says *en passant* that 'the peace now concluded was upon the general basis of the rescript (brought back by Pelopidas)'.

⁴ Cf. Athens and Sparta between 420 and 413.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 7. 4. 1: . . . Θηβαῖοι παρακαθήμενοι τὸν Ὀρωπὸν μέχρι δίκης.

⁶ Cf. Isocr. 9. 57, Plut. *Pelop.* 31. 1, and Epaminondas' epitaph (Pausanias 9. 15. 6).

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 5. 1. 33.

⁸ *Ibid.* 6. 3. 19.

Athenians to limit Theban power to Central Greece with the new Common Peace treaty of 371 (after Leuctra),¹ the Thebans could insist on a more favourable reading of the autonomy clause. This Philiscus was prepared to allow in 368,² and so it was possible for the Thebans in their turn to try to work Common Peace for their own advantage. They failed to do so in 367 and only partially redeemed their failure with the treaty of 366/5. The Athenians for their part did not have to submit to the humiliation of agreeing to a Common Peace sponsored by the city which they had tried to repress in the months after Leuctra.

In conclusion, the Peace of 366/5 was probably made on the terms of Common Peace where applicable, but it was accepted only by two limited groups of cities and cannot therefore be placed along with the Common Peace treaties.

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¹ Ibid. 5. 1.

² Xen. (7. 1. 27) and Diod. (15. 70. 2) agree that the Thebans were the cause of Philiscus' failure to bring about a new Common Peace treaty. Whereas Diod. says that they feared for their control of Boeotia, Xen.

says that they were unwilling to return Messene to Sparta. Philiscus was evidently a friend of the Spartans, for he left them a mercenary force; and to propose the return of Messene to Sparta would be no less realistic than not to satisfy Thebes over Boeotia.

HOMERIC EPITHETS IN GREEK LYRIC POETRY

ONE of the ways in which a poet may show his quality is by discrimination and originality in his choice of adjectives. Poetry likes to adorn the bare noun; a noun such as 'the sky' calls out for an attribute. But in practice the poet has to take care to avoid the cliché. He can seldom write 'the blue sky'; even 'the azure sky' has become trite. He has to search for the epithet which will be both apt and original. One recollects the story that A. E. Housman pondered for months before the right one came: '... and see the *coloured* counties and hear the larks so high'.

Homeric language has the peculiarity that one of its main resources is the use of epithets which, by virtue of frequent repetition, already have a ring of triteness or conventionality. I refer to the 'Homeric formula' or 'ornamental epithet'. There are occasions when it is significant that Achilles was fleet of foot, and on these the epithet *πόδας ὠκύς* adds something to the line. But when the context contains no reference to running, this epithet is purely ornamental and conventional. The frequency of these ornamental epithets is familiar to every reader of Homer. As an element in Homeric style, they may be satisfactory and effective. Regarded in isolation, they retain little vitality: they are 'dead'.

This, of course, is by no means a defect, but simply an interesting characteristic, of the Greek epic style. It is not confined to Homer. Hesiod, also writing in hexameters, draws almost entirely upon the traditional Homeric vocabulary, and the innovations, though significant, are few; and the same goes for almost the whole collection of Homeric Hymns, despite the differences of generation among them. Elegy, however, partly no doubt owing to the slight originality demanded by the metrical innovation of the pentameter, shows a progressive development. Tyrtaeus still uses Homeric epithets indiscriminately; but Solon is already more original, and the Theognis collection is on the whole sparing with ornamental phrases, even though in certain contexts (such as any mention of the sea) it is a slave to them.

Now the presence of these Homeric phrases in post-Homeric hexameter and elegiac poetry is perhaps not surprising. By choosing to write in the metre of Homer, or one as closely related to Homer's as the elegiac, the poet was committing himself to a position of discipleship towards the master, and his task was not to find a new language for himself but to invest the one bequeathed to him with a certain freshness by introducing, here and there, an element of originality; and in course of time the original elements began to preponderate over the traditional ones. But the survival of Homeric phrases in the completely new context of lyric poetry is a much stranger phenomenon. Archaic lyric poetry is often a long way from the epic. It may use entirely different metres, it may be personal instead of narrative, and its language is fresh and direct. Nevertheless, conventional Homeric epithets occur. Sometimes it seems fairly easy to explain their occurrence: if a lyric poet adopts a dactylic metre, or narrates a heroic story, it is not too surprising if features of epic dialect and vocabulary tend to appear. But there are many more instances which are not

so readily explicable, and which are especially disconcerting in that they occur in passages where the diction is otherwise crisp and economical. To put the problem in its sharpest form: when, in a poem where every word tells (in Sappho, for example), we come across what I have called a 'dead' expression, an ornamental epithet borrowed from Homer, should we be shocked or delighted? Is it simply a cliché, and therefore a defect in the poem, or is it a conscious archaism, a judicious borrowing from an honoured tradition?

Despite the interest of scholars in the survival of Homeric language into later literature, I am not aware that the sharp aesthetic problem raised by this survival has been properly examined.¹ It may be that the problem has no answer, or that it has been shunned for its associations with literary criticism rather than rigorous scholarship; yet I believe that it is possible to approach it in a reasonably scientific way. For this purpose I propose to concentrate upon a part only of the already small field of lyric poetry. The choral Dorian lyric (with the exception of Alcman, whose language is limpid and direct) is not very helpful: the diction of Simonides, Pindar, and Bacchylides tends to aim at an effect of rich profusion, in which a large number of epic words and phrases occur together with rarer expressions and original coinages; and since these poets (despite individual differences) were drawing on all the linguistic resources available to them, among which Homer naturally held an important place, it is impossible to subject their practice to rigorous control. Certain specific instances are illuminating, and will be referred to in what follows; but a systematic analysis of the poems does not yield any clear result. The same applies to tragedy. Here the number of Homeric epithets is in any case exceedingly small; but the language is often of such a richness that it can apparently absorb a few conventional expressions without any noticeable effect on the style, and although there are isolated instances which lend striking support to the interpretation here proposed of certain tendencies discernible in lyric, the writing of the tragic poets is too varied and original to support any general conclusions. There remains the 'monodic' lyric of Lesbos and Ionia (under which head I include, for convenience, Archilochus). These poets write in concise metrical forms (and usually also in non-dactylic metres) with an extreme economy of words and directness of expression. Any superfluity is at once noticeable; and this makes their practice with regard to ornamental Homeric epithets easy to control. A simple principle can be applied: where an adjective occurs which is neither predicative nor essential to the sense—which is ornamental, in fact, in so far as the sentence would be complete and meaningful without it; and where that adjective is already familiar in such a context from Homer, and there is no striking originality in its employment; we can count this as a gratuitous Homerism, an occurrence of a 'dead' expression. And these instances form the basis of a reasonably objective and systematic statistic.

But merely to present the result of such an analysis statistically would be to ignore both the subtlety and the interest of the problem. A mere list of Homerisms will have no value in itself unless it can be shown that any noticeable peculiarities in the distribution of the phrases are unlikely to be fortuitous, but reflect a more-or-less conscious variation in the practice of the poet. Some

¹ M. Leumann, in *Mus. Helv.* iv (1947), pp. 119 ff., well describes the phenomenon, but does not consider its implications.

evidence must first be produced that archaic poetry had achieved this degree of self-consciousness in its choice of vocabulary and its conventions of diction.

It is easy to observe that the appearance of an epic subject or of epic characters in a lyric poem tends to be accompanied by Homeric phraseology. This tendency is particularly marked in Bacchylides, where the difference between the vocabulary used in the narrative and the non-narrative passages is so striking that no doubt is possible about a deliberate intention behind it. To take an example: the central part of the thirteenth Epinikion relates the story of Ajax defending the Trojan ships from the attack of Hector. There are certain divergences from the version in the *Iliad*, but the main lines of the Homeric story are adhered to, and the passage contains many verbal echoes of Homer. Of the 29 ornamental epithets in these lines (vv. 97-169), 17 can be found in Homer; that is to say, the proportion of traditional to non-traditional epithets is 17 to 12. But in the following passage (vv. 175-231), which is concerned with extolling the victor and offering moral guidance, the ornamental epithets, though only a little less abundant (there are 16), are all, with only two exceptions, ones that are *not* to be found in Homer; 2 to 14, therefore, is the proportion of traditional to non-traditional epithets. An analysis of the fifth Epinikion produces a closely similar result. Verses 56-175 tell the story of Meleager. This time there is no parallel version in Homer, but the subject is treated in the heroic style, and there are a number of verbal allusions to Homer. In these lines the proportion of Homeric to non-Homeric ornamental epithets is 32 to 22. In the non-narrative passages on either side (1-55, 176-200) the proportion is 12 to 29.

This bald statistical variation in vocabulary can hardly be fortuitous, and invites us to look for the same tendency elsewhere. And indeed, the earliest choral lyric we possess, Alcman's *Partheneion*, conforms obediently. The poem apparently fell into two parts, the first relating the legend of the slaughter of the Hippocoontids, the second, by contrast, concerned only with the immediate present—the details of the religious dance and the personalities of the performers. Of the first part only a few half-lines survive; but these contain a catalogue of the Hippocoontids who met their death. The name of each hero is accompanied by an epithet, and of the six that are legible, four are traditional Homeric epithets for heroes (*ποδώκης*, *κορυστής*, *ἔξοχος ἡμιθέων*,¹ and *μέγας*). The concentration of these four epithets into six lines is all the more striking in that in the remaining ninety lines of the poem there are only four such epithets altogether. Moreover, the remaining fragments of Alcman (with one important exception) are exceedingly sparing of Homeric epithets, but mentions of Ajax and Odysseus are accompanied by *φαιδιμος*, *δορι ξυστόν*, and *ταλασίφρων*, (fr. 76, 77, 80), a reference to Paris by *Ἑλλάδι βωτιανείρα* (fr. 73).

The tendency, then, must be recognized; but it still needs explanation. We are no nearer to understanding the role of what, begging the question, we are inclined to call 'clichés', even if they do tend to be concentrated in passages of heroic narrative; for, if they are really clichés, their presence is *prima facie* no less a stylistic defect here than anywhere else. However, a possible solution to this problem is suggested by a characteristic of Bacchylides' language as a whole. Bacchylides uses a language in which many of the adjectives, though

¹ Homer would have said *ἔξοχος ἡρώων*: *ἡμιθέων* is post-Homeric. But the effect is no more original for that.

not actually Homeric, are formed on the Homeric model and give the impression of Homeric compounds while retaining some of the freshness of original coinages: 'Homeric epitheta audire tibi videris, si nova illa Bacchylidis auri-bus percipis'.¹ The following three phrases, chosen at random from a few lines of Epinikion 5 (73 ff.), will amply illustrate the point: *νευρὰν λυγκλαγγῇ* (cf. *νευρή δὲ μέγ' ἱαχε* Δ 125, *λυγύφθογγος, λυγύφωνος*, etc.), *χαλκεόκρανον ἰόν* (cf. *ἰὸς χαλκοβαρῆς* O 465), *τραχὺν οὔστον* (*πικρὸν οὔστον* Homer). Instances of this kind in Bacchylides are numerous; and their purpose is clearly to build up a Homeric 'tone' which will pervade the diction without robbing it of its originality. Now it is evident that this Homeric tone is especially cultivated in passages of heroic narrative, and that the simplest way to reinforce this tone is to introduce a number of phrases which are *in fact* Homeric and unoriginal. It looks as if there existed a poetic convention allowing, in heroic contexts, a judicious admixture of these unoriginal phrases, which contributed to the desired Homeric tone, and which, in these surroundings, did not have the ring of banality, so long as a reasonable proportion of unoriginal to original phrases was not exceeded—in the case of Bacchylides, about three to two.

This hypothesis may now be tested on the more exacting material of archaic lyric. A particularly favourable instance is afforded by Sappho, whose poems appear to be written either in a 'normal' (purely vernacular) style, or in an 'abnormal' style, in which Homeric usages are found side by side with the vernacular.² Only one of these 'abnormal' poems is long enough to be of any use to us, but this (β 2 = 55 D = 44 L.P.) is an excellent example of Homeric 'tone'. The scene described is the arrival of Hector and Andromache, newly married, in Troy. This has no immediate prototype in Homer (though the phrase *πολυδαρὸς Ἀνδρομάχη* Z 394, cf. X 471 f., suggests that it may have occurred somewhere in the epic tradition), and although there are certain scenes in Homer which may have suggested some of the details here (e.g. Priam harnessing his wagon Ω 265 ff. or the gifts offered to Penelope by the suitors σ 292 ff.) it would be a mistake to regard Sappho's poem as a mere rewording of a Homeric prototype:³ a number of the details are anachronistic for Homeric times, and the manner of narration is lyric rather than epic. However, the linguistic licences occurring in nearly every line leave no doubt of a deliberately created Homeric tone, and the adjectival phrases yield the following analysis.

(a) Homeric:

τάχως ἄγγελος (Ω 292, etc.)

κλέος ἀφθιτον (I 413, etc.)

ἐλικώπιδες Ἀνδρομάχων (cf. A 98; *ἐλίκωπες Ἀχαιοὶ passim*)

Θήβας ἐξ ἰέρας (*Iliad, passim*)

*Πλακίας ἀ[ι]ν(ν)άω (?)*⁴ (*ἀενάων* once in Homer, ν 109, with *ὑδατα*)

ἄλμυρον πόντον (Hesiod, *Th.* 107; *ἄλμυρον ὕδαρ* Homer)

¹ Hermann Buss, *De Bacchylide Homeri Imitatore* (Giessen, 1913), p. 27. On Bacchylides' original coinages see E. Eberhard's review of this in *B.Ph.W.* xxxiv (1914), col. 1225.

² The distinction is carefully formulated by D. L. Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus*, pp. 65 f.

³ Diehl's observation, 'carmen conditum

esse ad exemplum Hectoris λύτρων (Ω 265 ss.)', is misleading. Cf. Page, op. cit., p. 71.

⁴ Cf. Z 396 f. *ὅς ἐναίεν ὑπὸ Πλάκῳ ἰληόσση, Θήβη ὑποπλακίη* (i.e. the birthplace of Andromache). There is no known place, river, or monument called *Πλακίη* except a Pelagian colony near the Mysian Olympus, a long way to the north-east of Thebes (which

ποίκιλ' ἀθύρματα (cf. ο 416 μυρί' ἄγοντες ἀθύρματα νηί)
 πάτηρ φίλος¹ (Homer, *passim*)
 πτόλιν εὐρύχορον (λ 265 Θήβη εὐ.)
 σατίνας ὑπ' ἐντρόχοις (ἄρμα, ἄμαξα εὐτρ. Homer, *passim*)
 ἱκέλοι θεοῖς (cf. B 478 ἱκέλος Διί, etc.)
 ἄχω θεσπεσία (10 times in Homer)
 Πάον' ἐκάβολον (Ἀπόλλων ἐκ. *passim* in Homer)
 . . . θεοεικέλους (in Homer, *passim* of heroes)
 (? παρθενίκαν [υ υ -] σφύρων)

(b) Original:

ἄβραν Ἀνδρομάχαν (ἄβρός first in Hesiod, fr. 218 Rzach)
 ἐλίγματα χρύσια, ἀργύρα ἀνάριθμα ποτήρια
 αὐλος ἀδυμέλης (the compound first here: Homer only once uses ἡδύς of
 sound θ 64)
 μέλος ἄγνον (the expression is unique)
 ἐπήρατον ὄρθιον (perhaps cf. I 228 δαιτὸς ἐπήρατον ἔργα)
 Πάον' εὐλύραν (εὐλ. only here before fifth century)

This analysis may be regarded as a model for all those from which I have drawn my statistics, and it will be convenient to draw attention at once to certain points in its arrangement. It will be observed that no account is taken of the frequency with which a given phrase occurs in Homer, or the relative antiquity of the passage in which it occurs; indeed some phrases are placed under (a) which either occur first only in Hesiod, or else cannot be found verbatim in archaic epic at all. Thus ποίκιλ' ἀθύρματα has no exact prototype in Homer, ἄλμυρος πόντος none before Hesiod. The criterion which has been used is necessarily a little subjective, but not, I think, arbitrary. Our concern is not so much with the adjectival phrase as an entity, but with the adjective itself; and the question is not whether a certain phrase occurs once, or infrequently, or frequently, in Homer, but whether the adjective which the poet chose was already a familiar conventional one for objects of a certain class. Presumably far more epic poetry was current in the time of Sappho than we now possess; consequently a phrase which already sounds conventional in Hesiod or the Homeric hymns should not be regarded as the more original for the fact that it does not occur in the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey*. Thus ἀθύρματα, though a rare word, occurs in a closely similar context in the *Odyssey*, and the Homeric adjective ποικίλα which goes with it sounds more ornamental than descriptive; the phrase is therefore placed under (a). Again, it matters little that ἐλικώψ is used always of men in Homer, except once, for Briseis (in a Homeric Hymn it is also used once of the Muses). The adjective can have had little descriptive

is at the foot of Mt. Ida). According to Dicaearchus (Schol. Venet. A Z 396), Πλακίη was an epithet of Θήβη, owing to Thebes' propinquity to τὸ Πλάκιον καλούμενον ὅρος τῆς Λυκίας. Now it seems unlikely that Sappho had direct geographical knowledge of the area: it is more probable that she picked up the name from Homer, in which case there are two possibilities. Either δ.[.]νῶω conceals a noun, and Πλακία is correctly used as an adjective (this is barely conceivable); or else Sappho misdivided ὑπο-

πλακίη in Z 397 as ὑπὸ Πλακίη, in which case the last word in the line will be a purely ornamental epithet for something (Πλακίη) which never existed.

¹ H. Fränkel, *G.G.N.* 1924, p. 64, points out that in Homer the phrase πατήρ φίλος would be used in closer syntactical connexion with the rest of the sentence; but I cannot agree with him that in Sappho the phrase is full of meaning. Cf. φίλων τοκήων, Sappho fr. 27 a 10.

force for Sappho, and there can be no doubt that she learnt it from epic poetry.

To return to the analysis itself: it can be seen that in this poem of Sappho, where both metre and subject invite the use of Homeric language, the proportion of conventional to original epithets is about 14:8—closely similar, in fact, to the proportion in the narrative passages of Bacchylides. The technique of building up Homeric 'tone' seems to be much the same in both.

By itself, of course, this proportional consistency is neither an explanation nor a justification of the presence of these phrases in a heroic context: it merely suggests the existence of a poetic convention. There are, however, instances where a more deliberate intention can be discerned in the use of Homeric epithets. It has already been observed that in Alcman's *Partheneion* the sons of Hippocoon are each furnished with a more-or-less conventional epithet. Now the sons of Hippocoon were not a distinguished company: it is exceedingly unlikely that they figured in any considerable epic poem, and their importance was a local one. Is it not conceivable that Alcman wished to invest them with a more heroic stature by giving them some of the stock attributes of epic heroes? This would remain a mere guess were it not for a striking parallel in tragedy. In the *Persae* 28 ff. the chorus is describing the glorious army of the Persians, and gives a list of the commanders, each again with an epic (or epic-sounding) epithet—*Ἀρτεμβάρης ἱπποχάρμης, ὁ τοξοδάμας* (τοξοφόρος or τοξότης Homer) *ἑσθλὸς Ἴμαίος, ἵππων ἐλατήρ Σοσθάνης*; and another list of army commanders towards the end of the play shows the same tendency (967 ff., cf. 999 *Τόλμων αἰχμῶς ἀκόρεστον*). Now Aeschylus is very sparing of Homeric epithets, and it seems highly probable that in these passages he was deliberately using words with epic associations in order that, in the mouth of the chorus, the Persian officers might be invested with something of the dignity of epic heroes. The conjecture that Alcman was doing the same for the sons of Hippocoon finds, to this extent, support.

However, one must be cautious in assuming that a poet as early as Alcman was so sensitive towards the use of Homeric language: the evidence is simply insufficient. By the time of Anacreon, on the other hand, there can be no doubt at all that words were used deliberately for their epic associations. The following three examples will make this clear.

(a) Anacreon fr. 88:

πῶλε Θρηκίη, τί δή με λοξὸν ὄμμασιν βλέπουσα
νηλεῶς φεύγεις, δοκεῖς δέ μ' οὐδὲν εἰδέναι σοφόν . . .

Amid the direct and simple idioms of this light-hearted poem, one is brought up short by *νηλεῶς*, a word of uncertain meaning which has almost disappeared since Homer. What is it doing in these gay, intimate surroundings?

The history of the word is difficult. It was Schulze¹ who first discerned that besides the word meaning 'pitiless' to which the popular ancient etymology,² (a)ν-ελεος, is appropriate, there is another word, derived from *ναλεγής, 'inevitable' (cf. *ἀλεγομαι*, to avoid), which appears most commonly in the phrase *νηλεὲς ἦμαρ* (a euphemism for death). This sense of 'inevitable' explains one or two other Homeric phrases as well, notably the *νηλεῖ δεσμῶ* of the *Doloneia* (K 443—the chain which cannot be avoided, from which there is no release)

¹ *Kl. Schr.*, p. 375, *Qu. Epicae*, p. 289, followed by Boissacq, s.v.

² *Et. Mag.* 603. 26 *νηλεὲς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔλεος* κτλ. Cf. Hesychius, s.v.

and perhaps even the puzzling *νηλέϊ ὕπνῳ* (μ 372), 'sleep which one cannot avoid (indefinitely)'; just as the phrase *φυγῶν ὑπὸ νηλεῆς ἡμᾶρ* becomes pregnant paradoxical, 'escaping (on that day) the fate which no one can escape (for ever)'. Both these senses, 'pitiless' as well as 'inevitable', survive after Homer; the first appears in Theognis 1125 *νηλέϊ θυμῷ* (of Odysseus slaying the suitors) and becomes curiously inverted in Sophocles (*Ant.* 1197 *νηλεὲς σῶμα*, unpitied corpse); the second in Hesiod, *Th.* 217 *Μοίρας καὶ Κῆρας νηλεοποιῖνους*, and elsewhere. But already in Homer there are instances of a much vaguer use, which suggest that the two original meanings of the word have coalesced into something general and imprecise. For instance, *νηλεής* as an epithet of Achilles: sometimes the translation 'pitiless' is apt enough: in *Π* 33, for instance, Patroclus throws the word at Achilles as a reproach, and adds that he must be the son of grey sea and sheer rocks to have a temper so hard (*νόος ἀπηνής*). But 'pitiless' does not render the force of *I* 496 f.:

... Ἀχιλεῦ, δάμασον θυμὸν μέγαν· οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ
νηλεὲς ἦτορ ἔχειν· στρεπτοὶ δέ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοί.

Here there is a contrast between *στρεπτός* and *νηλεής*. The gods may be moved by entreaty: but Achilles is utterly obdurate, stubborn, unyielding. One might say the two meanings of *νηλεής* have run together. Achilles is so pitiless that no human resource remains for influencing his purpose, which, as a result, is as inevitable as fate. But to translate it here, one must say 'stubborn' or 'obdurate'. Similarly, only one sense is suitable in *T* 229, where the Greeks are told to bury their dead *resolutely*, *νηλέα θυμὸν ἔχοντας*.

This diversity of meanings is clear proof that already in Homer *νηλεής* was losing its sharpness, and that neither of the original senses was any longer vividly perceived; and this dilution of its meaning must account for queer phrases like *νηλέα φωρήν* in *H. Herm.* 385 or *κέδρου νηλεῖ καπνῷ* in Hesiod (fr. 215 Rz.): for here only a general sense of 'baneful' is appropriate. Thereafter, except for the Theognis passage already mentioned and a doubtful occurrence in Alcman (110 D), the word disappears completely until it reappears here in Anacreon. Aeschylus and Pindar use it to express something like 'stubborn', 'ruthless', Sophocles for 'unpitied'.

What does the word mean in Anacreon? Foals are not 'pitiless', nor is 'inevitable' in the least appropriate; what they are, above all, is 'stubborn', and we have seen that *νηλεής* could mean this, when used of Achilles, in Homer. But in Homer it could mean several other things besides, and by the end of the sixth century it must have become an archaism and have lost all sharp definition of meaning. Anacreon could certainly have found a more incisive word for stubborn; why did this astonishingly neat and careful writer here borrow a dead word from Homer? Surely there is only one possible explanation: that he was deliberately introducing a heroic overtone into the banter of the poem. The verses are a delicate mockery of the girl: Anacreon taunts her for her childish shyness, comparing her to a Thracian foal; but not to *any* Thracian foal—this one could figure in a heroic setting, it runs away *νηλεῶς*. The word may convey no precise meaning,¹ but its associations are powerful, and give a

¹ For another instance of a word losing its precision, compare *ραδινός*. This occurs once in Homer (*Ψ* 583) of a whip, in Sappho of a plant; and its root meaning is doubtless something like 'pliant'. But even in the

archaic period its vagaries are notable. Stesichorus (19 D) writes *ραδινούς δ' ἐπέπεμπον ἄκοντας*, Anacreon (165 B⁴) uses the word of horses, to mean 'swift', and Ibycus (58 B⁴) *ραδινούς* . . . *ἀντὶ τοῦ εὐμεγέθους λέγει*.

mock solemnity to the line. The girl is stubborn with the epic stubbornness of an Achilles. 'You *steadfastly* flee me' perhaps catches the delicately ironic intonation.

This suggestion seems to be confirmed by the rest of the line. Anacreon wants to say, 'You think I have no skill'.¹ But instead of saying, in the contemporary idiom, *δοκεῖς μ' οὐκ εἶναι σοφόν*, he uses the Homeric idiom *δοκεῖς μ' οὐδὲν εἰδέναι σοφόν* (cf. L.S.J., s.v. *εἶδω B. 1: 'frequent in Homer with neut. Adj. to express character or disposition', e.g. *ἄγρια οἶδε, ἄρτια ἤδη, φίλα εἰδότες*, etc.), and farther on in the poem he keeps up this mock-heroic tone with his portentous chariot-metaphor *ἀμφὶ τέρματα δρόμου*. Discreet allusions to Homer are his method of subtly underlining the raillery.

(b) fr. 5:

ἢ δ'—ἔστιν γὰρ ἀπ' εὐκτίτου
 Λέσβου—τὴν μὲν ἔμην κόμην—
 λευκὴ γὰρ—καταμέμεφται,
 πρὸς δ' ἄλλην τινὰ χάσκει.

In the preceding stanza of this poem each noun is artistically coupled with a colour-adjective and the two verbs placed together in the clausula—a miracle of neat construction. In the second stanza (quoted here) the composition is again vigorous and compact; but once more we are brought up short by the one word *εὐκτίτου*. It adds nothing to the sense, and looks simply like a piece of padding.

But then we observe that in four out of the seven cases in which Lesbos is mentioned in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* it is coupled with the epithet *εὐκτιμένη*. Now for Anacreon this form was metrically inconvenient: it could only have been accommodated in one central position in glyconics; but *εὐκτιτος*, also a Homeric word,² was easier, and was close enough to the original to make the allusion unmistakable.

It looks, then, as if *ἔστιν γὰρ ἀπ' εὐκτίτου Λέσβου* is a deliberate echo of Homer—for it is impossible to think that Anacreon, with his astonishing sense of style and within the rigorously constricted space of these tiny stanzas, did not choose his words deliberately. But why did he want a Homeric echo? The answer, again, is that he wished to introduce a note of mock-solemnity. What he had to convey was the fact that the girl was a Lesbian—in both senses of the word. One sense—what we should call the 'pejorative' sense—is conveyed by the gender of the pronoun in the last line, *πρὸς δ' ἄλλην τινὰ χάσκει*. The other, the literal one, ran the risk of sounding a trifle banal. So Anacreon, instead of saying simply, 'she comes from Lesbos', uses a more elevated phrase—as we might say, 'she *hails* from Lesbos'; by so doing he raises the girl for a moment out of her contemporary setting into a more dignified world. For a moment she assumes the proportions of a personage from heroic times, to whom one might ask the question, *τίς πόθεν εἰς ἀνδρῶν*; and attach more than a passing significance to the reply, 'I hail from finely-built Lesbos'.³

(c) fr. 51: *ἀσπίδα ῥῖψ' ἐς ποταμοῦ καλλιρόου προχοάς*.

Homer has *ποταμοῖο καλλιρόοιο* (ε 441) and *ἐς ποτάμου προχοάς* (ε 453). *ρίπτειν*

¹ I cannot agree with Wilamowitz and Diehl that *μ'* = *μοί*. The following lines must be understood as an answer to the imputation that he, Anacreon, is not sufficiently skilful. The point is made by B. Snell in *Philologus*, xcvi (1944), pp. 285 f.

² B 592 *εὐκτιτον Αἰπύ*.

³ Cf. Soph. *El.* 707 *ἐνατος Ἀθηνῶν τῶν θεοδμήτων ἀπο*. Here the whole passage—the list of competitors in the Pythian games—is tinged with epic vocabulary.

moreover implies something of a heroic effort. These Homerisms are in sharp contrast with Anacreon's usual style. What is the explanation?

There is no trace of any tendency in Anacreon to give straightforward descriptions of battles. This line must therefore be taken as a jest in the tradition of Archilochus (fr. 6) and Alcaeus (fr. 49), who preferred to throw away their shields and win immortality through the life of a poet rather than through the death of a hero. And how does Anacreon add salt to his jest? By the simple expedient we are beginning to recognize in his poems: he gives the line a mock-heroic tone by using a row of purely Homeric expressions.

This deliberate use of words for their epic associations is by no means confined to Anacreon, but is a recognizable feature of Greek poetry from the end of the sixth century onwards. There are numerous instances in tragedy. The word *μέροπες* was presumably no more comprehensible to Aeschylus than it is to us; yet this detracts nothing from its power when, in describing the mystery of the ways of god towards man, he writes the phrase (*Hik.* 90) *μερόπεςσι λαοῖς*: the sad heroic notion of the blind mortality of man resonates in this single adjective. Or consider the fine irony which Sophocles achieves with the phrase (*Ajax* 374 f.) *ἐν δ' ἐλίκεσσι βουσί καὶ κλυτοῖς πεσὼν αἰπολίοις*. Ajax's prowess is of heroic quality, to be described in epic terms, even when the exploit is only a demented attack on—a flock of sheep. These instances could be multiplied: the technique is established.

Whether it also appears earlier than Anacreon is a more delicate question, and the evidence is not decisive; but there is at least one passage in Archilochus which seems to exploit the associations of epic language in a similar way. Consider fr. 112:

τοῖος γὰρ φιλότῃτος ἔρως ὑπὸ καρδίῃν ἔλυσθεις
πολλὴν κατ' ἀχλὺν ὀμμάτων ἔχευεν
κλέψας ἐκ στηθέων ἀπαλὰς φρένας.

Each line has its prototype in Homer:

- (i) ι 433 *λασίην ὑπὸ γαστέρ' ἔλυσθεις* (of Odysseus under the ram);
- (ii) Υ 321 *κατ' ὀφθαλμῶν χέεν ἀχλὺν* (Poseidon's intervention against Achilles);
- (iii) Λ 115 *ἀπαλὸν τέ σφ' ἦτορ ἀπηύρα* (of a lion attacking a stag).

The verbal echoes are so close as to be unmistakable, but the difference in treatment is critical. In Homer the subjects of the phrases are Odysseus, Poseidon, and a lion; in Archilochus exactly the same actions are attributed to—an emotion! This is not merely a new and bold piece of psychological description: it is a piece of literary brilliance which depends for its effect on the adaptation of familiar Homeric phrases to a totally new situation.¹

By the end of the sixth century, therefore, and probably a great deal earlier, the lyric poets were fully conscious of the conventional associations of Homeric diction. Consequently it seems unlikely that they will have used purely ornamental Homeric epithets indiscriminately, and it is reasonable to think that some sort of poetic convention was responsible for the concentration of these apparent clichés in certain contexts. One such context (the narration of an epic

¹ Fr. 104 *χαλεπῇσι . . . δδύνῃσιν πεπαρμένους δι' ὀστέων* is a striking combination of the literal and figurative uses of *πείρω* in Homer, and might be added as a further

example. Archilochus' particular interest in Homeric words is discernible in 54, 56, 116 D, 186 B¹. See also Hauvette, *Archiloque*, pp. 269-72.

story) has already been sufficiently commented on. Another very noticeable one is the invocation of a god in a hymn. This observation is prompted particularly by Alcaeus' *Hymn to the Dioscuri* (78 D = B2 L.P.) which, in the short space of twelve lines, contains no less than six Homeric epithets ([*παῖδες ἱφθίμοι, εὐρηγὰν χθόνα, ὠκυπόδων ἐπ' ἵππων, εὐδογύων νάων, νῆϊ μελαίνα, ἀργαλέα νύκτι*) as against one more-or-less original epithet (*θανάτω ζακρυνέεντος*, cf. *φόβος κρυσέεις* in Homer). Now Alcaeus is the most careless of all the lyric poets in his use of Homeric epithets, and this poem in any case is not one of his best (Wilamowitz regarded it as frankly inferior to the 'Homeric hymn' to the Dioscuri); consequently the remarkable proportion of unoriginal to original epithets may simply be a piece of carelessness. But the incidence of *πάλων ὠκέων, Πωλυδεύκης κυδρός, Πάφον περιρρύταν*, and *Μῶσα λίγεια* in invocations of Alcman, of *αἰγιόχω* and *καλλίκομοι Μοῖσαι* in invocations of Sappho, of *παῖ μεγάλη Δίος* in another hymn of Alcaeus, and of *ἐλαφιβόλε ξανθή παῖ Διός* and *ἀγρίων θηρῶν* in an invocation of Anacreon, suggests that the proper solemnity required for addressing a god was achieved, as often as not, by a free use of Homeric epithets. This is not just a matter of the epithets applied to the divinities themselves. These, in lyric as elsewhere, are fairly stereotyped in any context,¹ and original coinages (such as Sappho's *βραδὶνὰ δι' Ἀφροδίτην*) are less common than traditional attributes. What is noticeable in the context of hymns is the prevalence of Homeric phrases in general: the substantives, whatever they are, tend to be qualified by conventional epithets. The analyses below will amply illustrate this; here it is merely worth adding that this concentration appears to be neither accidental nor confined to lyric poetry. The great prayer in the parodos of the *Oedipus Tyrannus* (151-215) contains, in the space of sixty lines, some ten expressions of a more-or-less conventional character. In the rest of the play there are barely any at all.²

Another area in which these phrases are common, particularly in the Lesbian poets, is the description of nature. The unusual poem of Alcman (fr. 58), describing the Sleep of Nature, has four of them in seven lines (*ὄρεων κορυφαί, μέλαινα γαῖα, ἐν βένθεσι πορφύρεας ἁλός, οἰωνῶν ταυπηπερύγων*) as well as several other Homerisms; and the vivid metaphor in fr. 59

*ῥίπας ὄρος ἀνθέον ὕλα
νυκτὸς μελαίνας στέρνον*

is built out of two common Homeric phrases. In Sappho descriptions of, or comparisons with, nature contain the following: *ὄδωρ ψυχρον, λειμῶν ἱππόβοτος, κάλοι ὠκεες στροῦθοι, πύκνα πτέρα*,³ *κάλαν σελάνναν . . . ἀργυρίαν, φέεινον εἶδος* (of the moon), *θάλασσαν ἀλμύραν, ἀνθέων ἐριθαλέων*. This concentration, again, can hardly be accidental, and it is not very difficult to suggest an explanation. The description of natural scenes demands considerable linguistic resources; it is not as simple as writing love poems or political verses and cries out for an elaborate poetic diction. Only one ready-made poetic diction was available to the lyric poets, that of Homer; and it is perhaps not surprising that they drew upon it more liberally than usual when faced with the task of describing the beauties of nature.

There are two more limited instances which it may be convenient (even

¹ I have therefore allowed a separate category for them in the analyses below.

² Soph. *Ant.* 1115 ff. is another example.

³ The context of these four is also that of a hymn. Here, as elsewhere, some overlapping of the categories is inevitable, but immaterial.

though the reasons for them are probably quite different) to regard as special cases of the description of nature. They concern the sea and the earth. First, the sea. In archaic poetry it is remarkably rare to find the sea referred to without either an elaborate periphrasis or an ornate adjectival phrase. In the whole Theognis collection, which is not unduly free with ornamental epithets, I know of only one instance where 'the sea' is mentioned without at least a qualifying adjective. Solon, a tidy writer, confronts us unexpectedly with *πόντου πολυκύμονος ἀτρυγέτου* (fr. 1. 19) and Archilochus twice fills half a line with Homeric arabesques: fr. 7. 3 *κατὰ κύμα πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης* and fr. 12. 1 *πολὴς ἁλὸς ἐν πελάγεσσιν*.¹ These instances are all from elegiac poems; but the tendency in lyrics is equally marked. The sea occurs twice in Alcman, with the phrases *πορφυρέας ἁλὸς* and *ἐπὶ κύματος ἄνθος*; it occurs twice also in Sappho, with *θάλασσαν ἐπ' ἁλμύραν* and *ἁλμυρον πόντον*; of the nine mentions of the sea in Alcaeus, six involve ornamental expressions; and none of the three instances in Anacreon is unadorned. Out of all these phrases only one shows any originality, Alcman's *ἐπὶ κύματος ἄνθος*: the rest are purely conventional. We can hope for no explanation of this strange phenomenon; but conventional descriptions of the sea seem to be an integral element in the poetic diction of the time, and we cannot assume that they produced a banal effect. We must simply accept this as a literary convention of the period.

The second case is in some ways even more mystifying: I mean the continual recurrence of the phrase *γῆ μέλαινα* (or, less frequently, *χθὼν μέλαινα*)—more mystifying because it is far from clear what the phrase means or why, already in Homer, it became a commonplace. The commonest application of the word *μέλας* in Homer is to *ships*—not, probably, because they were treated with black pitch² (for they were sometimes *μυλοπαρήγοι*) but because, from a distance, they *look* black. In the same way Apollonius Rhodius explains that Corcyra was called 'Black' (*Μέλαινα*) because, seen from the sea with its dark forests, it *looks* black (4. 567–9). And indeed Aristotle's account of blackness (*De coloribus*, c. 1) treats the word *μέλας* as if it simply denoted deep shadow. But this clearly will not help for *γῆ μέλαινα*. The Greeks did not always think of the land as seen from the sea, and if one is on land the landscape, particularly in Greece, appears anything but black. Perhaps, therefore, the colour of rich soil is intended by *μέλας*. This seems to suit phrases such as *μελὰν ἡ κειμένους ἐπὶ χθονί* (Arch. 58. 2) and especially the remarkable line in Theognis (878) . . . *ἐγὼ δὲ θανὼν γαῖα μέλαιν' ἔσομαι*. This application of *μέλας* (since the notion of 'pitch-black' is surely strange to the archaic period) can perhaps be justified by the sense of *opacity* which it has in connexion with water, whether ruffled by the wind (cf. *φριξ μέλαινα*) or deep and still (Theognis 959 *κρήνη μελάνδρος*—the water *before* it has been stirred up with mud).³ But if Sappho can write (27a D), 'Some say that a fleet of ships is the fairest thing on the *black earth*', she clearly cannot have been thinking of the *soil* when she used the expression *μέλαινα γαῖα*. I am inclined to think that there must at some stage have been some deep religious association behind the word,⁴ which was

¹ I cannot believe that in this verse *εὐπλοκάμον* also goes with *ἁλός*. The name of some divinity must have preceded.

² Hesych., s.v. *μέλαινα νῆες αἱ βαθεῖαι καὶ πισσόχριστοι*.

³ Cf. Suidas, s.v. *μελάνδρος· βαθεῖα· κυρίως δέ, καθάρου ὕδατος*.

⁴ There may be traces of this in the mythical and vague personage *Μέλαινα* (Paus. 10. 6. 4) who seems to have chthonic associations, and in the cult-title *μέλαινα Δημήτηρ* in Phigalaea (Paus. 8. 5. 8; 8. 42. 1). Cf. O. Gruppe, *Gr. Mythologie*, p. 103 n. 10, also Schol. Eur. *Or.* 1094, Callim., *fr.* 52 Pf.

doubtless forgotten even by the time of Homer, but which continued to make the adjective a regular concomitant of the word γῆ, even when the earth was personified as a goddess (Solon fr. 24. 4 f.):

μήτηρ μέγιστη δαιμόνων Ὀλυμπίων
ἄριστα γῆ μέλαινα . . .

But it is probably useless to probe further for an explanation; it is sufficient here to note that the phrase occurs so frequently in lyric poetry (particularly in Sappho) that it must once again be regarded as a proper element in the poetic diction of the time. By contrast it does not occur once in Aeschylus or Sophocles. They, perhaps, found it banal: the lyric poets evidently did not.¹

These three categories (heroic contexts, hymns, nature) will be found to absorb by far the greater part of the Homeric epithets in the lyric poetry I have chosen to examine, and those that remain over are relatively few. This remainder cannot usefully be discussed in general terms; nevertheless, before proceeding to the detailed analyses, there are a few individual cases to be considered and certain qualifications to be introduced which affect the compilation of the analyses and still further reduce the number of unexplained epithets.

(a) The German word *Lieblingswörter* is the most convenient label for the first qualification to be made. Every period in the history of poetry has certain favourite words of affection and appraisal which occur with the frequency of clichés but are yet such an integral part of the contemporary poetic idiom that it would be a mistake to regard them as trite or dead. 'Soote' in Chaucer, 'doux' in Ronsard, 'fair' in Elizabethan lyrics, are all instances of *Lieblingswörter* of the period; and Greek lyric is particularly rich in words of this kind. Mostly, however, they are words of a slightly sensuous connotation (ἄβρός, ἀπαλός, ἡμερόεις, etc.) and do not occur in the same contexts in Homer; moreover the fact that Homer uses ἐρατεινός and the lyric poets the slightly different (though metrically no more tractable) form ἐρατός (which only occurs once in Homer) indicates clearly that these *Lieblingswörter* were very much alive and were in no sense a loan from an already existing poetic vocabulary. In the main these words (ἄβρός, ἀγανός, ἐρατός, ἐρόεις, ἐφίμερος, ἡμερόεις, ἡμερτός, χαρίεις are the principal ones) either do not occur in Homer or are used there in a different way,² and consequently do not concern us; but it would be rash to conclude that there are no instances of words which are favourites both to Homer and to the lyric poets. I suspect that one instance of this is the word λιγυρός, which, together with the compound λιγύφωνος, accounts for four prima-facie clichés in Sappho and seems to have been her favourite word for characterizing sounds.

(b) Certain words for colour, pattern, material, etc. (e.g. ξανθός, πορφύρεος, ποικίλος, χρύσιος), occur rather frequently in both Homer and the lyric poets, and there is a temptation to rank them among the 'dead' expressions. But this would probably be a mistake. The visual sense of the lyric poets was strong, and the objects they describe are often rendered more vivid by these epithets. Moreover, words for colour and brilliance were a standard resource for adding lustre to a scene. When Alcaeus writes λάμπραι κυνίαι, or Alcman ποικίλος

¹ At least until the fifth century. Pindar (O. 9. 50) and Bacchylides (13. 153) each only use the phrase once, and τηλέφαντον κυανέας χθονός ἀστρον (Pindarfr. 33 b Sn.) looks like a conscious elaboration on it.

² Cf. Max Treu, 'Von Homer zur Lyrik' (*Zetemata*, xii [1955]), pp. 175 ff., for a valuable discussion of the lyric poets' use of these words.

δράκων παγχρύσιος, these poets are using words to a deliberate effect: it is easy to distinguish this from the degenerate use of lustre-words which can be observed in a purely conventional phrase like ἀγλαός ἦβη (Theognis 985). Particularly striking is the sensibility towards colour shown by Anacreon, who was fond of placing two or more contrasting colours in close apposition, e.g.

fr. 2 καὶ Νύμφαι κυανώπιδες
πορφυρέῃ τ' Ἀφροδίτῃ

fr. 5 σφαίρῃ δευτέρῃ με πορφυρέῃ²
βάλλων χρυσοκόμης Ἔρως
νήνι ποικιλοσαμβάλῳ

fr. 53 [Ἔρως] . . . μ' εἰδὼν γένειον
ὑποπόδιον χρυσοφαένων πτερυγίων ἀήταις
παραπέτεται.

In this last example the juxtaposition of colours is particularly forceful:³ 'greying cheek . . . gold-shining wings'; and in general this acute colour-sensibility accounts for a number of expressions which we might otherwise be tempted to regard as purely ornamental. When Anacreon writes of the 'dark-shielded Ialysians' (Ἰηλυσίους τοὺς κυανασπίδας fr. 15), of a girl 'with golden raiment' (χρυσόσπεπλε κούρῃ fr. 91), and of 'golden-helmeted Athene' (χρυσολόφου Παλλάδος Ox. Pap. 2321⁶) he clearly intended to convey vivid visual images. There is nothing conventional or banal about the language in which he did so.

(c) Anacreon, in fact, was a consummate stylist, and this may be the place to mention another of his characteristic devices. He is fond of building periods in such a way that each noun is attended by an adjective, forming a kind of syntactical symmetry through successive verses. The opening of fr. 5 (quoted above) is a good example; the following is another:

fr. 44 πολιοὶ μὲν ἡμῖν ἦδη κρόταφοι, κάρη τε λευκόν,
χαρίεσσα δ' οὐκέτ' ἦβη πάρα, γηράλεοι δ' ὀδόντες,
γλυκεροῦ δ' οὐκέτι πολλὸς βίοντος χρόνος λείλειπται.

Here each noun has its adjective. Four of the six—πολιοί, λευκόν, γηράλεοι, πολλός—are essential to the sense; but the remaining two, χαρίεσσα and γλυκεροῦ, are purely ornamental, and are, moreover, unoriginal loans from Homer. Yet their presence is justified—if justification is necessary—by the formal structure of the lines. Each of the two nouns *had* to have an attendant adjective; but the sense was already full, there was no room for a new idea, and a strongly original expression would have overloaded the period. These two slightly colourless words were all that the verses could take.

(d) It is impossible for us now to grasp the associations carried by the word ἱερός,

¹ This is probably not an indication of a particular colour so much as a suggestion of rich, varied colour in general, cf. Weber, *Anacreontea*, p. 65; L. Deroy in *Ét. classiques*, xvi (1948), pp. 3 ff. B. Marzullo even argues (*Maia*, 1950, pp. 132 ff.) that πορφύρεα is an old cult-title for Aphrodite meaning 'marina'.

² The ball of the Phaeacian dancers in θ 372 was πορφυρέῃ (= versicolor?), and this may also have been in Anacreon's mind. Eustathius, ad loc., says σεμνίνων (τὸ πορφυρέῃ) ἐπάγει: it is more the brilliance of the

ball than its colour which is suggested, the fact that it was coloured rather than its specific hue.

³ Aeschylus, it has long been believed (Schol. P.V. 128), learnt the ionic metre from Anacreon: did he also learn this trick with colours from the same poet? Cf. *Hik.* 529 f. λίμνα δ' ἔμβαλε πορφυροειδεῖ τὰν μελανόζυγ' ἄταν, *Eum.* 181 ff. μὴ καὶ λαβοῦσα πτηνὸν ἀργησιτὴν ὄφιν, | χρυσοχλάτου θώμιγγος ἐξορμώμενον, | ἀνῆς ὑπ' ἀλγούς μέλαν' ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ἀφρόν.

a favourite word of the lyric poets and one probably rich in meaning. When it does not mean ceremonially 'sacred' (as in *ἱρας ὁλολύγας* Alcaeus G2. 35 L.P., cf. *ὁλολυγμὸν ἱερὸν* A. Sept. 268) they use it mainly with some natural scene or object: e.g. *ἀλιπόρφυρος ἱαρὸς ὄρνις* Alc. 94, *ἱερὰς νυκτὸς* Stes. 6, *ᾠραν ἱρὰν ἀλκυόνος* Sim. 20—and they doubtless convey a good deal by it (for this use is post-Homeric). On the other hand, the word seems to have none of this power when used, as in Homer, of cities. Phrases like *Θήβας ἐξ ἱέρας* (Sappho 55. 6), *Ἰλιον ἱραν* (Alcaeus 74. 4), *Βαβύλωνος ἱρας* (Alcaeus 82. 10), *ἱερὰν ἀπ' Ἀθανᾶν* (Timocreon 1. 3, cf. Soph. *Aj.* 1221), have the ring of clichés, and I have listed them accordingly.

The principles by which the following analyses are composed should by now be clear. The first four categories in each correspond with the main points discussed in this article; all instances occurring in dactylic poems are placed together; and one or two special categories are added for individual poets where this seems justified by what has already been said. Square brackets indicate that the same instance has been listed under more than one category: some overlap is inevitable, and it is not always clear which of two possible categories is the correct one. The brackets are simply there to show my personal opinion and to prevent the phrase from being counted twice. A question mark indicates doubt about the text, the attribution, or the context. All references are to Diehl, unless qualified by B (= Bergk, *P.L.G.*⁴) or L.P. (= Lobel-Page, *Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta*). I have not normally thought it necessary to give references to lines within the fragments.

Archilochus

A. (i) *Heroic context*: None.

(ii) *Hymnodic*: None.

(iii) *Divinities*: *Ἄρεω μαιφόνου* (31), *παῖς ἐρικτύπου Διὸς* (51), *ἵππιος Ποσειδῶν* (117), *Δήμητρος ἀγνῆς* (119).

(iv) *Nature*: (a) *ἡ θὰ βαθὺς πόντος* (56), *θαλάσσης ἡχέεντα κύματα* (74).

(b) *μελαίνῃ ἐπὶ χθονί* (58).

(v) *Dactylic poems*: (12 in about 40 lines) *θαμειαὶ σφενδόνας, πολύστονον ἔργον* (cf. *Ἔρως* π. Α 73, etc.), *δεσπότην δουρικλυτοῖ* (3), *θοῆς νηός, οἶνον ἐρυθρόν* (5 A), *ἔντος ἀμώμητον* (cf. *ἀμύμονι τόξῳ* O 463) (6), *κῆδεα στονόεντα, πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης, ἀνηκέστοισι κακοῖσι* (7), *καθαροῖσιν ἐν εἵμασιν* (10), *ἐνπλοκάμου, πολυῆς ἄλδος ἐν πελάγεσσι, γλυκερόν νόστον* (12).

ἀνθρώποισι . . . θνητοῖς occurs in a deliberate paraphrase of Homer (68). It is difficult to know whether *λυσιμελής πόθος* (118) was a conventional expression by this time or not.

B. *Unexplained*: *νῆες θαλαῖ* (twice: 56 A, Pap. Ox. 2313³), *ὠκείῃσι νῆυσί* (Marmor Parium B I 35, v. *Philol.* xcix, 1955, pp. 4 ff.), *λαμψρὰ πτερά* (92 b), *Θρήκες ἀκρόκομοι* ([79 a]), *ἤβην ἀγλαήν* (Pap. Ox. 2310¹. 35).

Alcman

A. (i) *Heroic context*: *ποδώκη, κορυστάν, ἔξοχον ἡμιθέων, μέγαν* (1), *φαίδιμος Αἴας* (76), *δωρὶ ξυστῶ* (77), *Ὀδυσσῆος ταλασίφρονος* (80), *Ἑλλάδι βωτιανείρᾳ* (73).

(ii) *Hymnodic*: *πώλων ὠκέων, Πωλυδεύκης κυδρός* (2), *Πάφον περιρρύταν* (35).

- (iii) *Divinities*: Μῶσαι κροκόπεπλοι (34).
- (iv) *Nature*: οἰωνῶν ταυνοπτερύγων (58), ὄρος ἀνθέων ὕλα, νυκτὸς μελαίνας (59).
 - (a) The sea πορφυρέας ἁλός (58).
 - (b) μέλαινα γαῖα (58).
- (v) *Dactylic poem*: οἶά τε ποιμένες ἄνδρες ἔχουσιν (37).
- (vi) *?Lieblingswörter*: Μῶσα λίγεια (7), ἁ λίγεια Σηρήν (10).
- (vii) *Doubtful*: Ἀρέτα θειδῆς, ἁ καλλίσφυρος Ἀγνησιχόρα, ἵπποι παγὸν ἀεθλόφορον (a simile for Hagesichora) (1),¹ ?νηλεῆς ἀνάγκα (110), ?ἀγέρωχοι (122 B).²

B. *Unexplained*: εὐπύργω Σεράπνας (7), Σαρδίῳ ἀπ' ἀκρᾶν (13), πῦρ δάφιον (57).

Sappho

- A. (i) *Heroic context*: φίλων τοκήων (27a),]τοι βασιλῆες (28), fourteen in 55 (see above, pp. 209 f.), ἔσχατα γᾶς, βροδόπαχυν Αὔων (65 A).
- (ii) *Hymnodic*: ναῦον ἄγνον, [ῥῥωρ ψύχρον], [λείμων ἱππόβοτος] (2 L.P. = 5 D.), αἰγιόχω (86 L.P.), καλλίκομοι Μοῖσαι (90).
- (iii) *Divinities*: χρυσοστέφαν' Ἀφρόδιτα (9), [Πάον' ἐκάβολον 55], ἄγναι Χάριτες (103 L.P.), βροδοπάχυν ἄγναι Χάριτες (57), Χάριτες μάκαιραι (80), χρυσοπέδιλλος Αὔως (103 L.P.).
- (iv) *Nature*: κάλοι ὤκεες στρουθοί, πύκνα πτέρα (1), φάεινον εἶδος (cf. Θ 555) (4), βροδοδάκτυλος μήνα, θάλασσαν ἐπ' ἀλμύραν, πολυανθέμοις ἀρούραις (cf. πολυανθῆς § 353) (98).
 - (a) The sea [ἀλμυρον πόντον (55)], [θάλασσαν ἐπ' ἀλμύραν (98)].
 - (b) γᾶ μέλαινα (three times: 1. 10, 27a 2, (?) 31. 6).
- (v) *Dactylic poems*: ποίμενες ἄνδρες, χάμαι δέ τε πόρφυρον ἄνθος (117).
- (vi) *Lieblingswörter*: ἁ λυγύφανος (30 L.P.), λυγύραν χελύνναν (65 A), λυγύραν [ἀοῖ]δαν (103 L.P.), ὅπνος . . . γλύκυσ θέος (67), μέλος τι γλύκερον, λύνυραι δ' ἄη[(70), γλύκη μαῦτερ (114).
- (vii) *Stylistically accountable for*: ποίκιλος μάσλης³ (17), ξάνθα Ἑλένα εἰσκήν⁴ (35), ἀμαύρων νεκύνων (58), λωτίνοις δροσέοντας ὄχθοις Ἀχέροντος (97), χρυσίοισιν ἀνθέμοισιν (152). The unoriginality of the words does not detract from the visual effectiveness of these expressions.
- (viii) *Doubtful*: "Ερος ὁ λυσιμέλης (see under Archilochus vi) (137).

B. *Unexplained*: ὀνίαν λύγραν (25), ἀνθέων ἐριθαλέων (98 L.P.), μέγαν εἰς "Ολ[υμπον (27 L.P.).

Alcaeus

- A. (i) *Heroic context*: "Ιλιον ἴραν, ὄλβιον ξάνθαν ἐλάτ[ρα πώλων⁵ (74), Ἑλένας Ἀργείας, εὐστρωτον λέχος, ἐλίκωπες (N1, L.P.), νύμφαν ἐνναλίαν (76), [κατ οἶνοπα . . .] (Q1, L.P.), [μελαίνας χθόνος] (73).
- (ii) *Hymnodic*: παῖ μεγάλω Δίος (1),]μιοι παῖδες, εὐρην χθόνα, ὠκυπόδων

¹ It is possible that these heroic phrases are used of the girls deliberately, as in the passages of Anacreon discussed above, pp. 211 ff.

² Alcman and Alcaeus used this word differently, Eust. *Il.* 314. 41.

³ See above, p. 217.

⁴ ξανθός may have implied exceptional

beauty as well as colour: Eust. in *Il.* 432. 27 ἔπαινος δὲ κόμης παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς τὸ ξανθόν.

⁵ Alcaeus probably understood *Il.* 148-9 τῷ δὲ καὶ Αὐτομέδων ὑπαγε ζυγὸν ὠκέας ἵππους | Σάνθον καὶ Βαλίον, τὼ ἅμα πνοιῆσι πετέσθην as giving the colour, not the names, of Achilles' horses.

ἐπ' ἵππων, εὐδύγων νῶων, νῆϊ μελαίνα, ἀργαλέα ἐν νύκτι (78-79 = B 2, L.P.), ἀθανάτων μακάρων, εὐδελον τέμενος,¹ ἀργαλέας φύγας (G 1, L.P.).

- (iii) *Divinities*: εὐπέδιλλος Ἥρις, χρυσοκόμα Ζεφύρω (8), Δίος ἐξ αἰγίῳχω (11), ἀγναι Χάριτες (12), ?Μοῖσαν ἀγλα[(T 1. ii, L.P.)
- (iv) *Nature*:² εὐωδεσ[. . . γλ] αὔκαν ψύχρον ὕδωρ ἀμπελοεσσ[(F 1, L.P.), ἥρος ἀνθεμόεντος (98), cf. γᾶς ἀπὸ περράτων (135).
- (a) The sea ἄλμυρον πόντον (51), πορφυρίαν θάλασσαν (77), πολίας κῦμ' ἄλος (109/110, 27), κατ οἶνοπα . . . (Q 1, L.P.).
- (b) μελαίνα χθών (twice: 73, G 2. 29, L.P.).
- (v) *Stylistically accountable for*: Λεσβιάδες ἐλκεσίπεπλοι, ἄχω θεοπεσία (G 2. 32 ff., L.P.): that these two Homeric epithets were used deliberately is suggested by the presence in the same lines (which describe a ritual beauty contest) of the Homeric verb πωλεῖν and the tmesis περὶ δὲ βρέμει. But we can hardly guess at the reason.
- (vi) *Doubtful*: βλήχρων ἀνέμων³ (22), ἵτον μελιήδεα (35. 25), (probably used as a substantive, cf. 98) ἀγέρωχος⁴ (Z 79, L.P.), ἱραν ἐς πόλιν (? vel Ἱραν) (42).

B. *Unexplained*: ἵναν ἱραν (83), Βαβύλωνος ἱρας (82), νῆϊ μελαίνα (46 A), ὦκυ. . . [. . .] s nās (? ὠκυάλους) (H 28. 20 L.P.), δινάεντ' Ἀχέροντα (twice in 73), θυμοβόρω λύας (43), οἶνον λαθικάδεα (96).

Anacreon

A. (i) *Heroic context*: None.

- (ii) *Hymnodic*: Νύμφαι κυανώπιδες (2), ἐλαφιβόλε ξανθὴ παῖ Διός, ἀγρίων θηρῶν (1).
- (iii) *Divinities*: καλλίκομοι κοῦραι Διός (63).
- (iv) *Nature*: νεβρὸν νεοθηλέα γαλαθηνόν (39) (Homer uses γαλαθηνός and νεγηγής).
- (a) The sea πολὺν κύμα (17), κύμα πόντιον, ἰχθυόεν (Pap. Ox. 2321⁶), ? πόντον θύοντα πορφυρέοισι κύμασι (? Anacr. Pap. Ox. 2322¹. 17).
- (v) *Dactylic poems*⁵ (6 in 23 lines): πόλεμον δακρυόεντα, ἀγλαὰ δῶρα (96), πατρίδος αἶψα, ὑγρὰ κύματα (102), ἀγλαὸν κόσμον (107), δυσαχέος ἐκ πολέμοιο (111).
- (vi) *Stylistically accountable for*: εὐκτίτου Λέσβου (5—v. p. 213 above), ποταμοῦ καλλιρόου (51—v. pp. 213 f. above), χαρίεσσα ἥβη, γλυκεροῦ βιότον (44—v. p. 218 above).
- Colours: σφαίρη πορφυρέη (5), Ἱηλυσίους τοὺς κυανάσπιδας (15—cf. λεύκασπις X 294), ξανθὴ Εὐρυπύλη (16), χρυσόπεπλε κούρη (91),

¹ It is possible that a second substantive stood in v. 2 and went with εὐδελον. In Homer this adjective is used only of islands; but Alcaeus' use of it is not much more original for that. κυδαλίμαν θεόν, however, has a certain freshness (v. 6).

² Cf. also sub 'Incertum utrius auctoris' L.P.: ὦκυν αἰέτον (10), πῶας τέρεν ἄνθος (16).

³ M. Leumann, *Homerische Wörter*, p. 340, argues that this phrase derives from a mis-

division of ἀβλήχρων ἀνέμων in some passage of the Homeric poems now lost.

⁴ See above, p. 220, n. 2.

⁵ Out of conservatism, I attribute no more than the following elegiac fragments to Anacreon: 96-99, 101, 102, 107, 108, 110-12. Cf. Weber, pp. 31 ff., Wilamowitz, *S.u.S.*, p. 107, C. A. Trypanis in *C.Q.* xlv (1951), pp. 31 ff.

?μέλαιναν κόνιν (? Anacr. Pap. Ox. 2322¹. 6).

Ironical: τρύγα μελιθδέα (21).

B. *Unexplained*: ἰρὸν ἄστν (25), θάλειαν ἑορτήν (37), ? Ζηνὸς ὑπερεφής δόμος (? Anacr. 7).

Further exegesis is unnecessary. The number of conventional phrases which cannot be accommodated in these few and clearly defined categories is very small indeed—only in Alcaeus do they exceed five; so that, even if a substantial margin of error is allowed for (and I make no claim to rigorous objectivity) these analyses seem to sustain the conclusion that ornamental Homeric epithets were not used indiscriminately by the lyric poets. Those phrases which remain ‘unexplained’ either have overtones which we can no longer hear, or else are simply clichés, and the product of careless writing.

It may be useful, in conclusion, to compare these analyses with that of some poetry of which the date is uncertain. First, the Polycrates poem attributed to Ibycus (Pap. Ox. 1790=3 D). This, though it contains some eighteen unoriginal epithets in forty-two lines, shows no great statistical divergence from, say, a narrative passage in Bacchylides: the proportion of Homeric to non-Homeric epithets is again about 3 to 2. But the phrases themselves, which furnish this statistic, are somewhat peculiar. In the first place, there is a kind of *entassement* of conventional epithets which is unlike anything else in archaic Greek. For instance, Homer commonly writes *Πριάμοιο Δαρδανίδαο* and also *ἄστν μέγα Πριάμοιο*: here the poet runs the two together into *Δαρδανίδα Πριάμοιο μέγ’ ἄστν*, and then, not content with this, he adds *περικλεές* as an equivalent to Homer’s *περικλυτὸν ἄστν*, and throws in *δλβιον* for good measure. The resultant rigmarole, *Δαρδανίδα Πριάμοιο μέγ’ ἄστν περικλεές δλβιον*, has little to recommend it. Or again, Homer has both *μέγας Τελαμώνιος Αἴας* and *Τελαμώνιος ἄλκιμος Αἴας*: this poet rolls the two expressions into one with *μέγας Τελαμώνιος ἄλκιμος Αἴας*. In the second place, the phrases which are not borrowed directly from Homer are either trite or infelicitous. For triteness, consider (a) *δῆρην πολύμυμον ἔχοντες*: Homer has *δῆρην ἔχειν*, *πολύμυμος* occurs in H. Hom. 26. 7; while the phrase as a whole is simply a periphrasis for ‘fighting’, and is further amplified by *πόλεμον κατὰ δακρυόεντα*. (b) *ξεναπάταν Πάρν*: the word is already in Alcaeus (N 1. 5, L.P.), the notion a commonplace by the fifth century. For infelicity consider the only two phrases which are original, *ἀλώσιμον ἄμπαρ ἀνώνμυμον* and *ὑπεράφανον ἀρετήν*: both these contain ambiguities. *ἀνώνμυμος* normally means, not ‘unnameable’ (as here) but ‘unnamed’, i.e. unknown—a most undesirable overtone in this passage; and *ὑπεράφανος* is elsewhere always *pejorative* until Plato. It may have been permissible for the poet to press these words into new uses; but he can hardly have prevented the

¹ Anacreon fr. 21:

⟨δ⟩ Μεγιστῆς δ’ ὁ φιλόφρων δέκα δὴ μῆνες
ἐπέτε

στεφανοῦνται τε λύγω καὶ τρύγα πίνει μελι-
θδέα.

Cynulcus (Athen. 671 f) comments ὁ γὰρ τῆς λύγου στέφανος ἄτοπος—and indeed the question much exercised the grammarians. Hephaestion even wrote a book called *Περὶ τοῦ παρ’ Ανακρέοντι λυγίου στεφάνου*, and many learned theories were advanced to ex-

plain why Megistes wore such an ‘odd’ garland. But surely it is just as odd that he should have drunk τρύξ, which means either new, unfermented wine, or the dregs, the lees of wine; neither of which could be described as *μελιθδής*. There is one perfectly simple answer: Anacreon is *mocking* Megistes for wearing a rustic wreath (*τέναρος δὲ ἀγροίκων εἶναι λέγει στεφάνωμα τὴν λύγον* Athen. l.c.) and drinking cheap raw wine. *φιλόφρων* and *μελιθδής* are used with irony.

old meanings from being present to the hearers' minds. And in these passages the old meanings are disastrous.

The genuine poems of Ibycus are unfortunately too scanty to provide a reliable standard of comparison. However, one may observe that his adjectival phrases, though fulsome, are original: his description of nature in spring (fr. 6), for instance, contains no clichés. In the fragments with certainty attributed to him, the Homeric epithets are distributed as follows. Three qualify heroic personages: *λευκίππους κόρους* of the Molionidae (2), *γλανκώπιδα Κασσάνδραν* (16), and ? *ὀνομακλυτὸν Ὀρφην* (17); the simile of the horse (7) brings with it *σὺν ὄχεσφι θοοῖσ'* and *φερέζυγος ἵππος ἀεθλοφόρος* (cf. the similar phraseology in Alcman); and *ταυνοίπτερος* (9) and *τανύπτερος* (10) are used in descriptions of birds. That is to say, in about sixty lines there are altogether seven conventional epithets, most of which admit of stylistic explanation.

Corinna

It would be wrong to suggest that the thesis of this article provides any new criterion for deciding between the alternative dates proposed by Professor Page for Corinna—viz. the middle of the fifth century or the end of the third. Nevertheless it is worth observing that her diction is not only distinctly classical in the sense that (apart from four *ἄπαξ λεγόμενα*) it contains only five words which do not appear somewhere else in Greek literature by the end of the fifth century, but shows the same sort of discrimination in the use of Homeric epithets that characterizes archaic lyric. That is to say, if her language is in fact not archaic but archaizing, the work has been done by a singularly delicate and well-trained hand. The following analysis (in which allowances must be made for the particularly fragmentary nature of the material) follows the pattern of the others; and it should be noticed that the two discernible *Lieblingswörter* (*νίκαν ἑρατάν* (4), *λιγούραν Μουρτίδα* (15)) are also favourites of archaic lyric.

A. (i) *Heroic context*: ? *ὠκουπόρω* (5 A = PSI 1174); [*θάβαν*] *ἐπτάπουλον* (5 B).

(ii) *Hymnodic*: None.

(iii) *Divinities*: *ἀγκυλομείταο Κρόνω, μάκηρα ῥέα* (4), *Δεὺς βασιλεὺς, πόντω μέδων Ποσειδῶν* (5).

(iv) *Nature*: ? *Λάδοντος δονακοτρόφω*.

B. *Unexplained*: *λούπησι χαλεπήσι, λιττάδα πέτραν* (4), *καλλιχόρω χθονός* (18), ? *γῆαν εὐρού[χρονον]* (Pap. Ox. 2370¹. 8).

A. E. HARVEY

NOTES ON SOPHOCLES' *ANTIGONE*: CORRIGENDA

- p. 13: delete lines 5 and 6.
- p. 17, l. 18: after '3. 599-603:', insert 'the manuscripts have:'.
l. 22: for *κοπίς* read *κόνης*.
- p. 21, l. 24: for *βίον* read *χρόνον*.
- p. 22, l. 4: for *τοῦ χρόνου* read *τὸν χρόνον*.
l. 5: alter the genitives to accusatives.
- p. 23, five lines from the bottom: for '221 f.' read '22 f.'

HUGH LLOYD-JONES

¹ *C.Q.*, N.S. vii (1957), 12 f.

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